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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The complementarity regime created by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) marked a radical departure for international criminal justice. It represented a 
significant break with the Westphalian state system of national sovereignty and a step 
towards a regime of global governance based on the rule of law. The ICC is rooted in a 
Kantian notion of cosmopolitan justice where there is a need for a response to state 
failures to eliminate gross human rights violations. However, it has also been seen as a 
post-colonial court representing the hegemony of western justice and western authority 
over local traditions, particularly in the Islamic world. The operation of the operation of 
the complementarity regime does not reflect all types of juridical traditions and is 
therefore viewed with suspicion by nations with different criminal justice ideologies and 
policies.  
 
This thesis examines the practical and moral legitimacy of the complementarity regime 
of the ICC from two possible perspectives, both of which in their different ways support 
the idea of universal jurisdiction. Kant’s moral philosophy represents the western 
justification for the regime, whereas the tradition of Islamic Shari’a epitomises the 
potential resistance from the developing world. Through an analysis of the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion under the complementarity regime in relation to the Ituri region 
of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the Darfur situation in Sudan, the thesis 
examines both the logistics of the decision-making in these cases, as well as the moral 
justifications for intervention. The fieldwork included a six month programme of 
participant observation and interviewing in the Office of the ICC Prosecutor in The 
Hague.  
 
The ICC is an independent court with a global jurisdiction which grants the Prosecutor a 
broad discretion to apply the complementarity regime to meet the expectations of the 
entire international community, regardless of the status, national origin or state 
citizenship of the accused. This thesis argues that a careful consideration of the moral 
case for the exercise of authority under the complementarity regime is important and 
depends upon an understanding of the inherent differences between the Rome Statute and 
national justice systems. The research highlights the fact that moral obligations do not 
end at national borders. It asserts that a credible complementarity mechanism requires the 
effective prosecution of international crimes in a manner which is legitimate in terms of 
local culture and traditions. Otherwise, as the research demonstrates, the Court will enjoy 
little support, particularly as enforcement has so far focused only on Islamic or less 
developed countries. 
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 1 
Introduction  
 
The relationship between the nature of institutions and principles lies at the heart of a 
normative theory of justice. Major changes in the patterns of human interactions have 
challenged this complex relationship.1 Take into consideration the fact that there is a 
demand for morality ‘based on a common set of norms and values shared by the entire 
international community’2; it is argued that the creation of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) provides a moral duty to interfere in national jurisdictions to prosecute and 
punish violations of international core crimes. In the ICC, the Prosecutor is granted 
broad discretion in the initiation and conduct of criminal proceedings, such as the 
selection of the concrete cases for prosecution.3 However, as Knoops has stated, the 
legal-political foundation of prosecutorial discretion to initiate international criminal 
proceedings remains uncertain4 and the criteria upon which the Prosecutor’s discretion 
is based are complex.5 Furthermore, the prosecutorial decision-making process is based 
upon the assumption that the ICC presents ‘a universally recognized type of justice’.6 
However, it is important to take into consideration the cultural differences, such as 
traditional African justice7 and Sharia law, when the Prosecutor considers whether to 
proceed. As Stigen has noted, prosecutorial discretion is at the heart of the ICC 
complementarity regime and its purpose is to determine whether ICC interference is 
desired.8  
The goals of the ICC as outlined in the Preamble are the prosecution of the most 
serious international crimes and the ending of impunity for the perpetrators thereof.9 
Accordingly, Arsanjani writes, the Rome Statute was built on three principles.10 The 
                                                 
1
 Hayden, P. (2004). "Cosmopolitanism and the Need for Transnational Criminal Justice The Case of the 
International Criminal Court." Theoria: A Journal of  Social and Political Theory 51(2): 69-95. p.74. 
2
 Tibi, B. (1994). "Islamic Law/Shari'a, Human Rights, Universal Morality and International Relations." 
Human Rights Quarterly 16(2): 277-299. p. 277. 
3
 Ambos, K., L. Arbour, et al., Eds. (1998). The Prosecutor of a Permanent International Criminal Court: 
International Workshop in Co-operation with the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal 
Tribunals (ICTY and ICTR). Freiburg im Breisgau, Max-Planck-Institut. p. 210.  
4
 Knoops, G.-J. A. (2004). "Challenging the Legitimacy of Initiating Contemporary International 
Criminal Proceedings: Rethinking Prosecutorial Discretionary Powers from a Legal, Ethical and Political 
Perspective." Criminal Law Forum 15(2): 365-390. p. 366.  
5
 Statement by Justice Louise Arbour to the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, December 8, 1997, at 7-8. 
6
 Stigen, J. (2008). The Relationship between the International Criminal Court and National Jurisdictions: 
The Principle of Complementarity. Martinus, Nijhoff. p. 366.  
7
 Ibid., p. 365. 
8
 Ibid., p. 4. 
9
 Preamble of the Rome Statute, para 4.  
10
 Arsanjani, M. (1999). "The Rome Conference on an International Criminal Court: The Negotiating 
Process." The American Journal of International Law 93: 22-43. p. 24. 
 2 
first principle is that of complementarity which upholds the primacy of national courts 
over the ICC.11 This principle has been described as the cornerstone of the Rome 
Statute, without which the realization of a permanent ICC would not have been 
possible:12 it ‘permeates the entire structure and functioning of the Court’.13 In fact, as 
Evans has stated, whether or not the Court will succeed in its goals will depend on the 
Court’s interpretation of the complementarity provisions.14 The second principle 
confines the Court to dealing only with the most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community as a whole.15 The third principle is that the Statute should, to 
the extent that it is possible, remain within the realm of customary international law.16  
Therefore, complementarity is one of the founding principles of the Court and has 
been the subject of extensive academic commentary and debate.17 For instance,  
                                                 
11
 Ibid., 
12
 Williams, S. A. "Article 17: Issues of Admissibility", in 0. Triffterer, ed., Commentary on the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgeselischaft, 1999) pp. 390- 
392. 
13
 Benzing, M. (2003). "The Complementarity Regime of the International Criminal Court: International 
Criminal Justice between State Sovereignty and the Fight against Impunity." Max Planck Yearbook of 
United Nations Law 7: 591-632. p. 593. 
14
 Evans, R. D. (2005). Amnesties, Pardons And Complementarity: Does The International Criminal 
Court Have The Tools To End Impunity? The Human Rights Law Centre from 
www.nottingham.ac.uk/hrlc/documents/publications/hrlcommentary2005/amnestiespardonscomplementar
ity.pdf [accessed on 10th September 2011] 
15
 Arsanjani, Op, cit., p. 25 
16
 Ibid.,  
17
 See Stigen, Op, cit., Benzing, Op, cit.,  Newton, M. A. (2001). "Comparative Complementarity: 
Domestic Jurisdiction Consistent with The Rome Statute Of The International Criminal Court." 
Military Law Review 167: 20-73. ElZeidy, M. (2002). "The Principle of  Complementarity: A New 
Machinery to Implement International Criminal Law." Michigan Journal Of International Law 23: 869-
975. Guruk, J. (2002). "United States Opposition to the 1998 Rome Statute Establishing an 
International Criminal Court: Is the Court's Jurisdiction Truly Complementary to National Criminal 
Jurisdictions?" Cornell International Law Journal 35: 1-45. Holmes, J. T. (2002). Complementarity: 
National Courts vs. The ICC. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary A. 
Cassese, P. Gaeta and J. Jones. Oxford, Oxford University Press. Kleffner, J. K. (2003). "The Impact of 
Complementarity on National Implementation of Substantive International Criminal Law." Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 86(1): 86-113. Arsanjani, M. and M. Reisman (2005). "The Law-In-
Action of the International Criminal Court." American Journal of International Law 99: 385-405. 
Megret, F. (2005). "In Defense of Hybridity: Towards a Representational Theory of International 
Criminal Justice." Cornell International Law Journal 38: 725-751. Olasolo, H. (2005). The Triggering 
Procedure of the International Criminal Court. Martinus, Nijhoff. Yang, L. (2005). "On the Principle of 
Complementarity in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court." Chinese Journal of 
International Law 4(1): 121-132. Martin, J. B. (2006). "The International Criminal Court: Defining 
Complementarity and Divining Implications for the United States." Loyola University Chicago 
International Law Review 4(1): 107-133. Razesberger, F. (2006). The International Criminal Court: 
The Principle of Complementarity. Frankfurt am main, Peter Lang. ElZeidy, M. (2008). The Principle 
of Complementarity in International Criminal Law: Origin, Development and Practice Martinus, 
Nijhoff. Kleffner, J. K. (2008). Complementarity in the Rome Statute and National Criminal 
Jurisdictions. Oxford, Oxford University Press. Politi, M. and F. Gioia, Eds. (2008). The International 
Criminal Court and National Jurisdictions. Aldershot, Ashgate. Burke-White, W. W. and S. Kaplan 
(2009). "Shaping the Contours of Domestic Justice: The International Criminal Court and the 
Admissibility Challenge in the Ugandan Situation." Journal of International Criminal Justice 7(2): 257-
 3 
Jo Stigen has focused on several issues in relation to the complementarity regime, ‘by 
interpreting the relevant provisions of the Rome Statute and discussing them in a broad 
context’.18 He has analysed the procedures of the complementarity principle19 and legal 
issues regarding the relationship between the ICC and national jurisdictions.20 Although 
he has attempted to assess the policy and political considerations concerning Article 17, 
‘the focus of his interest lies in the realm of law, and not in that of policy.’21 Stigen has 
also aimed to answer the question of whether or when the ICC Prosecutor should 
interfere vis-à-vis national judicial systems.22 However, he has only focused on the 
interest of justice criterion in the prosecutorial decision-making process of selecting 
appropriate situations and cases.23  
Florian Razesberger has addressed the principle of complementarity as a new concept 
in international criminal law and critically analyzed the core provisions of the Rome 
Statute which deal with this principle. He has also examined different trigger 
mechanisms and stages of proceedings in which the Court deals with complementarity, 
such as the preliminary examination phase, the initiation of an investigation and 
challenges to the jurisdiction of the Court or the admissibility of a case.24 Razesberger 
has claimed that one of the functions of complementarity is to prevent politically 
motivated prosecutions and ‘minimize the factual political role of the Prosecutor’.25 
However, in this regard, he has analyzed only the relevant statutory provisions rather 
than delving into the origins of prosecutorial discretion based on the complementarity 
regime of the ICC.  
Another comprehensive work on complementarity has been carried out by Mohamed 
El Zeidy. In his 2008 study26, he explores the history of the notion of complementarity 
from the aftermath of WWI when proposals were submitted by official and non-official 
bodies to the League of Nations for the creation of an international criminal court.  
                                                                                                                                               
279. Greenawalt, A. K. A. (2009). "Complementarity in Crisis: Uganda, Alternative justice, and The 
International Criminal Court." Virginia Journal of International Law 50(1): 107-162. Stahn, C. and G. 
Sluiter, Eds. (2009). The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court. Martinus, Nijhoff.  
18
 Stigen, Op, cit., Preface at xi. 
19
 Ibid., Chapter 4 and 5  
20
 For further information refer to chapter 6 of Stigen’s Book 
21
 Hein, D. P. (2009). "Book review:Jo Stigen, The Relationship between the International Criminal Court 
and National Jurisdictions: The Principle of Complementarity." Journal of International Criminal Justice 
7(2): 439-444. p. 439. 
22
 Ibid., p.  440. 
23
 Stigen, Op, cit., Chapter 11 
24
 Razesberger, Op, cit., Chapter three broadly examines preliminary examination phase, etc.  
25
 Ibid., p. 28. 
26
 El Zeidy, Op, cit., 
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El Zeidy has also comprehensively analyzed the development of the doctrine of 
complementarity during the travaux preparatoires of the International Law Commission 
(ILC) in preparing the draft Statute of the ICC. Furthermore, he has widely examined 
the main provisions which govern the application of the complementarity principle, in 
particular addressing the practice of self-referral.27 He has argued that the Rome Statute 
constitutes two regimes, a regime of mandatory complementarity where a state is 
unwilling or unable to deal with a situation or a case within its domestic courts: and a 
regime of optional complementarity, which applies as a result of self-referral when a 
state consents to relinquish its jurisdiction in favour of the Court’s. Like Stigen, he has 
also observed the inactivity scenario and referred to the same conduct test in the 
Lubanga and Darfur decisions. He writes ‘it is a condition sine qua non for a case (…) 
that national proceedings encompass both the person and the conduct which is subject 
before the Court ‘.28 
Jaan Kleffner, along with other scholars, has clarified the formal framework of 
complementarity in the Rome Statute by interpreting the relevant provisions, which set 
forth the criteria for admissibility and the procedural aspects of their application. In 
doing so, he has considered the emergence of complementarity as a legal principle, as a 
criterion for admissibility, and the importance of this principle in the relationship 
between the ICC and national criminal jurisdictions. He has examined the procedural 
settings of complementarity and the obligations of states to exercise their jurisdiction 
over core crimes as it is declared in paragraph 6 of the Preamble of the Rome Statute. 
He has critically examined the notions of unwillingness and inability and suggested that 
a criterion of effectiveness of national proceedings should be used to ‘replace the terms 
unwillingness and inability.’29 He has argued that ‘complete inaction on the national 
level would thus allow the ICC to take up a case without having to enter into an 
assessment of the admissibility criteria in Article 17 (1) (a) to (c). The provisions on 
                                                 
27
 El Zeidy’s book, Chapters 3 and 4.  
28
 El Zeidy, Op, cit., p. 161. See also Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on the Prosecutor’s 
Application for a Warrant of Arrest, Art. 58, No. ICC-01/04-01/06-8-US-Corr, 10/02/2006, paras. 31-37. 
Unsealed pursuant to Decision ICC-01/04-01/06-37 dated 17/03/2006; Prosecutor v. Ahmad Muhammad 
Harun (Ahmad Harun) and Ali Muhammad Ali-Abd-Al Rahman (Ali Kushayb), Decision on the 
Prosecution Application under Article 58 (7) of the Statute, No. ICC-02/05-01/07-1-Corr, 27/04/2007, 
paras. 24-25. 
29
 Kleffner, Op, cit., Complementarity in the Rome Statute and National Criminal Jurisdictions, pp. 160-
161. 
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complementarity only apply once a state takes, at minimum, initial investigation 
steps’.30  
He has also addressed the question of self-referral, which he names ‘auto-referral’, 
and its tension with the formal framework of complementarity in general and the 
procedural setting of complementarity in particular.31 Kleffner briefly considers 
prosecutorial discretion and refers to the diversity of criminal justice systems. He states 
that, ‘the diversity between different criminal justice systems gives rise to varied 
procedures for the exercise of that discretion and different forms and degrees of checks 
and balance’.32 In addition, he claims that the ‘complexity of a discussion of 
prosecutorial discretion increases due to the fact that ICC crimes may be subject to 
different branches of a state’s criminal justice system, for instance civil and military, 
which in turn may differ as far as investigative and prosecutorial discretion is 
concerned’.33 Kleffner has attempted to establish grounds for the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion during proceedings, providing two potential justifications: a 
lack of evidence and political expediency. He has mainly examined these issues from 
the point of view of competent national authorities, whether they are entitled ‘to 
abandon an ongoing investigation for lack of evidence or for policy considerations, a 
lack of public interest.’34 He has claimed that the discretionary power of these 
authorities to decline initiation of an investigation when one or more ICC crimes may 
have been committed is incompatible with the requirements imposed by Article 17 of 
the Rome Statute.35 Finally, Kleffner has looked at the legitimacy of complementarity 
by focusing on the consent of states to the Rome Statute and the legitimacy with which 
complementarity safeguards state sovereignty.36  
At the heart of the ICC is the principle of complementarity under which national 
courts have become significant fora for prosecuting international crimes. In contrast to 
the primacy over national courts of the two ad hoc tribunals, the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR), the complementarity regime of the ICC precludes admissibility under the 
special circumstances set forth in Articles 17-20 of the Rome Statute. The 
                                                 
30
 Ibid., p. 120. 
31
 Ibid., p. 237  
32
 Ibid., p. 284.  
33
 Ibid., 
34
 Ibid., p. 287.  
35
 Ibid., p. 285.  
36
 Ibid., p. 342.  
 6 
complementarity principle empowers states to become more effective at investigating 
and prosecuting cases of international crimes through the good faith application of 
domestic criminal process and strong jurisdictional connection with cases.  Therefore,  
an examination of the ad hoc international criminal tribunals is beyond the scope of this 
thesis which instead focuses on the uniqueness of the ICC in order to examine the 
practical and moral legitimacy of its complementarity regime and how the Court should 
ensure that national court systems have the capacity to provide local justice for 
international crimes. It is worth mentioning here that the Rome Statute defines the 
question of complementarity as pertaining to the admissibility of a case rather than to 
the jurisdiction of the Court. The issues of admissibility and jurisdiction have to be 
distinguished.37 The Court cannot exercise the jurisdiction that it has if a case is 
inadmissible.38 The principle of complementarity does not affect the existence of the 
jurisdiction of the Court but it regulates when the Court may exercise this jurisdiction,39 
as illustrated in the following graph (from Stigen, p. 3). 
 
Jurisdiction              Admissibility    Prosecutorial 
Discretion  
        
 
As a jurisdictional precondition, the situation within which the alleged crime was 
committed may refer to the Court through one of the trigger mechanisms. The 
Prosecutor then has the power to consider the admissibility of the case to determine 
whether to initiate an investigation.40 In other words, ‘the procedural aspect of 
complementarity is embodied in the regime of admissibility to which all cases are 
subject’, and ‘it refers to the policy choices made in deciding what kinds of cases’ 
should be heard at the ICC rather than national courts.41 Therefore, even where states or 
the Security Council refers situations, the Prosecutor must make an independent 
                                                 
37
 Benzing, Op, cit., p. 594.  
38
 Holmes, Op, cit., p. 627. 
39
 Benzing, Op, cit.,  
40
 Benvenuti, P. (1999). Complementarity of the International Criminal Court to National Criminal 
Jurisdiction. Essays on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. W. Schabas and F. Lattanzi. 
Fagnano Alto, il Sirente 1. p. 42.  
41
 Sadat, L. N. and S. R. Carden (2000). "The New International Criminal Court: An Uneasy Revolution." 
The Georgetown Law Journal 88: 380-474. pp. 383 - 414. 
Articles 
5-8, 11, 12, 
13, 16 and 
26 
Articles 
17-20 
 
Article 
53 (1) (c) 
and (2)(c) 
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assessment on jurisdiction and the admissibility criteria, namely the complementarity 
principle.42  
This research does not purport to describe conclusively the complementarity regime in 
all its substantive and procedural aspects, but rather seeks to focus on the role of the 
ICC Prosecutor as a primary guardian of the complementarity regime of the ICC in 
exercising his or her power to initiate investigations and prosecutions. There are limits 
on how many perpetrators can be prosecuted by the ICC, and this raises an important 
question as to how to determine the division of labour between the ICC and domestic 
jurisdictions. This largely depends on how the complementarity regime will develop in 
practice in relation to the impunity gap - large numbers of perpetrators of genocide, 
crimes against humanity, and war crimes do not appear before a domestic court or 
international tribunal.43  
The main contribution of this study is its emphasis on the importance of ethics and 
rationality in the prosecutorial decision-making process in order to close the impunity 
gaps both at the international and at the national level. Since the complementarity 
regime has a global reach, I have tried to assess it in terms of normative principles from 
both the developed and the developing world. I have therefore chosen both a Western 
and an Islamic perspective to demonstrate how an independent prosecutor could be 
capable of holding any person accountable for committing crimes of universal concern 
regardless of their power or position. Hitherto, there has been little attempt, if any, to 
critically analyse the discretionary power of the prosecutor from a socio-legal 
perspective and to address the important political and moral dimension of the exercise 
of prosecutorial discretion at the ICC. There are two main factors that significantly 
influenced me to pursue my doctoral research on the complementarity regime of the 
ICC. On the one hand, coming from a country with an Islamic system gave me strong 
motivation to explore the triggering procedure of the ICC, since the Rome Statute does 
not include the Islamic legal system as one of the legal traditions of the world. In 
addition, I was interested in the controversial arguments regarding the mixed approach 
on prosecutorial discretion negotiated during the Preparatory Committee on the 
establishment of the ICC by participants from different legal backgrounds. They 
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reached the conclusion that broad discretion should be granted to the Prosecutor to 
initiate and conduct criminal proceedings. However, the exercise of discretion by the 
Prosecutor has been criticized by a number of scholars and Non Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs), such as the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) 
and Human Rights Watch, on the basis of a lack of clarity in the ICC Statute and an 
ambiguous procedural system. Among scholars, Goldston has criticized prosecutorial 
discretion in relation to the failure of the Prosecutor to bring charges against one side in 
a conflict (e.g. in Democratic Republic of Congo), and out side of a particular region 
(e.g. beyond Africa).44 Furthermore, the Prosecutor has also been criticized for those he 
has brought to the Court (e.g. in DRC and Darfur). 
My work centres around three key research questions. It will examine how the 
complementarity procedures work in the DRC and Darfur situations, which were 
referred to the ICC Prosecutor. More specifically, the central question is how does 
prosecutorial discretion in these selected case studies affect the legitimacy and 
credibility of the Court? It will ask whether the exercise of a complementarity decision 
is ethically justified and, finally, what reforms may be needed in terms of norms or 
guidelines within the Prosecutor’s strategies.  
 
Appropriate prosecutorial policy: 
Despite the significant guidance in the Rome Statute and the Rules of Procedure that 
seeks a balance between complementarity and the effectiveness of the ICC, there are 
some important gaps and unresolved questions that could undermine the actual practice 
of the ICC regarding the principle of complementarity. Newton has argued that if the 
ICC and its Prosecutor ‘do not adhere to provisions for respecting the complementarity 
principle; the political backlash could eviscerate the ICC as a functioning institution 
with international credibility and support.’45 He has further claimed that 
complementarity is ‘an intellectually simple concept that masks the deep philosophical 
and political difficulties that the International Criminal Court’ faces.46 Complementarity 
is in theory an impartial, reliable, and de-politicized process for identifying the cases of 
international concern, and hence international jurisdiction. However, ‘the thicket of 
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subjective provisions designed to implement complementarity allows treaty opponents 
to argue that national justice systems are threatened with displacement at the hands of 
an unrestrained international prosecutor.’47 For instance, in theory, complementarity 
would require the ICC to recognize the discretion of the domestic authorities regarding 
the scope and form of the domestic charges. In reality, complementarity ‘may be an 
incomplete restraint on a zealous ICC prosecutor, motivated by a strong awareness of 
moral and legal obligations to serve the needs of international accountability, who could 
use the form of domestic charges as a pretext to exert ICC authority.’48  
Although the principle of complementarity is intended to offer states and the 
international community a possible way out when the absence of trial or punishment for 
international crimes would be unacceptable, it should not, however, be analysed only in 
the light of the provisions of the ICC Statute. Each national context must be taken into 
account, as it will influence the state’s ability to exercise its jurisdiction over 
international crimes. This implies an analysis of national criminal justice systems to 
evaluate their ability to assert jurisdiction.49 Without going into detail, it can logically 
be assumed that the inherent differences between legal systems will influence the way 
in which the principle of complementarity will be implemented. It will, therefore, not be 
uniformly applied. This must be acknowledged as a normal interaction between the 
international and national legal systems and taken into consideration.50 In this context, 
even if international crimes are defined in the same way at the international and national 
level, differences in criminal procedure and admissibility of evidence may lead to 
divergences of application. For instance, if one person is accused of an international 
crime but insufficient evidence is gathered or the rules for a fair trial are not met, 
national judges may be reluctant to or refuse to prosecute the accused. They would 
comply with their national judicial framework, but not necessarily with the international 
requirement.51 An important question that may be raised here is: would the ICC accept 
such a situation, or would it initiate proceedings on grounds of unwillingness or 
inability to prosecute those accused of international crimes?  
Wessel has claimed that Article 17 leaves open the crucial question of whether mere 
intent by the state to protect an individual from the Court’s jurisdiction is enough, 
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standing alone, to revoke complementarity even where the state has done nothing 
objectively wrong.52 Some scholars, such as Delmont and Kovacs, have observed the 
ambiguity of the complementarity regime and claimed that this ambiguity ‘invites both 
judicial gap-filling and activism.’53 The complementarity regime is designed to find a 
balance between the sovereign right of all states to exercise criminal jurisdiction over 
acts within their jurisdiction,54 and the effective prosecution of international crimes of 
concern to the international community as a whole.55 However, the effective 
prosecution of international crimes depends on action at the national level on the one 
hand,56 and for the Prosecutor to monitor the situation in states with a view to 
identifying possible situations in which the goals of the Statute are in danger of being 
disregarded on the other.57 In essence, alongside the concept of state sovereignty, the 
interest of the international community in the effective prosecution of international 
crimes58 is important to put an end to impunity, which falls in the process of analysis 
and decision-making of the Prosecutor.  
Perhaps the most important challenge facing the Prosecutor is determining which 
crimes to select for a preliminary examination proprio motu pursuant to Article 15 (1) 
and (2) of the Rome Statute, for an investigation pursuant to Article 15 (3), and for 
investigations based on referrals by the Security Council pursuant to Article 13 (b), or 
by a state party pursuant to Articles 13 (a) and 14.59 Although there will be significant 
differences between a preliminary examination and an investigation, the decision as to 
whether to conduct a preliminary examination or an investigation will usually involve 
most of the same considerations and the Prosecutor needs the same guidelines for both. 
In addition, although there will be a number of important differences between 
investigations based on what triggers them, as Rule 48 makes clear, in determining 
whether there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation under Article 15 (3), 
the Prosecutor shall consider the factors in Article 53 (1) (a) to (c), which apply to state 
or Security Council referrals.60 In determining which crimes should be preliminarily 
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examined or investigated, and in deciding which crimes and individuals should be 
prosecuted, the Prosecutor should consider what the role of national criminal justice 
systems will be in dealing with the crimes that are not investigated or prosecuted at the 
international level.61 Although the Prosecutor will not be able to investigate and 
prosecute every crime within the Court’s jurisdiction, the Prosecutor’s investigation and 
prosecution strategy should be seen as part of a global partnership in building and 
operating a new framework of international justice between the Court and national 
courts.62 In other words, the Prosecutor should have both global and situational anti-
impunity complementarity strategies, designed to encourage efforts to bring all persons 
responsible for crimes under international law to justice.63 Neither the Statute nor its 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE) provide much guidance for the Prosecutor in 
deciding whether or not to initiate an investigation and to proceed with a prosecution. 
Thus the Prosecutor is faced with making certain difficult choices, among which are 
whether to prosecute the greatest number of perpetrators or whether to try to the highest 
possible standards in prosecutions.64 As Roper has suggested, the coercive powers of 
the state in domestic criminal justice systems should not be ‘extrapolated to 
international criminal proceedings’.65 Many of the tools available to prosecutors in 
domestic criminal justice systems, such as subpoenas, are not available in an 
international criminal context.66 In fact, the national institutions may be in a better 
position to conduct the investigations due to their closer access to the facts and their 
context of meaning, their knowledge of the language and the society, and the available 
resources.67 In deciding the appropriate guidelines for determining when the Prosecutor 
will conduct preliminary examinations or investigations of crimes, the Prosecutor needs 
to have clear ideas about the desired caseload in terms of numbers of crimes, numbers 
of suspects and accused, and the locations where the crimes occur that he or she wants 
to investigate each year. Once these difficult decisions are made about desired 
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outcomes, various types of guidelines can be developed for deciding when to conduct 
preliminary examinations or investigations.68  
Several commentators have advocated a guidelines-based approach to constraining 
prosecutorial discretion. For example, as participants in a process of expert 
consultations organized by the ICC Prosecutor, Avril McDonald and Roelof Haveman 
urged the Prosecutor to ‘objectify’ the use of prosecutorial discretion, arguing that ‘it is 
of vital importance that guidelines are developed - and made public - giving direction to 
the decision either [to initiate] or not to initiate an investigation. ‘Vital’, as the danger 
looms large that the court is accused of starting investigations on entirely arbitrary 
grounds, and even based on political considerations.’69 Allison Danner has also argued 
that prosecutorial guidelines rooted in ‘good process’ may ‘enhance’ the legitimacy of 
the Prosecutor. She suggests a regulated system of prosecutorial policy based on 
publicly promulgated guidelines developed by the Prosecutor and approved eventually 
by a vote of the Assembly of States Parties. This approach, argues Danner, will enhance 
legitimacy by rooting the Prosecutor’s decision-making in neutral ex ante criteria that 
‘provid[e] for a transparent standard that the Prosecutor will consistently apply.’70 
Having said that the guidelines represent an effort to facilitate transparent decision-
making,71 these guidelines will also ensure that the prosecutor makes his or her 
decisions on principled, impartial bases and assist in the public understanding that he or 
she is, in fact, making decisions in this way.72 Clearly, if the Prosecutor declines to 
promulgate such guidelines, he or she risks the credibility and public legitimacy that are 
important in the success of the Court.73  
Furthermore, it is necessary to decide what the applicable criteria for guiding these 
choices are. What are the types of discretion that the prosecutor can exercise: legal, 
political, ethical/moral, practical/pragmatic, and how should the Prosecutor exercise this 
discretion? In order to answer these questions, it is critical to consider the moral 
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dimension of prosecutorial discretion as the basis on which the legitimacy of the ICC 
depends.  
 
Organization of the Thesis 
The thesis has been organized into eight chapters. Chapter Two, following this 
introductory chapter, will provide the philosophical underpinning of the thesis from a 
normative approach in order to examine the legitimacy of the existing prosecutorial 
decision-making process. It is worth mentioning here that as my thesis is not a 
philosophical one, it does not delve deeply into philosophical debates about the origins 
of morality. In addition, it will not analyse the legitimacy of the ICC from a 
conventional and jurisprudential point of view. Given that legitimacy is the fundamental 
question of my thesis, the following page will establish a background for the work that 
follows.  
Clearly, the drafters of an international criminal court intended to create a system of 
global justice that would be justifiable to the whole world to complement national 
jurisdictions. Therefore, the establishment of the ICC as a permanent international 
criminal court is an enormous achievement attempting to bring alleged perpetrators to 
justice for the most serious crimes against humanity around the world. However, an 
important question has to be answered as to how the ICC can justify its intervention in 
domestic jurisdictions to proceed. Crucially, the ICC has to be legitimate not only in the 
West but for the whole world, including Islamic jurisdictions. In fact, the support of the 
entire international community is essential for a credible complementarity mechanism to 
make proceedings more accessible for affected communities, with a view to ending the 
impunity gap for serious crimes. The philosophy chapter will elaborate two possible 
ethical perspectives that may satisfy the moral obligations of the ICC. It will explain 
why Kant’s moral philosophy and Islamic law have been chosen to frame this thesis.  
Whereas the Western, Kantian approach is based upon reason, morality and ethics in 
Islam are derived from divine law. However, although these approaches contrast with 
each other and deal with ethics in different ways, the focal point of both perspectives is 
their aim to reach a universal law. The extent to which Islamic law is compatible with 
modern international law has already been studied by scholars such as Nassar74 and An-
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Naim.75 As Nassar has correctly observed, to answer the question of whether there is an 
international duty to prosecute, a basic issue of coexistence has to be considered.76 At 
the Rome Conference, in July 1998, seven countries voted against the creation of the 
ICC. Of these seven ‘four were countries with predominantly Muslim populations 
purporting to apply at least some measures of Islamic law’.77 
Little attention has been focused on why the Court has enjoyed no support from 
Islamic states, particularly in Africa and the Middle East. Moreover, consideration of 
moral obligations whether derived from Islam or not seem to play an important role in 
the legitimacy of the Court. From the Quranic point of view regarding Muslim Ummah 
(society), the norms of Islamic law are global and should be applied equally to the 
whole world.78 As will be examined later in this study, the solution for the two 
competing systems at the international level is to accommodate both sides. 
The right to hold individuals responsible and accountable towards international 
humanitarianism is a part of the cosmopolitan ideology. The advanced technology 
available to the international community enables it to look into events within state 
territories. Bharadwaj has claimed that ‘the spatial reach of the international community 
is leading towards the construction of an international moral solidarity against 
infringement of individual rights.’79 Concannon has suggested that international 
prosecutions are only one tool in the struggle for accountability and should be used as a 
backup to national prosecutions’.80 As has been highlighted in the Rome Statute, 
‘national prosecutions should remain the primary option…because they can handle 
many more cases and are usually preferable from the perspectives of victims and local 
justice systems’.81 As such, the Court’s mandate limits it to ‘the most serious crimes of 
concern to the international community as a whole’, 82 as international courts can only 
prosecute a small fraction of the large-scale human rights violations that occur.83 The 
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national courts can try many more cases than the ICC ever could, and it is generally 
better for the victim’s community and for developing national systems.84 
In this context, having said that international prosecution can be seen as an 
extraordinary mechanism, critical thinking on moral and ethical parameters for initiating 
international proceedings in general is still needed in order to establish legality and 
legitimacy.85 The legal-ethical and political foundation of the ICC is important for the 
moral justifiability of international criminal prosecutions and for ‘restricting 
arbitrariness vis-à-vis prosecutorial discretion.’86 As Megret has written, the ethical 
standards of the profession seem essential to safeguarding the legitimacy of 
international criminal justice.87 Although there is no universal codified judicial and 
prosecutorial ethics and morality, there is nevertheless an inescapable ongoing process. 
With the greater significance of their role in society, the importance of the codification 
of professional deontology also increases.88 Therefore, as DeGuzman has noted, the 
Court’s normative legitimacy is an intrinsically important question and its sociological 
legitimacy is a critical component of its effectiveness.89  
In Chapter Three, I will be looking at the conceptual framework of the prosecutorial 
policy at the ICC. Having said that the Prosecutor has been granted a broad discretion 
with potentially global reach, this chapter will examine how important the position of 
the Prosecutor is in terms of the complementarity principle, which obliges the 
Prosecutor to defer to national legal systems and guides his or her work. The emphasis 
will be on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in answering difficult questions such 
as what situations should be investigated and who should be prosecuted, which are 
crucial to designing a prosecutorial strategy based on the global nature of the ICC. The 
chapter will also analyse prosecutorial guideline at the ICC since it is important to 
consider whether his or her decisions will be taken in a rational and consistent way.  
Chapter Four will provide some context to the Darfur conflict, which was referred to 
the Prosecutor by the Security Council. In particular, I will be looking at the legal and 
                                                 
84
 Ibid., p. 248.  
85
 Knoops, G.-J. A. (2004). "Challenging the Legitimacy of Initiating Contemporary International 
Criminal Proceedings: Rethinking Prosecutorial Discretionary Powers from a Legal, Ethical and Political 
Perspective." Criminal Law Forum 15(2): 365-390. p. 366.  
86
 Ibid.,  
87
 Megret, F. (2008). "International Prosecutors: Accountability and Ethics." from  
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1313691 [accessed on 10 September 2011] 
88
 Ibid.,  
89
 DeGuzman, M. M. (2009). "Gravity and the Legitimacy of the International Criminal Court." Fordham 
International Law Journal 32(5): 1400-1436. p. 1436. 
 16 
political developments of the Sudanese criminal justice system and will explore how 
Islamization has been used as a weapon of political power. The chapter will observe the 
operation of various mechanisms and committees, such as special courts, which were 
established by the Government of Sudan in order to satisfy the criteria of the 
complementarity test and handle prosecutions domestically, as well looking at the 
failure of Sudan to engage with its international obligations regarding international 
crimes under the Rome Statute. Finally, it will set the scene for the next chapter by 
considering whether Sudanese criminal procedures are adequate in terms of Article 17 
of the Rome Statute. 
Chapter Five will evaluate the prosecutorial decision-making process in the Darfur 
situation. I will start by exploring the extent to which the Prosecutor is bound by the 
findings of the Security Council’s investigation, and whether the admissibility criteria 
will still apply for this type of trigger mechanism. The chapter will mainly deal with the 
legitimacy of prosecutorial strategy in Darfur in terms of whether it is truly committed 
to ending the impunity gap. In doing so, I will look at the decision-making process in 
terms of the admissibility of the situation and cases by reviewing the Prosecutor’s 
reports to the Security Council and quoting interview statements to demonstrate the 
vagueness of prosecutorial strategy in order in assessing the situation and, more 
importantly, in selecting specific cases. Given that the on-going insecurities in Darfur 
halted inside investigation in Darfur even by national judicial bodies, this chapter will 
examine how the prosecutorial discretion can be exercised to determine whether or not 
selected cases are the subject of genuine national investigation or prosecution. 
Additionally, the Pre-Trial Chamber decisions will be critically examined to highlight 
the performance of the Prosecutor in applying the complementarity principle, which 
started with cases of government involvement in the conflict.  
Chapter Six and seven take other examples of the practical application of the 
complementarity principle in the DRC. I should note here that although the two case 
studies presented in this thesis, Darfur and DRC, were referred to the Prosecutor 
through different trigger mechanisms, I will follow a similar structure to the Darfur 
chapters in considering the prosecutorial decision-making process in the DRC, 
particularly the potential abuse of prosecutorial discretion. Chapter Six will look at the 
very complicated conflict in the Ituri region of the DRC with the presence of various 
armed groups - governmental, rebel, national and foreign - who participated in the 
conflict and committed widespread human rights crimes. Due to the massive incidence 
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of human rights atrocities in the DRC, the Security Council established a UN 
peacekeeping mission there (United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo – MONUC 90) given authority under Chapter VII, and the largest 
peacekeeping mission in the world. This chapter will further examine the development 
of the Congolese criminal justice system, in particular the military justice reform and 
the operation of the justice system in the DRC. In addition, it will attempt an overall 
evaluation of the adequacy of the Congolese criminal justice system in light of Article 
17 of the Rome Statute. It will also consider the Prosecutor’s discretion in indicating the 
Ituri region as the first priority.  
Chapter Seven will explore the exercise of the discretionary power of the Prosecutor 
in the DRC. I will start by analysing the legitimacy of self-referral in order to pave the 
way for examining the DRC referral to the Prosecutor. I will further discuss the 
admissibility test for this type of referral and will argue that the practice of self-referral 
could result in political abuse of the ICC by the referring state. The chapter will trace 
how the decision regarding the admissibility of the situation and cases was made by the 
Prosecutor and will critically examine the selected DRC cases, which are selected from 
rebel groups, to evaluate the legitimacy of prosecutorial discretion in this situation 
where domestic criminal justice was able to proceed.  
Chapter Eight is the conclusion, in which I will recommend on the one hand the need 
for a code of prosecutorial ethics and normative standards, and on the other the need for 
sensitivity to different legal traditions in prosecutorial decisions. The ICC Prosecutor 
should actively work at building trust and building the moral legitimacy of the Court, 
particularly in the eyes of people in Africa and Islamic countries, in order to bring 
perpetrators to justice.   
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Chapter Two: The Normative Basis of the Complementarity 
Regime of the ICC 
 
 
Introduction: 
 
The failure of many states to protect the rights of the individual has necessitated the 
transfer of sovereignty to another entity. This failure is seen in the extensive number of 
humanitarian law violations that have gone unpunished.1 Normative political theory 
provides the appropriate framing of the relationship between the nature of the 
institutions and the principles of justice (the balance between law and morality). Major 
changes in the patterns of human interactions have challenged this complex 
relationship, particularly in the last decade of the 20th century.2 As Michael Ignatieff has 
observed, these changes and events alert us to ‘the needs of strangers.’3 Since the start 
of the new century, as Tibi has argued, there has been a tremendous demand for 
morality based on a common set of norms and values shared by the entire international 
community.4 Taking into consideration the existing cultural diversity,5 a question may 
arise here as to how to reach universal morality.  
The creation of the ICC fulfils a moral duty under which the Court is able to interfere 
in the international system for the prosecution of serious crimes - regardless of the 
national, political or other identity of the perpetrators - when a domestic system is 
unwilling or unable to do so.6 In this sense, the Court can be understood as a project of 
public interest versus the particular interests of states. Public interest is based upon 
universal morality: impartiality and equality, the fundamental principles shared by all 
major law systems.7 With regards to the need for transnational criminal justice, Hayden 
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has argued that the ICC is an example of a global institution that has moral obligations 
to rectify injustice since it is designed to prosecute and punish violations of 
cosmopolitan morality, in particular genocide and crimes against humanity.8  
The Preamble of the Rome Statute notes that ‘during this century millions of children, 
women and men have been victims of unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the 
conscience of humanity’ and recognizes that ‘such grave crimes threaten the peace, 
security and well-being of the world’.9 In fact, the intent of the drafters was to create a 
court and procedures that could be acceptable to the nations of the world in spite of the 
different policies and ideologies governing their criminal justice systems.10 However, as 
Bassiouni remarks, due to diplomatic disputes, lack of time and oversight during the 
review stage, the Drafting Committee on the establishment of an international criminal 
court - which he chaired - was left with the ‘task of putting together the pieces of an 
enormous jigsaw puzzle.’11 Furthermore, in his book he admits that the Statute ‘contains 
certain ambiguities, overlaps, inconsistencies, and gaps.’12 Therefore, it does not 
represent all types of jurisprudence, such as Islamic jurisprudence, which is why the 
Court does not receive support from the Islamic states of North Africa and the Middle 
East.13 Although the ICC has the potential to fulfil the role of a universal system of 
justice it has excluded all non-western global ideologies, including Islamic law. In fact, 
the operation of ICC complementarity regime does not reflect all types of juridical 
traditions and is, therefore, viewed with suspicion by nations with different criminal 
justice ideologies and policies. Islamic countries where the most widespread 
contemporary conflicts are taking place, often challenge the legitimacy of the ICC based 
on allegations of selectivity of cases and political interference from major powers which 
has resulted in mistrust towards the emerging practice of the ICC. 
Before the ICC was established, national criminal jurisdictions were involved in 
prosecuting violations of humanitarian law or extraditing perpetrators. However, the 
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creation of the ICC reflects a major shift in the normative structure at the international 
level concerning the prosecution of serious violations of humanitarian law, and it has 
highlighted an international duty to prosecute core crimes if states prove unwilling or 
unable to do so themselves.14  
An important question may be raised here about the moral authority or legitimacy of 
the ICC and its appropriate procedures in relation to different criminal justice systems. 
We may ask on what moral authority it acts to bring to justice those who commit 
serious crimes which ‘deeply shock the conscience of humanity’15, and are ‘of concern 
to the international community as a whole’16, particularly when the domestic courts will 
not or cannot act effectively. In the context of international criminal law, some difficult 
philosophical questions may arise about whether moral obligations and political 
responsibilities end at national borders.17 In discussing this issue, this chapter has been 
organised around two philosophies, Kantian moral philosophy and Islamic philosophy, 
to consider the normative foundations of the legitimacy of the complementarity regime 
of the ICC. It is organized in three sections. The first section looks at the two moral 
approaches: the Kantian and the Islamic. It first justifies choosing the Kantian moral 
approach towards the creation of the ICC, while arguing that Islamic considerations 
need to be incorporated. It will argue that Kant’s moral philosophy represents the 
western justification for the complementarity regime whereas, the tradition of Shari’a 
epitomises the potential resistance from the developing world. The second section will 
grapple with the revolutionary concept of sovereignty, which has an important role in 
the application of the principle of complementarity. The final section will focus on the 
normative legitimacy of the ICC and will address the nature of the differing relations 
that exist between Islamic countries and the ICC.  
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General justification for the normative foundations of the 
Complementarity regime of the ICC    
 
Criminal law is distinct from other aspects of law as either an efficient technique 
helping us to achieve worthwhile ends, or as an essentially appropriate response to 
certain kinds of wrongful conduct. Philosophical theories of criminal law can make a 
distinction here from analytical or normative points of view. As Wacks has observed, 
there are two principal forms of legal theory, descriptive legal theory, which includes 
positivist theories, and normative legal theory. Legal positivism, as an analytical and 
descriptive theory, seeks to explain the concept of criminal law, while normative legal 
theories are concerned with what the law ought to be.18 Descriptive legal theories are 
about facts and do not attempt to morally evaluate or justify law, whereas normative 
legal theories are about values.19 It is also important to distinguish between procedural 
and substantive criminal law. While the latter is related to detailed knowledge of the 
basic doctrines of the substantive criminal law, the former emphasises a profound 
philosophical curiosity about the analysis and rationale for these doctrines.20 In fact, 
these theories have different theoretical traditions. Positivist theorists see the status of 
law as it has been laid down in a certain way recognised by the legal system, whereas 
natural law theorists present a particular view of the legitimacy of law based upon 
morality for its authority.21 According to the positive law approach, morality is removed 
from the law.22 In other words, legal positivists contend that there is no necessary 
connection between law and morality.23 Natural law theorists, on the other hand, view 
law and morality as related24 and attempt to resolve the tension between what ‘is’ and 
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what ‘ought’ to be.25 They regard the law as a moral instrument which includes 
principles of reason and conscience found in human nature.26  
Positivist international law replaced natural law as the dominant theory in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth century, and was considered as law not because of some 
moral code, but because states freely consented to obey it.27 Despite this, war has still 
been used as an instrument of national policy. Massive atrocities have occurred both 
within the boundaries of single states and in international conflicts.28 It can also be seen 
that many of the problems of international security subjected to a criminal law 
enforcement system cannot be resolved simply by the application of positive 
international law,29 since legal positivism separated law as a distinct area from 
knowledge and practice, and ‘purified’ it of ethical, political, and social scientific 
considerations.30 In this context, the authorities under positive international law have 
failed to respond to atrocities through legal means.31 Therefore, Finch has argued that 
‘the weakness of international law is not due to the lack of enforcement, but to the 
absence of an international moral sense,’32 and consequently, in the twentieth century, 
natural law has received new attention partly in reaction to these new circumstances. In 
particular, the more liberal consciousness of the Post World War II era has raised a 
number of moral principles that have been elevated above the will of the state, and 
which include some minimal standards of human rights that belong to all of mankind.33 
Wind has claimed that the Nuremberg Trials, the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights in 1948, and the adoption of the Genocide Convention by the UN are good 
examples, which illustrate the re-emergence of natural law principles in world politics.34 
Since the end of the Cold War, an increase in humanitarian intervention and genocidal 
civil war in the 1990s paved the way for the establishment of ad hoc International 
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Criminal Tribunals in The Hague and Arusha,35 as Wind has noted. Cassese has also 
asserted that: 
 ‘The idea of prosecuting those who committed international crimes 
now acquired a broad-based support in world opinion and many 
governments. The international community in turn became more 
vocal about a permanent institution with universal recognition that 
would not suffer from the problems of ad hoc institutions.’36  
 
As Kumm has claimed, the legitimacy of international law has been challenged in 
recent years,37 particularly since the subject matter of international law has been 
expanded by a normative consensus. In this regard he suggests the ICC is one of the 
innovations which is based upon ‘a normative attachment to basic principles of human 
rights.’38 In addition, Cassese has also observed that the establishment of the ICC is a 
revolutionary step in the context of ‘the emerging vision of the international 
community’39 and ‘has the potential for introducing a revolutionary paradigmatic 
change in our conception of international law.’40 The creation of the ICC demonstrated 
a tension in the international legal system regarding the status of sovereignty between 
the Grotian and the Kantian visions of international law.41 In other words, the ICC is the 
ultimate manifestation of an increasing split between ‘traditional inter-state law and an 
emerging cosmopolitan legal order.’42 The rationale behind the creation of the ICC can 
be considered from these two different approaches. Cassese has argued that there are 
two models of international legal relations, the Grotian model and the Kantian model.43 
The key difference between them in international theory is that the Grotian tradition 
observes the international society of states as ‘an unimprovable via media’, while the 
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Kantian tradition views international society as the ‘chrysalis for the community of 
mankind.’44 
The Grotian model is a traditional one, coming into existence after the 17th century 
with emphasis on the notion of state sovereignty and the idea of state self-interest.45 The 
Grotian tradition emphasises the primacy of the state over individuals and 
cosmopolitical justice from a conservative point of view, in order to form the 
jurisdictional and substantive range of international law.46 From a jurisdictional point of 
view, this tradition emphasises state responsibility mechanisms and regards states as the 
enforcement arms of international law when it comes to the principle of individual 
criminal responsibility.47 In this regard, Cassese has noted that national enforcement of 
humanitarian international law has been ‘at least until recent years a dead letter.’48 From 
a substantive point of view, the Grotian tradition is more interested in violence arising 
out of international rather than domestic conflicts, and focuses more on ‘violence 
committed by the sovereign in times of war (international humanitarian law) than in 
times of peace (human rights).’49  
By contrast, according to the Kantian approach to international community, 
individuals have become subjects of international dealings in their own right.50 It 
focuses on peace and respect for all members of the international community. In this 
regard, Teson has argued that the international law of human rights fails to recognise the 
important normative status of the individual. Whilst traditional international legal theory 
focuses on the rights and duties of states, it rejects the connection that the rights of 
states derive from the rights and interests of individuals.51 In addition, Teson has 
suggested that the common set of values among the countries of the world provide 
legitimacy to international law,52 while sovereignty is a function of government to 
control its population and self- interest rather than to justly represent its people.53  
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Ralph has claimed that ‘we might equate 1998 with 1648 as a pivotal moment in 
international politics.’54 He has argued that the creation of the ICC ‘might well one day 
precipitate a revolution of Westphalian proportions which would certainly rest its 
legitimacy on an entirely different footing.’55 As Cassese has noted, ours is a time when 
common interests and concerns prevail over private interests56 and international legal 
order is now increasingly focused on the rights and obligations of individuals rather 
than national interests and mutual relations of states.57 While the Grotian society is 
based on jurisdiction, which is enforced only by states, the Kantian society is based on a 
specific concept of jurisdiction, which is enforced by the ICC under the principle of 
complementarity. 
As Ralph has mentioned, Kantian philosophy can be identified as ‘the figurehead of 
the revolutionary tradition’58 which sees in the society of states ‘the revival of a civitas 
maxima, which exercises authority over a world society of individuals.’59 This can be 
read as saying that the revolutionist idea of ‘world society’ is identified by those rights 
claims of individuals and non-state groups that are asserted by ‘a third image of 
international [or cosmopolitan] law’ and enforced by global institutions at the global 
level when states are unable or unwilling to do so themselves.60 Kant as a founding for-
father of universal cosmopolitanism, as Archibugi has observed, did not believe that a 
‘peaceful and democratic international society could be achieved within individual 
countries, [but] rather that it also required the establishing of appropriate institutions 
and the development of a consistent body of law.’61 
As for the ICC, the Rome Statute, as a revolutionary document, conceives of a ‘world 
society of humankind’ to bring to justice the perpetrators of core crimes if a state is 
unwilling or unable to fulfil its obligations to the society of humankind. In fact, under 
the rules and norms of international society, states are obliged to prosecute those 
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charged with committing a serious crime.62 It is important to note that Kant did not 
‘sanction intervention’, which would be a violation of the rights of an independent 
nation. He emphasized a cosmopolitan law, which should be respected by states.63 From 
the Kantian point of view, cosmopolitan right is a ‘complement of the unwritten code of 
law - constitutional as well as international law - necessary for the public rights of 
mankind in general and thus for the realisation of perpetual peace.’64 In this sense, by 
challenging states which are unwilling or unable to enforce universal values, ‘the 
Kantian ICC forces solidarists to prioritise either a commitment to universal values or 
state enforcement.’65  
Therefore, Kantian moral philosophy can be applied as a mode of thinking in order to 
explore a legitimate authority for the establishment of the ICC and its complementarity 
regime. According to the Kantian model of international community, the international 
criminal court should be established to focus on individual responsibility under 
international law,66 and to bring into effect the fundamental norms of international law 
such as human dignity and the respect for human rights.67 Prosecution and punishment 
of serious offences against human dignity are still entrusted to the national or the 
territorial state, but if the national criminal justice systems fail to secure justice, it is the 
ICC that administers justice impartially over heinous crimes against humanity on behalf 
of the international community as a whole.68 As such, the ICC will not pursue cases 
against alleged criminals unless the competent state authorities are ‘unwilling or unable’ 
to do so.69 That is to say, national courts should bring to trial those alleged to be 
responsible for breaches of internationally agreed values and should operate not only on 
behalf of their own national authorities but on behalf of the whole international 
community to protect ethnic, religious and racial groups.70  
Therefore, based upon the moral authority of the ICC, it does not matter whether ‘the 
guilty are citizens of a neglected African nation, or the leadership of a powerful Western 
democracy’71 As Malekian has noted, there should not exist any form of discrimination 
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between different ethnic, political or religious groups and the international rights of all 
should be respected in Islamic and non-Islamic societies.72 Justice is a core value of 
Shari’a and it is an aspiration of Islamic states to find a global system of justice capable 
of enforcing the rules of international criminal law amongst all nations equally,73 
regardless of whether offenders are powerful or weak. However, more conflicts, with a 
variety of different actors, are taking place in the Islamic world than in any other part of 
the globe, making it a ‘field of experiment of international criminal justice’; see, for 
instance, the Iraqi High Tribunal, the Lebanese Special Tribunal and the proceedings on 
Darfur pending before the ICC.74 Is it, therefore, legitimate to choose Islam as a 
representative of the non-Kantian justification for a global sytem of justice?  
 
Two moral approaches 
Issues relating to ethics and morals, in the contemporary world have been raised both 
in the Muslim world based upon classical Islamic knowledge and in non-Muslim 
countries based upon European culture. As mentioned earlier, during the twentieth 
century there has been an enormous need for a morality shared by the entire 
international community towards cruel and inhumane treatments which have happened 
in different parts of the world, to ensure that ‘no ruler, no State, no junta and no army 
anywhere can abuse human rights with impunity.’75 This chapter will put forward 
Kantian moral theory and Islamic law among other approaches to consider the moral 
legitimacy of the ICC. The moral basis of the complementarity regime must be 
established not merely from a Kantian perspective, but in a way which is acceptable in 
other parts of the world, for example in conformity with Islamic moral precepts. Islamic 
law like Kantian cosmopolitanism is a doctrine of universality and has become the 
philosophy of court’s victims (defendants) whereas Kant’s deontology is the ideology of 
the judges and prosecutors. The Kantian moral theory and Islamic law (Shari’a) have 
similarities as well as differences. However, both of these possible moral approaches in 
their different ways, support the idea of universal system of justice. The following 
paragraphs highlight some of the differences between them and then focus on their 
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similarities, for the purpose of this chapter and the philosophical justification of my 
thesis. Given that there is a tension between philosophy and religion, I have attempted 
to consider international justice in the world from an ethical perspective. 
The primacy of ethics over metaphysics is the principle similarity between the Kantian 
and Islamic approaches, but there are great differences in their methodology. In fact, 
whereas in Islamic philosophy ethics are religious, Kant’s ethics are rational.76 Siddiqui 
has claimed that philosophical ethics draws its resources from human reason and human 
experiences and does not consider the role of faith. By contrast, religious ethics draws 
its resources from revelation. For instance, in Islam the sense of God’s guidance 
becomes the guiding principle.77 Nonetheless, the same set of questions can be raised by 
both philosophical and Islamic ethics to find out what acts are right and what acts are 
wrong? What values should be pursued?  
Islam rejects differing worldviews and also refuses to recognize changes in moral 
perspectives which emphasize the interrelatedness of individuals and community and 
their mutual responsibility for one another.78 Kant rejects divine command theory. He 
argues that we fulfil our duty by obeying the moral law and achieving the highest good. 
Kant rejects the idea that either reason or experience is any certain basis for claiming 
the existence of God and says this gap can be filled by faith in God.79 From the Kantian 
point of view, the themes of freedom, morality and religion are ‘postulates of pure 
practical reason.’80 Kant’s ethical system is based on a belief that reason and ‘the moral 
law within’ are the final authority for morality, whereas from an Islamic viewpoint 
reason needs to be filtered through scripture and not the other way round.81 According 
to Suseelan, the rationalists’ approach to ethics placed too much emphasis on the 
contribution of reason,82 whereas Shari’a does not allow behavior norms based on 
individual conscience.83  
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As Sandberg has argued, religious liberty can be limited in the interests of public 
morality, although there has been a historical connection between religion and morality. 
He writes, ‘the state can justify interfering with an individual’s right to practise religion 
on the grounds of public morality’.84 In other words, as Moore has noted, in Kantian 
ethical thought, ‘religion can, although by no means must, serve to sustain us in making 
sense, and particularly ethical sense, of the world.’85 Therefore, it can be argued that 
some of the ideas in Kant’s view of faith are in line with the broad Islamic perspective, 
in the sense that the existence of the immortal soul, free will, and faith in a creator are 
clearly Islamic ideological strains. Likewise, the existence of a priori information in 
human consciousness to distinguish between right and wrong is an idea that finds 
mention in the Qur’an:86  
 ‘We showed him the Way: whether he is grateful or ungrateful (rests 
on his will).’87 
‘By the Soul, and the proportion and order given to it; And its 
enlightenment as to its wrong and its right.’88  
In addition to the above points of difference and similarity between these two moral 
approaches, Kant’s assertion that goodwill determines whether or not the action was 
morally right, not the consequences of the action, appears to come close to the Islamic 
concept of Niyyah (intention)89  which can be a focal point for discussion of a universal 
sense of justice. The following section will consider Kant’s moral law and the Islamic 
philosophy of law in relation to the international criminal justice system and the moral 
legitimacy of the ICC in particular.  
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1. The Kantian approach  
Kant maintained a universal law of morality (moral cosmopolitan) based upon the 
categorical imperative. In essence, moral requirements are based on a standard of 
rationality, which is ‘reason’s guide to action’ for the purpose of discovering a universal 
law and particularly perpetual peace.90 From the Kantian vision, individuals have the 
same challenges as always; however, moral cosmopolitanism, suggested for the purpose 
of perpetual peace,91 has influenced the majority of the world’s states to put moral 
principle ahead of national sovereignty.92 According to this view, law institutions do not 
change people directly but they can provide a powerful mechanism93 for promoting 
moral behaviour through specific penalties. 
Kantian influence in natural law is evident in the focus on reason as the source of 
normativity. Kant conceived law as part of morality and argues that practical reason or 
the ‘rational will’ is the source of norms.94 In other words, practical reason is the ability 
and the intelligence inherent in human reason to distinguish between wrong and right in 
every case.95 Kant’s moral philosophy ‘verifies the consciousness of the obligation to 
act morally’ and insists that ‘freedom (a rational idea) is real’.96 Therefore, the starting 
points of Kant’s approach are freedom and rationality, as morality is based on reason.  
Kant formulates the moral law as a ‘categorical imperative’, implying that the moral 
law is ‘categorical’, or that it applies to all situations. It is also ‘imperative’, which 
means it is absolutely authoritative.97 From this point of view, a ‘categorical imperative’ 
operates as the foundational principle of morality.98 Categorical imperatives are our 
moral duties and Kant maintained that ‘because we are only contingently rational, all 
practical rules always appear to us as commands or imperatives, telling us how we 
should or should not act in order to act rationally.’99 Categorical imperatives may count 
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as duties, or rule out wrongs. In a sense, moral responsibilities require us to consider our 
desire as irrelevant to what we should do.100 As Crisp has noted, according to Kant’s 
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, ‘moral worth attaches to an action only to 
the extent that it is motivated by respect for the moral law.101  
From the Kantian point of view, it is arguable that there is a need for the Court to be 
derived from an analysis of a prior idea of reason. What has to be decided upon are the 
conditions under which human beings will accept the authority of the rule of law. 
According to cosmopolitanism, it is the moral obligation of national authorities to 
pursue the interests of its citizens.102 As civilisation has developed, emphasis has been 
placed on the motives and intentions of action rather than the mere fact of what was 
actually done.103  Habermas has argued that the first step on the road from international 
law towards a cosmopolitan world was undertaken in the Nuremburg-Tokyo tribunals 
after World War II.104 The transition from international to cosmopolitan law is based 
upon the rights of the world citizen and from this point of view the ICC is the first 
international body which can be said to be performing cosmopolitan law. 
 
1.1 The Categorical imperative; rational origin of morality:  
The categorical imperative refers to moral rules, which must be followed universally, 
and this includes treating all rational beings equally. According to Kant, morality 
involves ‘answering to the call of duty’.105 In this sense, a command is appropriate for 
every person at every time in every circumstance.106  
Therefore, for an action to be moral it should be in accordance with the three 
formulations of the categorical imperative, including: 
1- Formula of Universal law: ‘Act only on that maxim through which 
you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law [of 
nature].’ 
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2- Formula of Humanity: ‘Act in such a way that you always treat 
humanity whether in your own person, or that of any other, never simply 
as a means, but always at the same time as an end.’  
3- Formula of Autonomy: ‘Every rational being must so act as if he were 
through his maxims always a law making member of the universal 
kingdom of ends.’107  
 
As Paton has asserted, the categorical imperative may have some secret self-interest. 
However, it cannot be established by an appeal to experience since experience cannot 
explain what ought to be.108 Moreover, according to Kant’s doctrine of the universality 
of moral law, the principle of moral action must be impersonal, objective, and impartial 
as between one person and another.109 In the Kantian view, an ideal moral community 
can be called the ‘kingdom of ends’ or ‘virtual commonwealth’. In essence, the moral 
community is composed of individuals, each of whom must be considered an end and 
never merely as a means in the calculations of others.110 In sum, these first and third 
formulations illustrate the need for moral principles to be universalisable. The second 
formulation points to the radical distinction to be made between things and persons, and 
emphasizes the necessity of respect for persons.  
Kant argues that penal law is an aspect of the categorical imperative and the criminal 
must be punished111 according to Kantian deontological ethics on punishment based on 
a retributivist foundation.112 Retributive justice refers to re-establishing the social and 
moral balance which existed before the crime was committed. In this regard, Kant 
believes that punishment is an application of the categorical imperative and it would be 
immoral not to punish.113 Furthermore, he states that any ‘deviation from the principle 
of retribution had to be regarded as a public violation of justice.’114 Villa-Vicencio has 
suggested that given the impact of social and cultural factors on the behaviour of 
                                                 
107
 Acton, Op, cit., p. 21. 
108
  Paton, H. J. (1947). The Categorical Imperative: A Study in Kant’s Moral Philosophy. London, 
Hutchinson & Company. p. 127. 
109
 Ibid., p. 135. 
110
 Mahoney, J. (2007). The Challenge of Human Rights: Origin, Development, and Significance. Oxford, 
Blackwell Publishing, p. 179.  
111
 Merle, J.-C. (2000). "A Kantian Critique of Kant's Theory of Punishment." Law and Philosophy 19: 
311-338. p. 318. 
112
 Ibid., p. 312. 
113
 Kilchling, M. (2008). "Restorative Justice- A Victim Oriented Approach ". from www.etc-
graz.at/cms/fileadmin/user_upload/humsec/SAc_08_PPP/PPP_Michael_Kilchling_I.pdf [accessed on 
10th September 2011]  
114
 Ibid.,   
 33 
people, ‘the affirmation of personal autonomy still stresses the need for all members of 
society to take responsibility for their actions.’115  
The universal principle of justice conforms to the principle of ‘universalizability that 
Kant laid down as the first formulation of the categorical imperative.’116 In essence, the 
universal principle of justice from Kant’s viewpoint is concerned with explaining ‘how 
the practical requirements in moral laws could be legitimately enforced through the 
application of external coercion.’117 Kant introduced cosmopolitan law in one of his 
most famous writings, ‘Perpetual Peace. A Philosophical Project.’118 and asserted that ‘a 
violation of right on one place of the earth is felt in all’119, concluding that cosmopolitan 
law must form a ‘supplement’ to the ‘unwritten code’ of  both state law and 
international law if the ‘public rights of human beings’ are to be secured.120 According 
to Archibugi, ‘cosmopolitan law an innovation, allow[ing] the international community 
to monitor the internal affairs of its members’.121 There are various interpretations of the 
concept of cosmopolitan law. However, some scholars -such as Martin Wright and 
Hedley Bull - have explored the nature of Kant’s cosmopolitanism and have argued that 
it represents a desire to create a society of individuals who are independent from 
states.122 They have argued that ‘cosmopolitan law is another channel of non-violent 
interference since the normative system of the natural law tradition authorised either 
rebellion or for other states to have recourse to violence against state authority if the 
latter violated natural rights’.123 Cosmopolitan ethics will be analyzed later in this 
chapter.  
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1.2 The origins of complementarity 
It is important to consider the philosophical aspect of the notion of complementarity 
as this idea is ‘extremely complex and the Court is now faced with pressing questions 
regarding its interpretation.’124 Complementarity means ‘a complementary relationship 
or situation’ or ‘a state or system that involves complementary components.’ The 
foundation of complementarity in the philosophy of science is attributed to the Danish 
physicist Niels Bohr; however, the notion may apply in other fields of science such as 
sociology, biology and psychology.125 Bohr has argued that the relationship of concepts 
such as love and justice, thoughts and sentiments are complementary.126 These terms are 
related to ‘our inner experiences which are equally essential’; however, they are 
mutually exclusive in the sense that ‘even our warmest feelings completely lose their 
nature when we try to express them by way of clear logical reasoning.’127 Moreover, 
Bohr believed that ‘we must be clear to ourselves that the use of the notion of justice in 
its extreme consequence, excludes love, to which we are called upon in relation to our 
parents, brothers and sisters, and friends.’128  
Kaiser has suggested that there are possible Kantian aspects to complementarity. 
There are some philosophical similarities between Bohr’s complementarity - 
particularly his critical interest in the construction of knowledge - and Kant’s 
epistemology.129 In fact, Bohr’s complementarity contains some Kantian features. For 
instance, ‘Bohr’s complementarity shares Kant’s actual mechanism for guaranteeing the 
objective reality of our judgement.’130 Kant believes that knowledge is divided into two 
sources, positing sensibility and understanding as the foundation of metaphysics. In 
other words, ‘without sensibility no object would be given to us, without understanding 
no object would be thought.’131 That is to say that Kant dealt with the problem of the 
relationship between the ‘objects [which are possible experience] and our 
representations of them.’ He found a solution in the possibility for a priori knowledge. 
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He writes, ‘we can know a priori of things only what we ourselves put into them.’132 
For Kant, sensibility and understanding formulate concepts of objects in judgements 
and the judgements are governed by a priori knowledge (rules) pertaining to objects of 
possible experience. Kaiser has argued that the mechanism of linking knowledge to the 
domain of possible experience provides an indication of a Kantian aspect to Bohr’s 
complementarity. Although Bohr rejected Kant’s a priorism, like Kant he advocated a 
two-source epistemology,133 ‘a distinction between knowable and unknowable objects 
in terms of the possibility of experience, and the mechanism of conceptual containment 
used to guarantee objective reality of judgments.’134  
In the context of international criminal law, complementarity is perceived as a 
principle that defines the relationship between domestic courts and the permanent 
international criminal court. In essence, it provides national courts with primacy to 
exercise jurisdiction over the core crimes defined under the Rome Statute in achieving 
the common goal of ending impunity.135 A question may arise here as to what the 
relationship is between the ICC and sovereignty. We may consider whether the 
authority structure of the ICC - including issues of jurisdiction and the trigger 
mechanism - is a new form of sovereignty.136 Leonard has claimed that supreme 
authority has been transferred in the modern state from the Church to the nation-state. 
Therefore, it shows the need to view sovereignty as a social arrangement.137 The 
formation of an international criminal court may be an example of the changing nature 
of sovereignty, moving from one agent to another based upon the principle of 
complementarity.138 The principle of complementarity defines the relationship that the 
ICC has with the national authorities and domestic courts of states, which was the main 
concern of participants in the Preparatory Committee for the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court (Preparatory Committee).139 Subsequently, the ICC can 
exercise its authority only if the domestic judicial system is unwilling or unable to 
pursue the alleged crime in the relevant situation.140 The main reason for the 
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establishment of this type of system is to protect the interests of victims141 and ‘the 
international community as a whole.’142 In essence, there has been a change in the 
nature of state sovereignty, which has become less exclusive. States are no longer the 
privileged agent, but rather individuals are privileged ‘through the inception of 
complementary sovereignty’ in the emerging global society.143 Therefore, according to 
Leonard, a new form of sovereignty is emerging. The ICC, based upon the principle of 
complementarity, provides a situation in which states no longer hold supreme authority 
concerning the core crimes under international humanitarian law, in those cases where 
states cannot demonstrate their sovereign authority.144 In addition, it is one of the few 
international courts in which individuals rather than states can be party to the 
proceedings.145  
 
1.3 The revolutionary concept of sovereignty 
The Westphalian state system, that has regulated international conduct since the Peace 
of Westphalia in 1648, is giving way to new approaches.146 In fact, as Richard Flak has 
observed, ‘we are experiencing both the terminal phase of the Westphalian framework 
and the emergence of a different structure of world order … as exhibiting the agency of 
non-[s]tate actors, as to qualify as post-Westphalian.’147 In other words, there was a 
move from natural to positive law conceptions, in keeping with notions of sovereign 
consent, and legal positivism has developed as a reaction to natural law theories. The 
traditional Westphalian model is incapable of providing contemporary understanding of 
the field of international law, particularly the ‘legitimacy crisis relating to fundamental 
reconfigurations of global power.’148 It is important to note that international law is 
concerned with the actions of sovereign states, and it does not provide punishment for 
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individuals.149 Therefore, those that carry out ‘the act in question’ are not personally 
responsible since they are protected by state sovereignty.150 In the eighteenth century 
fundamental questions were raised from the rationalist perspective about the nature of 
government and its justification.151  
Subsequently, there has been a growing disconnect between the theory and the 
practice of the Westphalian system which does not fit within the Westphalian paradigm 
of authority.152 This ‘post-Westphalian’ revolution is preceded by more cooperative 
efforts between citizens of different states, and the emergence of new international 
standards and norms which have challenged the principle of non-interference in 
sovereign state matters, such as the Rome Statute of the ICC which is a universally 
binding normative regulation.153 In essence, the universality of laws, particularly the 
application of criminal law beyond state borders; extraterritoriality; and regionalization 
are challenging traditional notions of sovereignty.154  
Under traditional Westphalian doctrine, the ‘boundaries of justice were thought to be 
coextensive with the legal territorial jurisdiction and economic reach of the sovereign 
policy’,155 and it was based upon ‘principles of equal state sovereignty and the absolute 
right to internal self-determination without external interference’.156 From the Kantian 
point of view, the state cannot always determine what justice is simply by virtue of 
having power. Kant, as a defender of limited government,157 was critical of the 
Westphalian model and the creation of a world state,158 arguing that a ‘permanent 
universal peace by means of so-called European balance of power is a pure illusion’, 
and he furthermore asserted that domestic freedom is not secured through the 
Westphalian model.159 Teson has claimed that Kant developed a normative philosophy 
of international law in such a way that the notion of state sovereignty can be redefined 
as the sovereignty of state dependent upon the state’s domestic legitimacy. 
Consequently, the principles of international justice must be compatible with the 
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principles of internal justice based upon the Kantian categorical imperative, which is not 
based upon national interest or rights of governments.160 However, Franck has argued 
that justice and legitimacy are conceptually separate. While domestic systems attempt to 
promote justice, international systems only seek order and compliance. For instance, 
that a rule is legitimate does not mean that it is just; conversely, many just rules may not 
be legitimate. Furthermore, justice applies to individuals, while international law 
addresses sates and government.161 However, the Kantian theory of international law 
rejects this and attempts to unify a theory of justice and make legitimacy dependent on 
justice.162  
As a result, classic international legal theory is incapable of serving as the normative 
framework as it promotes states and not individuals, governments and not persons, 
order and not rights, compliance and not justice. Instead, a liberal theory of international 
law ‘commits itself to normative individualism, to the promise that the primary 
normative unit is the individual, not the state.’163 As mentioned earlier, Kantian 
international ethics follow from the categorical imperative and freedom is the first tenet 
of international ethics.164 The state is a moral-political entity created by autonomous 
persons rather than a mere piece of territory. Kant emphasises the individual rather than 
the state, noting that ‘… no one had a greater right to any region of the earth than 
anyone else.’165  
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1.4 Cosmopolitan ethics 
 
Although there may be various readings and interpretations of cosmopolitan law, 
Brown has observed that Kantian cosmopolitan law is ‘an attempt to create additional 
institutions for the expression of individual autonomy under the growing 
interdependence of globalisation’.166 In essence, the protection of individual rights of 
liberty is one of the fundamental rights for any international legal order.167 It is also 
broadly accepted that Kant sought to create a level of cosmopolitan law that would 
oblige both states and individuals to the ‘hospitable treatment’ of all human beings, 
regardless of their citizenship or national origin (nationality and locality).168 Moreover, 
according to Teson, the normative value of the individual is not to be violated by 
another state.169 Therefore, Kantian cosmopolitan law provides the well-judged 
atmosphere necessary to regulate global interactions in line with reason and the 
requirement of a civil condition of global public right.170 As Ku has argued, 
international law can be considered as a normative system taking ‘on a principally 
legislative character by mandating particular values and directing specific changes in 
State behaviour’,171 in such a way that respect for states is derived from respect for 
persons. In fact, ‘the reason for respecting state stemmed from concerns about 
individual freedom, not from holistic claims about the state as a moral person.’172 
Furthermore, a lasting international peace is not possible if individual freedom is not 
secured within every state’s border.173 Therefore, justice makes sense only among 
individuals, not among states which exercise ‘tyrannical power’.174 This would be the 
result of ‘a slow-going evolutionary process’ for the purpose of the transformation of all 
kinds of power into one generally accepted, or at least acceptable, legal order.175  
Kantian cosmopolitan philosophy provides a normative ethical global order, without 
the existence of a world government, for the purpose of achieving perpetual world 
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peace.176 In this sense, Kant believed in creating a society of world citizenry 
independent from states. Therefore, it is important to examine the relationship between 
the rights of states and the concepts of cosmopolitan law.177 Autonomy as a limited 
sovereignty is important for Kant’s moral vision178 and Kantian cosmopolitanism 
advocates ‘a new level of cosmopolitan law which holds supremacy over the idea of 
absolute state sovereignty’, while Kant also believes ‘states are primary violators’ of 
human freedom. Such freedom must be universally respected in the same way that a 
sovereign state should be protected under international law.179 There should therefore be 
a global community under a commonly accepted international right, holding states 
accountable to this notion of global society and eliminating the injustices often 
committed by them.180  
It should be noted that a judicial system of public right can be divided into domestic 
law, international law, and cosmopolitan law.181 Kant believed that every judicial 
constitution should follow these three dimensions of rights.182 Domestic law relates to 
rights and duties that exist between citizens and their government; international law 
places emphasis on the necessary rightful condition which should exist between the 
various governments as representatives of entities; finally, cosmopolitan law focuses on 
the rightful condition which should exist between all humans and all states regardless of 
national origin or state citizenship.183  
From the Kantian point of view, international law is connected with domestic 
justice184 and he focused on domestic justice as a precondition for establishing a good 
civil condition of public right. In other words, there is a primacy of domestic law in 
Kant’s ‘global vision’ to provide the foundations for a movement toward cosmopolitan 
justice based on the categorical imperative.185 According to Kant, perpetual peace is in 
contradiction with the principle of sovereignty and the independence of states.186 Kant 
maintains that perpetual peace and the idea of international rights can only be secured 
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through a consistent commitment to universal law. Brown has argued that this is a 
variation of Kant’s categorical imperative and that the Kantian theory of justice and his 
metaphysics of morals ‘focuses on domestic justice as the necessary first principle for a 
cosmopolitan order.’187 National borders have become more flexible and international 
crime is demanding an international legal system able to prosecute criminals. Kant’s 
cosmopolitanism lays the philosophical foundation for moral world order and, on 
Kantian grounds, the best way to realize perpetual peace under international law is 
through a republican form of world government. The Kantian vision of institutionalism 
is that ‘sound, moral cosmopolitans should become institutional cosmopolitans and 
commit themselves to end the Westphalian nation-state and bring into being a 
democratic world government dedicated to peace, justice, and well-being for all people 
everywhere.’188  
Furthermore, according to the Kantian theory of international law, there is a primacy 
of respect for individual autonomy and international justice, which must focus on the 
rights of individuals.189 The ICC is one of the few international courts in which 
individuals rather than states may be party to the proceedings.190 In this point of view 
(the Kantian vision), the reason to promote universal law is based upon creating those 
‘conditions under which the choice of one can be united with the choice of another in 
accordance with a universal law of freedom.’191 Teson has claimed that Kant is seen as 
‘the pioneering advocate of an international organization capable of securing a lasting 
peace.’192 Covell, meanwhile, has argued that although Kant did not advocate ‘anything 
like a permanent international court for the application of the laws of nations’,193 there 
is no incompatibility between the establishment of independent procedures for 
adjudication of disputes and the need for a world sovereign to mediate such disputes.194 
On the other hand, Martinez has claimed that although some scholars have made 
progress to identify different aspects of the international judicial process, the work of 
these scholars is generally more descriptive than normative.195 In this sense, the 
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emergence of an international judicial system is important in considering whether to 
promote respect for individual rights or to fulfil the interests of powerful states.196 Also, 
the matter becomes more difficult when an international court considers increasing its 
effectiveness. Martinez has stated that nations grant jurisdiction to international courts 
in order to remove ‘certain disputes from the realm of politics and shift them to the 
realm of law.’197 More importantly, the fact that ‘politicians may secretly hope that the 
mechanism they have created won’t work very well is not something that courts can 
base their decisions upon’. However, an international court aims to resolve disputes as 
effectively and apolitically as possible.198  
Franceschet has argued that the ICC has been formed in accordance with 
cosmopolitan moral standards. In other words, cosmopolitan principles and ethical 
justification are satisfied by the creation of the ICC, which has been a departure from 
the traditional model of nation-state.199 The ICC is rooted in the notion of cosmopolitan 
control while creating a supranational judicial body in ways that suggest the need for a 
response to failures of sovereignty at the state level.200 In fact, cosmopolitan morality 
has led to important reforms in international law with regard to liberal ideological 
standards. The essential point here is that sovereignty gives all states freedom to choose 
whether and when they will obey international law and morality. Therefore, 
cosmopolitan law is the project of eliminating disorder and the violence against 
individual rights which originates from the states system.201 
In the cosmopolitan community vision, human beings are members of particular 
sovereign states; however, they are also members of the universal community of 
humankind.202 Since the end of World War II there has been an impressive expansion of 
human rights and democracy to societies that had been excluded from the benefits of 
freedom.203 Also, since the Nuremberg Trials, there was strong interest among states to 
create a permanent international criminal court based upon individual accountability. 
However, it was not possible until the immediate political context changed after the 
Cold War.204 Franceshet has claimed that the way the Cold War ended created a high 
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degree of normative consensus on the need to strengthen and extend the enforcement of 
universal human rights, particularly given the reality of crimes against humanity and 
genocide in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and on the need for the creation of ad 
hoc Tribunals by the UN Security Council to bring to justice those had committed 
serious crimes in those states.205 
It is important to note that international law based upon the Westphalian model 
displaced ‘just war’ doctrine in providing guidelines for permissible uses of 
international force, and was tied to the consent of sovereign states rather than direct 
religious authority. That is to say, international law became an autonomous source of 
authority with respect to the use of force as can be seen after World War II, particularly 
in the Nuremberg Trials.206 However, international law has lost much of its legitimacy 
as there have been revolutionary changes in the nature of conflicts and the doctrine of 
territorial sovereignty since the end of the Cold War.207 In essence, the challenges to 
international law were developments of a normative character, such as global ethics and 
the ‘changing balance of considerations within the United Nations between upholding 
sovereign rights and protecting people victimized by human rights abuses.’208 
In particular, moral imperatives associated with a human rights culture have emerged 
since the failure of the United Nations to prevent ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and the 
1994 Genocide in Rwanda.209 Bickerton has argued that normative power was designed 
to respond to civilian power and the demand of the nation-state and national interests. 
He claims that the post-Cold War period gave the European Union (the EU) more 
responsibilities since it has been given more cultural identity. In other words, the EU 
chose to be Kantian while ‘the United States is absolutely Hobbesian.’210 Normative 
power comes from different sources of legitimacy; cosmopolitan law is one of the 
sources that give us an understanding of norms that have a universal content.211 In 
essence, in terms of legitimacy, the more action can be justified in terms of humanity as 
a whole, the more it will be perceived as legitimate.212  
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Therefore, the ICC as an international legal forum was established with competence 
over the most serious crimes, those that affect the whole of mankind,213 and it operates 
based upon the principle of complementarity, giving the ICC authority only when states 
are deemed unwilling or unable to exercise the responsibilities of primacy of national 
criminal jurisdiction in good faith.214 In addition, Steven C. Roach has argued that 
although the ICC’s legitimacy derives in large part from its legal function and authority, 
the Court will also be a political actor, with significant discretion in choosing where and 
when to enforce international peace and security.215 Furthermore, the ICC promotes a 
culture of human rights within states and reinforces the notion that the legitimacy of the 
state depends on whether it implements a system of rights, rather than claims to absolute 
sovereignty.216  
In terms of how moral law is enforced it is important to note that while the civil law 
directly and substantively regulates behaviour, the maxims of the moral law ‘do not 
directly obligate action but permit action indirectly through reference to the categorical 
imperative’.217 In essence, moral law is distinguished by the quality of the force it holds 
over action. This ‘force is felt directly in moral conscience’ out of respect for the moral 
law and requires a ‘historico-cultural dimension of moral formation.’218 The main goal 
of international criminal justice is not the implementation of the rules, norms, and 
provisions of the system, but to achieve the essence of these rules in a balanced scale of 
justice with the same standard of weights and measures.219 For instance, the Darfur 
crisis has raised the question as to whether the international community can respond 
effectively to humanitarian emergencies, and the ICC leads the international community 
in mounting a response to serious violations of international crimes.220 According to the 
procedural dimension of the ICC’s legitimacy, the ICC’s judiciary capacity should 
eliminate undue delays and ensure that states meet the high evidential standards for 
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investigating and prosecuting those responsible for serious crimes. In addition, ‘the 
ICC’s legal neutrality depends on the prosecutor’s ability to exercise his or her 
discretionary power in a consistent manner’, particularly in politically sensitive cases.221  
However, it is important to consider why states have established legalised 
international institutions ‘when their autonomy would be less constrained by avoiding 
such legalisation?’222 What national interest might be derived from joining the ICC? 
And more importantly, why would a state want to take the risk that its nationals, 
particularly those acting in an official capacity, will be tried before an international 
tribunal? 223 Megret has observed that a state ‘behaves spontaneously in ways designed 
to maximize the global common good’ rather than due to the moral imperatives of the 
times.224 However, he has also asserted that national interest is shaped by certain 
normative structures. Therefore, according to the principle of complementarity, it is 
inevitable that ‘joining the ICC for at least some of the less ‘virtuous’ states involves a 
substantially more significant normative effort than most brands of realism would 
allow’, since the ICC ‘would herald the rise of an international society which bears 
almost no relation to the one that we have known since Westphalia.’225  
Stigen has argued that states might have different motives for joining the ICC, 
creating the potential for different categories of states.226 Four categories can be 
considered in understanding why a state may choose to join the ICC: the realist, 
functionalist, constructivist and rationalist. He particularly observes that although some 
states expect to gain increased domestic and international stability and security, mostly 
states join the ICC ‘as a promoter of shared values and norms’ and because states 
believe that the ICC can promote their own individual interests.227  
According to the complementarity regime of the ICC, the Rome Statute has implications 
for state sovereignty in its aim to reduce the failure of states in bringing the perpetrators 
of crimes to justice.228 It has been assumed that the ICC as an international institution 
was established because it promoted the interest of dominant powers. This, in essence, 
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is the realist model for explaining why states join the ICC. But given that powerful 
states will have a greater interest than others in maintaining international stability, the 
effective enforcement of international criminal law does not necessarily promote the 
interests of dominant powers. The number of international crimes will be reduced as a 
result of the ICC’s activity but it will generate an additional need for international 
military backing. For instance, the United States, United Kingdom, and France are all 
experiencing considerable domestic criticism as a result of costly interventions in areas 
of violence, but the need for deploying troops is not likely to be reduced with the 
introduction of the ICC.229 
From the functionalist point of view, states create international institutions because the 
institutions will promote public goods efficiently with reduced transaction costs. That is 
to say that, in the context of the ICC, ‘the world community has alternative back-up 
mechanisms for bringing major criminals to justice’ when national systems fail to do 
so.230 However, Stigen has argued that the application of functionalist theory has 
weaknesses in the context of the ICC. Historically, states have done very little to 
combat impunity for international crimes, criminal justice being viewed as a morally 
just but politically unrealistic response to gross human rights violations. Moreover, the 
functionalist theory also fails to notice the fact that the main effect of the Rome Statute, 
due to the complementarity principle, is not so much coordinated international efforts as 
an increased number of genuine national investigations and prosecutions.231 
The constructivist model asserts that the ICC represents shared norms. According to 
this approach, ideas are constructed through interaction among individuals, groups, and 
states. Stigen has claimed that the number of states party to the Rome Statute supports 
this model and illustrates that ‘the most important factor for the ICC’s success so far is 
probably an idealistic international civil society’s efficient lobbying vis-à-vis 
governmental decision-makers, including massive NGO campaigns’.232 In this model, 
states perceive the risk that their citizens will be brought before the ICC as insignificant. 
They believe the ICC will not make any real difference to them since the Rome Statute 
appears attractive to ‘well-functioning democracies with credible judiciaries’.233 These 
states with military personnel are frequently and directly involved in international 
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peacekeeping operations. However, the complementarity principle gives them an 
opportunity to pre-empt ICC interference. For instance, prior to the United Kingdom’s 
ratification, the Secretary of State, Robin Cook, noted that the complementarity 
principle was an ‘important safeguard for British citizens. It means that in all 
circumstances Britain will be able to pursue any bona fide allegation of an offence by 
United Kingdom citizens through our domestic courts, rather than allowing proceedings 
to take their course through the International Criminal Court’.234 Therefore, in the view 
of constructivists, many states expect never to be affected by the ICC’s activity.  
The final model is the rationalist. From this perspective, states are seen as rational 
actors pursuing their individual self-interests. States join an international tribunal in 
order to ‘constrain other governments in their international behaviour [as well as] 
domestic actors, including their own government’ through a process of legalisation’.235 
From the rationalist point of view it is suggested that, after centuries of war and 
violence, states have finally ‘woken up to the realization that untrammelled sovereignty 
is simply either a source of unmitigated evil or not in their best interest.’236 States suffer 
from the fact that international crimes are not suppressed and they cannot rely on other 
states to repress international crimes consistently. Therefore, the ICC, based on 
complementarity, which makes a presumption in favour of national jurisdiction, was 
created to ensure the delivery of a global public good and bring an end to impunity for 
international crimes.237  
This section has sought to explore how important Kant’s theory of retributive justice 
and the categorical imperative are in justifying the complementarity regime of the ICC, 
as well as to explore the reach of the wider cosmopolitan community inside the nation 
state for prosecuting the most serious crimes and the achievement of perpetual peace. 
From the Kantian point of view, individuals have become subjects of international 
dealings in their own right, since international cosmopolitan legal order is now 
increasingly focused on the rights and obligations of members of the international 
community rather than national interests and the mutual relations of states.238  
As a moral being, each individual has a duty to understand and obey the principles 
that unite him or her with other humans. As mentioned earlier, Kant’s moral theory is 
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summarised by the categorical imperative,239 which are our moral duties and 
responsibilities to act rationally and to treat all rational beings equally.240 Rationality 
advocates common authority as moral obligation.241 In this vision, things happen for a 
reason, and there is some kind of will behind every single incident in the world and 
practical reason is directed at solving practical problems. One of these problems is to 
give an analysis on how to achieve perpetual peace.242 As the Preamble of the Rome 
Statute affirms, ‘the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a 
whole must not go unpunished’.  
In this context, Kant’s retributive justice refers to re-establishing the social and moral 
balance that existed before the crime was committed. In fact, punishment is regarded as 
an application of the categorical imperative and it would be immoral not to punish.243 
The universal principle of justice from Kant’s viewpoint is concerned with explaining 
‘how the practical requirements in moral laws could be legitimately enforced through 
the application of external coercion.’244 In this sense, cosmopolitan law allows the 
international community to monitor the internal affairs of its members,245 and 
demonstrates ‘an aspiration to create a society of individuals independent from 
states.’246 In addition, the Kantian vision of institutionalism is that ‘sound, moral 
cosmopolitans should become institutional cosmopolitans and commit themselves to 
end the Westphalian nation-state and bring into being a democratic world government 
dedicated to peace, justice, and well-being for all people everywhere.’247  
Consequently, according to the Kantian model of international community, an 
international criminal court is the first international body that can be said to be 
performing cosmopolitan law.248 The ICC is rooted in the notion of cosmopolitan law, 
to administer justice impartially over heinous crimes against humanity, and on behalf of 
the international community as a whole249 when the competent state authorities are 
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‘unwilling or unable’250 to exercise the responsibilities of primacy of national criminal 
jurisdiction in good faith.251 In effect, in order to have a response to failures of 
sovereignty at the state level,252 the complementarity regime of the ICC is based less on 
state sovereignty and more oriented towards the protection of all citizens of the 
world.253 On the other hand, having said that an international court aims to resolve 
disputes as effectively and apolitically as possible,254 states want to take the risk of 
joining the ICC for a variety of motives. According to the rationalist model, states suffer 
from the fact that international crimes are not dealt with and find that they cannot rely 
on other states to tackle international crimes consistently.255  
 
2.  The classical Islamic approach; Islamic jurisprudence 
 
Islamic law, or Shari’a, as a universal religion, is based on the revealed book of Islam 
(Qur’an) which recognises no boundaries for its kingdom.256 According to the Islamic 
philosophy of law, all human beings are subject to divine law and every individual must 
have the respect of other individuals because of the spiritual dignity of human beings.257 
Islam is a distinct cultural system in which the collective, not individual, lies at the 
centre of its world view. Islam makes no distinction between the individual and the state 
as an overall political structure. In fact, the individual is considered a member of the 
umma (community)258 and Islamic law is obligatory for Muslims regardless of the 
territory they reside in.259 According to Islamic theory, God is the sovereign of the 
community of believers, and the ultimate ruler and legislator.260 Thus, law plays a 
greater role than it does in western societies.261 Shari’a governs the life of every Muslim 
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in every way, which is unknown to the West.262 Communities of believers constitute the 
Islamic ummah, which is a manifestation of society’s belief in unity. In this sense, the 
unity of God in their belief, and the unity of these believers in their practice can play an 
active political role in domestic as well as international affairs. In other words, from the 
Islamic viewpoint, religion and politics are not separate arenas; law and politics are 
considered part of religion.263 In fact, Islamic law regulates the rules of conduct for all 
nations regardless of the theological attitudes of the relevant nations,264 since the idea of 
‘peace is the dominant idea in Islam.’265 Islamic law encourages activities that work 
against anarchy and violence by ‘criminalizing individuals, groups, and government 
authorities involved in anti-peace action.’266 Since the divine legislator does not rule 
directly over believers, a new form of government has been established based on divine 
law and justice, and led by a representative who derives his authority not directly from 
God but from God’s law.267 It is worth mentioning that there are important questions 
about the legitimacy and qualifications of the ruler since their primary task is to put 
God’s law and justice into practice. Since the Prophet, the first ruler, died without 
providing a rule of succession, the procedural question of the choice of person who has 
a legitimate claim to succeed the Prophet in accordance with the standard of political 
justice (justice based upon the will of the sovereign), has became crucial.268 By contrast, 
the gradual decline of the Church’s political power in Europe contributed to the shift in 
the source of legitimacy from the supremacy of religious authority to the people, and 
became the main factor behind the formation of nation-states.269 In fact, the secular 
concept of the nation-state runs counter to the Islamic ideal of ummah, since the notion 
of ummah supersedes national boundaries.270 Interestingly, it is ‘suggested that the 
European Enlightenment itself was a product of Arab influence through the Iberian 
peninsula’271 and that Islamic international law developed with the purpose of creating 
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acceptable international relations between the various nations of the world.272 However, 
although the Islamic Enlightenment occurred much earlier than the eighteenth-century 
Enlightenment in Europe, due to historical factors, it could not continue.273  
Although the frameworks for Western international criminal justice and Islamic 
criminal justice come from two different traditions, basic legal principles from each 
system should be recognised during the application of international criminal justice so 
that through equality, reciprocity, and mutual understanding, an international justice can 
be achieved that cannot be ignored by any criminal party.274 Exclusion of the Islamic 
legal tradition from consideration by the Rome Statute is a matter of concern. It is 
concerning simply because the better understanding of justice and equality between 
nations around the world paves the way to achieving appropriate human rights 
principles, something that concerns the international community as a whole.275 In this 
regard, Richard Vogler observes that ‘the international tribunals are intended to be truly 
global’, but that ‘the practice of the international tribunals increasingly gives the 
impression that defendants from the developing world are being dragged unwillingly 
before alien, western courts.’276 Malekian has argued that recognizing one concept of 
law over another ‘diminishes the value of international criminal justice and creates 
contradictions in the application of an impartial equal jurisdiction and basic philosophy 
of culture attitude.’277 Moreover, it is important to note here that recent evaluations of 
international criminal tribunals suggest that, as Delmas-Marty has pointed out, 
‘harmonization is a progressive, evolutionary process which should also involve a 
descending integration from international law to domestic law and lead to a more 
pluralist conception of international criminal law.’278  
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2.1 Reluctance of Islamic states to participate in the ratification of the 
Rome Statute:  
In the past fifty years, international law has been changed dramatically. On the other 
hand, Shari’a is over fourteen centuries old and seems cannot be changed,279 as it is 
based on divine inspiration, and is ‘often [a]contradictory body of opinions [without] a 
uniform, unequivocal doctrine of criminal laws.’280 Therefore, an important question 
arises here as to whether the ICC’s jurisdiction is compatible with Islamic law. Islamic 
criminal law and international criminal law share many overlapping functions for the 
suitable prevention and prohibition of international criminal violations, including the 
prohibition of torture, slavery, and war crimes.281 The question that arises is how the 
absence of specific elements of crimes in the penal codes of domestic law in Muslim 
states relates to the repressive use of Shari’a by these Islamic states. Even in those cases 
where Shari’a has been codified, a state may progress further in Islamic rule by making 
use of ‘its monopoly on the use of force’ against political and civil rights in the name of 
God.282 The state’s monopoly on the use of violence remains problematic, since 
normative pressures can now, more than ever, influence states.283  
Islamic states have played a positive role in the establishment of the International 
Criminal Court;284 however, there were many important conflicts between Islamic ethics 
and the ICC provisions, which need further adaptation to the ICC Statute.285 It is worth 
mentioning that seven countries voted against the Rome Statute in 1998 as they were 
opposed to the formation of the ICC. Four of them were countries ‘with predominantly 
Muslim populations purporting to apply at least some measures of Islamic law’, 
including Libya, Qatar, Iraq, and Yemen.286 
As Shari’a has not provided a comprehensive system of codes, it is important to 
consider how Islamic law relates to the ICC provisions.287 This raises the question of 
whether international criminal law is compatible with a broader application of Shari’a 
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in Islamic states.288 For instance, suicide is a crime under Islamic law and can be 
punished by Islamic courts.289 This conflict reflects the important role of Islam in many 
Muslim countries since they officially recognize Islamic values as a source of 
legislation,290 meaning that the national decision-making process cannot be separated 
from Islam.291 However, the lack of an independent judiciary to provide the necessary 
oversight of the government’s actions and practice is one of the central problems of 
undeveloped criminal law systems in these countries. As Bassiouni has argued, Islamic 
states have failed to adopt a ‘progressive codification of Islamic criminal justice which 
could adapt it to a contemporary framework which would keep faith with the past, while 
setting the foundations for the future.’292  
However, many Arab states are deeply concerned that secular provisions of the Rome 
Statute would allow the ICC to extend its jurisdiction over matters that are of national 
concern. For instance, corruption and a lack of accountability continue to persist in Arab 
Islamic countries, even in the more liberal Arab states in which the judges of Shari’a 
appeals courts must actively balance Shari’a against the protection of the basic political 
liberties of Muslim citizens.293  
The abuse of the state’s monopoly on the use of force reveals the need to adapt 
Shari’a and criminal legal systems to international law, or rather to the Rome Statute.294 
That is to say that a flexible application of Shari’a to civil society can facilitate the 
adaptation of Islam to international law.295 For instance, although 13 members of the 
Arab League have signed the Rome Statute, there are currently only four Arab states 
which have ratified the Statute; Jordan, Tunisia, Comoros and Djibouti.296 On the other 
hand, in Asia, Afghanistan voted in favour of the Statute and has ratified it but 
Indonesia, as the largest Muslim population in the world, abstained from voting and has 
not signed the Rome Statute.297  
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Another concern of Arab countries towards the ICC as an international criminal 
justice institution is based upon the concept of sovereignty. Since most Arab states were 
subjected to colonialism, they are deeply concerned with regard to any external 
interference in their domestic affairs.298 The relationship between international criminal 
tribunals and states is a complex one, with the complementarity regime of the Rome 
Statute being designed to support sovereignty.299 However, it is argued that states with 
‘well-developed criminal justice systems that have the ability and the capacity to 
investigate and prosecute ICC crimes would benefit more from this.’300 In other words, 
the criminal justice systems in the less-developed countries will be judged to be unable 
to effectively hold proceedings. Thus, the ICC will not protect their sovereignty, and 
‘their system will be assessed by judges from those same Western-based countries.’301 
An-Naim has suggested that developing Shari’a will require states leaders and Islamic 
clerical authorities to reinterpret the non-constitutive nature of Shari’a. In other words, 
Shari’a cannot in itself provide the essential source of constitutional changes to bring 
Islam into line with the modern evolution of international law. Under Shari’a, Qur’an 
and Sunnah are the only sources from which to develop constitutional safeguards 
against human rights abuses but given the ambiguities of contemporary Shari’a, Islamic 
states face a challenge in incorporating all the ICC’s legal standards into their domestic 
criminal systems.302  
However, the tension between Islamic states and the ICC could be resolved by a 
mutual, ongoing practice of appealing to the interests of all states parties.303 In fact, the 
system of international criminal law relies on a jurisdiction provided by its different 
constituent national criminal jurisdictions, whereas ‘Islamic international criminal law 
relies on its own provisions’304, and is bound by ‘outdated rules of fixed punishments 
for all crimes.’305 The basic jurisdiction in Islamic international criminal law is based on 
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its original source (Qu’ran and Sunnah), but this does not prevent ‘the adaptation of the 
law to its other sources and even to the modern system of international criminal law.’306 
Nevertheless, it must be noted that the method, degree, and level of punishment in 
Islamic international criminal law may not be the same as in the system of Western 
international criminal law.307 For instance, capital punishment is part of Islamic law as a 
mandatory penalty under Shari’a. However, the diversity of practice would suggest 
there is little consensus even among Muslims as to the scope of capital punishment. In 
other words, although some Islamic states attempted during the negotiation process of 
the Rome Statute to assert that there was some principle at stake, Islamic law in no way 
mandates capital punishment for the crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the 
International Criminal Court, namely genocide, crimes against humanity, and war 
crimes.308 For instance, as Schabas has noted, two of the crimes for which Islamic law 
mandates the death penalty - adultery and apostasy - cannot by any effort of 
interpretation be deemed to be the ‘most serious crimes’ for which the death penalty 
may be imposed in accordance with Article 6(2) of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights.309 
It is interesting to mention here that the creation of the International Islamic Court of 
Justice (IICJ) has been proposed by the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), 
for the purpose of peacefully settling the disputes arising among member states.310 The 
potential establishment of an Islamic Court, based on Islamic law as the primary 
applicable law, may raise a question as to what would happen in the case of a conflict of 
jurisdiction raised by a non-Islamic country under the same dispute. Moreover, it will 
probably have potential consequences for the political and diplomatic balance in the 
Arab region.311 Having said that, the ICC was established to adjudicate genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and war crimes; it does not provide Shari’a law to include all people 
in its world judiciary. Since the ICC issued an arrest warrant against the Sudanese 
President, the creation of an Arab and Islamic criminal court has been proposed by 
Egyptian activists and members of political parties in order to prosecute the crimes 
committed by the world powers in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Palestinian Occupied 
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Territories.312 From the viewpoint of most Muslim countries, the Western world 
hegemony over the ICC operation does not serve their nations’ interests as ‘they may 
want to impose their Shari’a law concepts’ instead of using Western concepts of law.313 
But what if the Islamic countries were to start their own version of the ICC? They could 
then arrest and prosecute all those who say anything negative towards Islam. They 
would not hesitate to issue arrest warrants against people for insulting Islamic law.314 It 
has been claimed that the result of such efforts would be that each group would end up 
with its own ICC, one for Russia and China, one for the Islamic world and one for the 
Western world, each sharing their own values, background and concept of justice.315 It 
is important to ask here what compromises would be made in such a case? In essence, 
setting up an international judicial system has been desirable due to the international 
community’s wish to protect the people of the world from core crimes such as those 
which are now happening in Darfur. Giving up most of the values in the process is not 
the answer.316  
 
2.2 Substantive law in the Islamic legal tradition 
Islam as a comprehensive way of life encompasses a complete moral system that is an 
important aspect of its universal standards. Muslim defenders claim that the world-wide 
application of Shari’a would result in universal freedom and justice.317 In an Islamic 
context, Shari’a includes both ethics and law. However, it does not allow behaviour 
norms based on individual conscience.318 From an Islamic perspective, the purpose of 
human life is to worship God by leading this worldly life in harmony with the Divine 
Will, and thereby achieving peace in this world and everlasting success in the life of the 
hereafter.319 In other words, its objective is complete justice, mercy, well-being and 
wisdom.320 
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In classical Islamic theory, the Qur’annd Sunnah (sayings and practice of the Prophet 
Muhammad) are the basis for the Islamic Divine Law. The Sunnah basically attempts to 
find a solution to any problem from the vantage point of the Prophet Muhammad’s life, 
his sayings and his actions.321 Sunnah is the second source of Islamic law and 
constitutes a practical interpretation of it. It also consists of hadith, which means the 
statements of Prophet and the manner of his life.322 Therefore, the Qur’an and Sunnah 
are the two main sources for Islamic legal theory and provide the subject matter of 
law.323 For Muslims, the moral directives of the Qur’an and hadith are the expression of 
ethics in operation. In essence, Muslims believe that only knowledge of the Qur’an and 
hadith can help individual Muslims solve the conflicts between social and moral norms 
that create ethical dilemmas. Therefore, Islamic law reflects the will of Allah (God) 
rather than the will of the moral majority or the will of a human lawmaker.324 
Islamic law originated in the legal precedents of Muhammad’s early Muslim 
community on the Arabian Peninsula in the 7th Century AD, and had its jurisprudence 
shaped by specific circumstances and therefore limited to individual cases.325 
Thereafter, the Muslims continued their expansion across the Arabian Peninsula and 
into Syria, Mesopotamia (present day Iraq), Persia, and westward into Egypt and the 
rest of North Africa.326 It is interesting to note here that law existed apart from religion 
under the first four Caliph, who followed the Prophet and were continuing to spread the 
moral teachings of the Qur’an. The law was generally administered through existing, 
pre-Islamic institutions of foreign character, such as Persian (to the east) and Byzantine 
(to the west) the two great empires that dominated the Middle East before Islam.327  
The Qur’an contains a variety of lawmaking provisions and legal prescriptions and 
proscriptions which are interspersed throughout its chapters and verses, some dealing 
with specific questions of substantive law, others with questions of criminal procedure, 
and still others establishing the basis for interpretation. Therefore, Qur’an and Sunnah 
                                                 
321
 Sondy, A. d. (2005). "Morality in the Modern World: Islam." from 
www.ltscotland.org.uk/Images/MoralityIslamv2_tcm4-299190.doc [accessed on 10th September 2011]  
322
 Malekian, Op, cit., The Concept of Islamic International Criminal Law: A Comparative Study, p. 6.  
323
 Hallaq, W. B. (1997). A history of Islamic legal theories: an introduction to Sunniī usūl al-fiqh. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 1.   
324
 Ibid., 
325
 Schirrmacher, Op, cit., 
326
 Roberson, C. and D. K.Das (2008). An Introduction to Comparative Legal Models of Criminal Justice. 
Boca Raton, Taylor & Francis Group, p. 6.   
327
 Lippman, M., S. McConville, et al. (1988). Islamic Criminal Law and Procedure. An Introduction. 
New York, Praeger, p. 22. 
 58 
define the procedural and substantive elements of Arab states’ constitutions,328 whilst 
the rules for interpreting the Qur’an itself are subject to the science of interpretation 
(ilm usul al-fiqh).329 In other words, the Qur’an and Sunnah do not give explicit 
guidance on all issues. When guidance is not clearly given in the Qur’an, there are 
several other sources of law. For example, guidance can be sought from fiqh, which 
means ‘understanding’ and is the science of jurisprudence: the science of human 
intelligence, debate and discussion.330  
Islamic law contains the rules by which the Islamic system of criminal justice is to be 
applied.331 However, Qur’anic provisions do not provide a complete code of law and 
procedure of general application;332 they cover ‘only a small part, or outlines some basic 
principles of norms and values.’333 Out of a total of 6237 verses only 190 verses or 3% 
of the total can be said to contain legal provisions. Most of these deal with family law 
and inheritance.334 As such, the Qur’an does not set forth a complete system of criminal 
justice, and criminal proceedings are only referred to for a select number of offences. It 
does, however, contain the elements necessary for the construction by believers of a 
system of justice capable of being respectful to the needs of the society at a given time 
and place. Therefore, Islamic jurisprudence recognizes a number of sources of law that 
permit the development of a comprehensive system of criminal justice.335 However, 
significant differences exist among Muslim scholars as to whether or not Islam in 
general, and Shari’a in particular, are dynamic or static.336 Shari’a is essentially a 
policy-oriented legal system, which requires dynamic evolution and evolving 
application to remain strong. For example, nothing in Shari’a would prohibit the 
development of a criminal code, a code of criminal procedure, a code of corrections, or 
an international criminal court, provided that these different codes embody the basic 
rules of the Shari’a. Furthermore, it is clear that the Shari’a does not provide certain 
rules which can and should be embodied in a codified system in order to ensure the 
integrity of the legal process itself and its proper application, and in order to guarantee 
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the basic human rights of the accused as required in the Islamic criminal justice 
system.337 Consequently, modern jurisprudence in Muslim countries tends to be a 
composite of Quranic commandments, elements of Islamic traditions, customary law, 
vestiges of pre-Islamic Persian or Roman codes, and elements of European legal 
provisions left over from the colonial period.338  
 
2.3 Procedural law in the Islamic legal tradition  
It is important at this point to consider how consistent Islamic conceptions of crime 
and procedure are with the law and practice of the ICC. Islam is a universal religion that 
invites humanity into the unity of God.339 The universality of Islam is an undeniable fact 
and it carries a divine message, as a Qur’anic doctrine of Apostleship,340 which is not 
bound by the constraints of time and space and is addressed to human beings wherever 
they are. This universal character of the Islamic message makes all humans equal in 
terms of duty and legal capacity, as well as in terms of rights and duties.341 However, 
Khadduri has argued that Islamic procedure lacks uniformity and consistency mainly 
because Islam’s process is ‘partly judicial and partly administrative in character.’342 
Islamic criminal law recognizes three categories of crime, including hudud, ta’zir, and 
qisas. These classes of crime are usually distinguished substantially on the basis of rules 
of evidence and penalties inflicted: capital crimes, crimes of retaliation and 
discretionary crimes. The most serious cases, denoted capital (hadd) crimes, comprise 
those classed by the Qur’an or tradition as capital offences and for which they set down 
a fixed penalty. Since Islam regards such crimes as committed against God and not a 
human being, a charge may no longer be dropped once it has been brought; nor is an 
amicable out of court settlement permitted until punishment has been inflicted on the 
guilty party.343 Hadd crimes are set by God and lead to mandatory penalties. Ta’zir 
crimes are forbidden behaviour or acts that endanger public order or state security,344 
and imply the correction or rehabilitation of the perpetrators. Ta’zir crimes have a 
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discretionary nature and punishment is left to the judge. Ta’zir offences include bribery, 
immodest clothing, immoral behaviour, and public drunkenness, etc. Since these 
offences are not explicit in Islamic law, the punishment is left to the discretion of the 
judge as to the range of punishments set out in the penal code, and different countries 
have different punishments for these crimes.345  
The third category is qisas, or retribution, which is concerned with crimes against the 
person such as homicide, infliction of wounds, and battery. Punishment by retribution is 
set by law.346 Qisas crimes include those crimes which cause physical harm or death to 
another; such as murder, manslaughter, battery, mutilation to person, and damage to 
property. A further category is that of diyat. This is not a crime, but a separate 
punishment referring to a form of compensation, or blood money, which is to be paid to 
the victim or the victim’s family as reparation for an injury or murder. This category is 
for those who choose to forgo their right of retribution under the qisas punishment.347  
How do these categories of crime relate to international core crimes? The Rome 
Statute has jurisdiction over the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole: genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.348 Malekian, 
in relation to the three categories of crime in the ICC Statute, has claimed that Islamic 
international criminal law has many provisions dealing with these three categories.349 
For instance, the concept of genocide exists in Islamic jurisprudence and implies ‘strict 
prohibition of acts that are conducted in order to kill, in whole or in part, the population 
of a nation or city.’350 Although the principle of Islamic law is the protection of human 
beings, the concept of crimes against humanity has different conditions for its 
recognition when compared with international criminal law. In particular, according to 
Islamic law, an act recognised as a crime against humanity does not necessarily need to 
be widespread or systematic because Islamic law places its emphasis on human value. 
That is to say that the penal system in Islamic law and the Rome Statute ‘are not 
identical and can create problems concerning the mono-cultural view of these 
definitions.’351  
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According to Article 21 of the Rome Statute, the ICC may apply the national laws of 
states which normally exercise jurisdiction over crime, provided that those principles 
are not inconsistent with the Rome Statute and with international law and 
internationally recognized norms and standards.352 However, the Rome Statute does not 
provide any definition concerning the scope of ‘internationally recognized human 
rights’ as a source of law. Furthermore, international criminal proceedings are ‘widely 
fragmented as a result of [an] unprecedented development of international or mixed 
criminal tribunals which follow very different approaches as far as criminal procedural 
law is concerned.’353 In addition, the Court does not define what is to be understood by 
the general principle of law derived by the Court from the national laws of the legal 
systems of the world.354  
 
2.4 Criminal proceedings under Shari’a  
Criminal proceeding in Islamic law is acting on behalf of society in a contest between a 
defendant and the government.355 Punishment in Islamic thought is morally justified 
because of its deep root in scripture and divine laws.356 The Shari’a presumes that any 
person is innocent until proven guilty in a court of law, and entitles every person 
accused of anything to a fair trial under the Shari’a or his or her own traditional law.357 
Vogler has observed that in Islamic criminal justice, ‘by way of contrast to western 
criminal law, the nature of the offence determines the procedure to be adopted and the 
evidence required, as well as the punishment.’358 In other words, in common law 
systems, offences are classified by the type of harm arising from the crime.359 Whereas, 
according to Islamic law, the definition of crimes, the means of establishing proof and 
the appropriate punishments, are all closely linked.360 Furthermore, Islamic law does not 
conform to the notion of law as in common law and civil law systems.361  
Classical Islamic law was very progressive for its time, as it came with a message 
trying to convey the importance of meeting certain standards of legal protection for 
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individual rights.362 Mayer states that classical Islamic law, a thousand or more years 
ago, did not grant a right to appoint a lawyer (wakil),363 whereas Roberson has argued 
that ‘Shari’a generally entitles individuals and legal entities to a wakil (representative), 
who may be a lawyer.’364 Mayer has claimed that according to scholars of Islamic law, 
the scheme of Islamic criminal justice comports with contemporary standards of 
enlightened criminal justice, and classical Islamic law is still capable of evolving, 
according to its own principles and methodology.365 Due process in Islamic criminal 
law is based upon Shari’a although specific procedural safeguards are not stipulated in 
either the Qur’an or the Sunnah.366 However, due process rights in the Shari’a consist 
of the presumption of innocence, the prohibition of pre-trial detention, the right of 
silence, the right of defence, the prohibition of torture, and the prosecution burden of 
proof.367 According to traditional Islamic criminal law, there is no jury system and there 
is no prosecutor. Judges conduct the investigation, the examination and issue the 
verdict.368 
The application of Shari’a within criminal procedure in Muslim countries began 
during a limited period of time in the seventh century CE. However, the comprehensive 
application of Islamic law was restricted, particularly in the late nineteenth century, 
when they borrowed new codes derived from European ones.369 In fact, during the 
nineteenth century, the application of Islamic criminal law has seen important changes 
due to the emergence of Western hegemony in that century.370In most parts of the 
Islamic world, it was replaced by Western-type criminal codes. In some countries this 
happened immediately after the establishment of colonial rule. Elsewhere it was a 
‘gradual process.’371As previously stated, Shari’a does not provide for a particular 
framework for criminal procedures and judicial process, rather it focuses on the guiding 
principles and objectives without attempting to address the details.372 In this sense, it 
has been written into different aspects of Shari’a and criminal law. However, studies 
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have not yet succeeded in a comprehensive analysis of the procedural rules of Shari’a in 
order to identify those rules within Western codes which are compatible with Islamic 
law.373 
All of the above points indicate quite clearly that, although there has been a tendency 
in some Muslim countries to adopt Western legislation, this trend has not resulted in a 
noticeable change to the systems of government in these countries,374 and that 
furthermore, procedural rules of the ICC are incompatible with Shari’a.375 That is to 
say, the Islamic world view conflicts with the provisions of the Rome Statute.376 The 
state and religion are inseparable in Islamic countries, meaning that the national 
decision-making process cannot be separated from Islam.377  
 
2.5 Sovereignty: 
From the Islamic point of view, ‘the course of justice’ is the application of the judicial 
system, which is established by the state for civil and criminal offences. In other words, 
the monopoly of force and the means of enforcement are placed in the hands of the 
state.378 Sovereignty is another concern of Islamic states with regard to the 
complementarity regime of the ICC,379 although this principle gives primacy to national 
jurisdictions to prosecute crimes falling within the scope of the Rome Statute.380 In 
considering the importance of sovereignty in Islamic states, Roach has identified four 
types of Islamic state sovereignty, including supreme sovereignty, monarchical, 
republican, and democratic. In a sense, the existence of a fundamental bond between 
Shari’a and state rule characterizes these different forms of sovereignty.381  
A monarchical form of sovereignty consists of hereditary rule and the submission of 
the people to ‘the king/sultan/sheikh in exchange for social public order and 
beneficence.’382 In Saudi Arabia, as an example of this type of sovereignty, Shari’a 
remains inflexible and ‘the criminal system allows the government to detain individuals 
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without any judicial body to provide oversight of detention.’383 Saudi Arabia has 
applied Islamic criminal law in its traditional form since it was founded in 1927 and is 
administrated by the Saudi Ministry of Justice.384 An-Naim has argued that in Saudi 
Arabia, ‘certain ideological elites make decisions in the name of the people, who 
continue to be victims of human rights violations. …that position is also taken in the 
name of religion and culture, but it is self-appointed guardians of religions and 
culture.’385  
Republican sovereignty consists of political pluralism or non-elected state political 
parties. In other words, the sovereign adopts Shari’a as the principal source of 
legislation; for instance, Yemen is not defined by a union, the prince, or the people, but 
rather it is ‘compromised of decision-making bodies of non-elected political parties’.386 
Democratic sovereignty is the third type of Muslim state sovereignty, which lies in the 
people’s democratic will; examples can be seen in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Tunisia. The 
distinctive feature of this type of sovereignty is the separation of governmental powers 
to protect individual political and civil rights. However, one may observe particular 
deviations from the democratic norms of human rights protection in this type of 
sovereignty.387 
The last form of sovereignty, according to Roach, is supreme sovereignty wherein the 
supreme authority of God is recognized in the constitution and state sovereignty is 
subordinated to God’s will.388 It is arguable that this type of sovereignty is similar to the 
pre-Westphalian period. In that time, the sovereign authority that ‘held the claim to rule 
was God and his word, and no other agent’s claim to rule superseded it.’389 An example 
of this is Sudan, one of the most extreme versions of an Arab Islamic state,390 whose 
constitution recognizes the supreme authority of ‘God over both sovereignty and the 
state.’391 In this type of sovereignty, the state rejects any recognition of secular norms or 
forms of law.392 Subsequently, a conflict between Shari’a and the protection of 
individual rights arises since there is a lack of state accountability to the people. In fact, 
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‘the constitutional provision on the supreme authority of God over state and sovereignty 
reflected the Sudanese government’s ability to justify virtually any form of brutal 
repression.’393 This has happened in the Darfur region of Sudan, where the Sudanese 
government have supported Janjaweed militias and has conducted unlawful attacks 
against civilians.394 Furthermore, in the case of Sudan there may be problems with 
applying and enacting ICC provisions in cases involving nationals of non-state 
parties.395 
Iran, a non Arab Islamic country, is another example of this form of sovereignty in 
which Islamic law is the principal source of legislation. In other words, God’s will is 
placed above the sovereignty of the people, and the highest clerical rulers are in charge 
of enforcing the laws and rules in conjunction with God’s will – in Iran’s case, the 
Supreme leader and Council of Guardians.396 It is also important to note that, according 
to Iran’s Islamic Punishment Act 1991, the judge can rule in hudud offences based on 
his knowledge in criminal cases related to both crimes against God and people.397 In 
1979, with the overthrow of the Shah and the establishment of the Islamic republic, all 
laws and regulations were newly reformulated based on Islamic rules, and all previous 
laws based upon French-model Criminal Procedure Code abolished.398 The new system 
reflects inquisitorial procedures399 and it is argued that it suffers from over-
criminalisation, with three decades of experience illustrating that it does not work.400 In 
this regard, Bassiouni has argued that the revolutionaries’ application of Islamic 
criminal justice is contrary to the basic doctrine of Islam.401 He notes that, ‘although 
certain laws that were promulgated may be in conformity with a certain interpretation of 
Islam, the manner in which these laws have been applied, as well as ways in which 
other processes have been carried out, are without question contrary to the spirit and 
letter of Islamic criminal justice clearly embodied in the Shari’a.’402 He also claims that 
the demand for the establishment of Islamic criminal justice in various Muslim societies 
is not because their current system is unfair or inadequate. Rather, the demand stands as 
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a symbol of a greater issue - that of radical socio-political and economic 
transformation.403 
Iran is considered to be one of the leading Islamic systems for criminal law and 
procedure. The Judges are primarily religious clerics interpreting ‘God’s will.’404 The 
Islamic system of Iran may also reflect similar value systems in other Muslim countries 
of the world, particularly in the Middle East; countries such as Saudi Arabia, Syria, 
Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Libya, and Egypt.405 It should be noted that it is 
impossible to understand the present legal development in the Islamic countries of the 
Middle East without a correct appreciation of the past history of legal theory, of positive 
law, and of legal practice in Islam.406  
Review of the Rome Statute with an eye towards different criminal justice systems 
reveals support and dispute from Muslim countries, for instance Iran.407 Comparing the 
Iranian criminal justice system with the Rome Statute reveals several apparent conflicts 
that may cause a reluctance to adopt the ICC Statute. Abtahi has argued that the conflict 
between some provisions of the Rome Statute and the principles of Shari’a (the Shi’i 
twelve Ja’fari school) may arise if the Statute is ratified.408 During the UN Diplomatic 
Conference on the Establishment of the Statue, Iran had an active presence at various 
stages of the elaboration of the Statute. However, it has an ‘ambivalent position’ on the 
ICC.409 In terms of the complementarity regime of the ICC, although Iran supported this 
principle, some Iranian scholars claimed that application of the complementarity 
principle in the case of Iran could possibly raise problems. They argued that ‘there is no 
correspondence between its judiciary and international standards, without further 
elaborating on this issue.’410 In addition, the Iranian delegation in the seventh session of 
the ICC Assembly of State Parties (ASP) stated that, according to the principle of 
complementarity, ‘the main responsibility remains on the shoulder of the national 
criminal jurisdictions’ and that therefore, ‘the need for boosting the domestic judicial 
capacities is a crucial element for realizing the purpose of the Rome Statute.’411 The 
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other concern raised by Iran is the lack of Muslim judges in the Court. In fact, this may 
create two types of problems. On the one hand, non-Muslim judges may not be familiar 
with Shari’a principles and therefore justice may not be carried out as it should be. On 
the other hand, article 36 (8) (a) of the Rome Statute does not provide for the religious 
background of the judges which may raise a theological issue in the case where a 
Muslim is judged by non-Muslim judges.412  
It has become increasingly important that countries agree that the ICC provides an 
interesting alternative to the traditional manner of determining the appropriate 
jurisdiction for trying international criminal offences as, previously, countries would 
rarely allow external authorities to exercise jurisdiction over their own citizens. 
However, the ICC jurisdiction raises the issue of whether Islamic law is compatible 
with the contemporary rules of international jurisdiction.413 Although the ICC itself is 
not based on universal jurisdiction, the contention of universal jurisdiction is that ‘all 
states have an interest in punishing crimes that are of international concern’414, which 
can be seen in the Preamble to the Rome Statute - to put an end to impunity for the 
perpetrators of the most serious crimes of concern to the international community.415 
However, substitute the law of man for the law of God, and the exclusion of Islamic 
law’s exclusive jurisdiction becomes a common concern for Muslim countries joining 
the ICC.416 Therefore, it is important to determine whether Muslim countries accept a 
duty for a state to either prosecute or extradite and whether this can be reconciled with 
Islamic law.417  
Malekian has claimed that ‘Islamic law permits a hybrid jurisdiction’ and that the 
legal nature of the ICC is a combination of domestic and international criminal rules. 
Therefore, as long as the Court maintains its objectivity to implement its Statute, its 
provisions may not violate the provisions of Islamic law.418 He does not address the 
complexity of different criminal procedure systems to demonstrate whether Islamic 
procedure is compatible with the Rome Statute, particularly the admissibility 
assessment of a situation or a case based upon the complementarity principle. However, 
he observes that ‘a significant principle of Islamic law is the unchanging nature of 
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Shair’a’, and that ‘penalties cannot be modified by subsequent laws’.419 Therefore, 
‘procedures which are supposedly polar opposites, or antimonies existing in a 
dialectical relationship with each other, cannot be amalgamated.’420 
Substantive and procedural features of the ICC emerged from negotiations between 
states in the Rome Conference. The ICC negotiators from common law and civil law 
states pushed for rules and procedures that were based on their legal backgrounds, 
forging a compromise between common law and civil law principles rather than Islamic 
law or mixed law states.421 In fact, the differences between Islamic law and Western 
legal systems constituted a large obstacle at the Rome Conference. Islamic law was 
largely neglected in the ICC negotiations since Islamic states constituted the smallest 
group amongst the negotiators by comparison with civil law and common law states.422 
Furthermore, Wippman has argued that Islamic states ‘feared that the ICC would be 
used as a tool of Western interests and that their nationals and government officials 
might some day be subject to ICC investigation and prosecution.’423  
Importantly, unlike Western legal systems, there is no division between state-level 
decision-making and the Islamic religion in Islamic law. This indicates that judges 
operating in Islamic domestic legal systems use Shari’a to ‘determine what criminal 
penalties to impose on Muslims accused of violating Shari’a codes.’424 However, as 
Islam makes no distinction between religion and law, this creates inherent tension in the 
application of secular international humanitarian human rights in countries where 
Islamic law is applicable.425 The ICC would have the power to subject citizens of an 
Islamic state to secular international law, which gives the ICC jurisdictional power that 
goes directly against the Islamic faith.426   
As such, Islamic criminal law is fundamentally different from Western legal traditions 
and international criminal law. In this sense, Islamic law, with its strict adherence to 
Shari’a, remains unique and different from Western legal traditions. These differences 
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minimized the impact of the Islamic legal tradition on the structure and procedures of 
the ICC.427 That is to say, the rules and procedures of the ICC constitute a hybrid of the 
civil and common systems whilst Islamic law is simply absent from the structure of the 
ICC. As Powell has argued, this fact creates a significant bias in favour of both civil and 
common law states. In fact, signature and ratification of the Rome Statute does not 
benefit Islamic law states in the same way that it does civil and common law States.428    
 
Conclusion:  
This chapter has addressed an interesting and important question in the creation of 
the ICC and its complementarity regime. Based upon what authority does the Court 
have legitimacy to interfere in a sovereign state to prosecute, arrest and punish 
offenders for the purpose of ‘put[ting] an end to impunity for the perpetrators of’ 
international crimes’?429 Two different normative approaches have been applied in the 
analysis of the ideological roots of the ICC. The purpose of this chapter has been to 
demonstrate the normative foundations of legitimacy of the ICC based on Kantian 
philosophy and the Islamic legal tradition. From the point of view of Kantian morality, 
the ICC is acting in the name of and on behalf of humanity: those who commit serious 
crimes which deeply shock the conscience of humanity are of concern to the 
international community as a whole. As Cassese observes, the establishment of the 
ICC is a revolutionary step in this context of an emerging vision of the international 
community.  
Like Kantian cosmopolitanism, Shari’a is a doctrine of universality but its principles 
are divinely inspired. In spite of the importance of Islamic universalism, significant 
numbers of conflicts are currently taking place in Arab states and have resulted in the 
deaths and displacement of thousands of innocent civilians, which seems to require that 
‘voice of reason accurately conveys to the West the thoughts and concerns of the Arab 
people.’430 However, as this chapter has considered, there is an inherent tension for the 
application of a secular international legal system in countries where Islamic law is 
applicable. Given that the rules and procedures of the ICC were formulated on the 
basis of Western legal systems, and that as such the Rome Statute does not include any 
Islamic provisions, the application of the Court has been particularly challenged in 
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Muslim countries. Although the ICC has been mostly hailed as a success, Islamic states 
still regard its operation with scepticism as Islamic legal tradition is unjustifiably 
neglected among the legal systems by the ICC which has relied purely upon Western 
inspiration.431  
Therefore, cultural adaptation will reflect the willingness of states to reconcile their 
national customs with international law, allowing Islamic states to resolve the tensions 
between secular and Islamic law.432 The Islamic states need to interpret the spirit and 
words of the Qu’ran and Sunna with a view to formulating a comprehensive system of 
specific codes (Shari’a),433 since the Rome Statute provisions will conflict with Islam 
where cases arise, and these cases will sometimes involve serious international 
crimes.434 In fact, it is imperative that Islamic societies touched by those processes feel 
a sense of buy-in or participation that is meaningful for them,435 so that the ICC no 
longer resembles an imperialist Western court.  The next chapter will examine the ICC 
Prosecutorial policy in order to explore whether or not the Prosecutor has taken into 
accout the importance of operating a code of prosecutorial ethics and cultual sensivity 
towards diferent situations.  
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Chapter Three: ICC Prosecutorial Policy on 
Complementarity 
 
Introduction: 
The concept of broad prosecutorial discretion is based on the body of law under which 
the prosecutor decides to file a warrant of arrest, and to trigger a system of charging, 
dismissals, and guilty pleas.1 Over the years, courts in many legal systems have 
reinforced the independent role of the prosecutor by enhancing the degree of discretion 
that the prosecutor possesses.2 The role and functions of the prosecutor have been the 
subject of debate and reform in many democratic countries.3 It is because prosecutors 
are the main ‘gatekeepers’ of the criminal justice system that their decisions have such a 
great impact on the public interest.4 Moreover, the jurisprudence of various courts and 
tribunals as well as national courts in recent decades has demonstrated the important 
role of the prosecutor in the administration of justice.5  
Prosecutors have traditionally been reluctant to explain their decisions to the press, 
while the public, through the media, expect more information about the decision in 
order to enhance prosecutorial accountability.6 In the prosecution process it is 
important to consider the fact that the decision to prosecute and the decision to charge 
‘should not be made by improper influence, political, or otherwise’7 and prosecutors  
‘shall perform their duties fairly, consistently and expeditiously, and respect and 
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protect human dignity and uphold human rights, thus contributing to ensuring due 
process and the smooth functioning of the criminal justice system.’8  
The degree of discretion that prosecutors possess in international tribunals varies 
depending on the nature of their mandates.9 In the context of the ICC, in accordance 
with the principle of complementarity, prosecutorial discretion is broader than in the 
other international tribunals. The criteria upon which the Prosecutor’s discretion is 
exercised are complex,10 and the methodologies for assessing those criteria are vague; 
particularly in the selection of situations, assessment of preliminary investigation and 
charging decisions.11 Therefore, some important issues arise here relating to the 
selection of situations and cases for investigation and prosecution in the context of 
international crimes. 
The issue of an independent Prosecutor with powers to initiate investigations and 
prosecutions was one of the most controversial issues at the Rome Conference and a 
number of states, such as the United States, the Russian Federation, China and others, 
were opposed to the idea of a Prosecutor with such powers. The Draft Statute prepared 
by the International Law Commission (ILC) in 1994 did not provide an independent 
Prosecutor. According to the Rome Statute, situations are identified on the basis of 
three triggering mechanisms, including Security Council referral,12 state referral,13 and 
prosecutorial initiative.14 Therefore, it is arguable that the power of the Prosecutor to 
initiate an investigation in general, and to assess the preliminary investigation in 
particular, has become critical. 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine prosecutorial discretion in the context of 
the ICC in order to assess the prosecutorial decision-making process with regard to the 
complementarity regime. As previously mentioned in the last chapter, the Prosecutor 
has an ethical duty, on behalf of the international community, to bring criminals to 
justice. A Kantian model of criminal justice can accommodate the ambivalence about 
retributive ideas of individual justice in criminal law. This model of thinking is a basis 
for the relationship between society on the one hand and the responsible individual on 
the other. In fact, this spreads the ideas of universal responsibility and moral 
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accountability across a social space, between an individual and a community. 
Therefore, the ICC Prosecutor should act in an ethical rather than a purely expedient 
way in selecting situations and cases; otherwise, they will miss something crucial to 
ethics, by neglecting the concept of moral duty, and a good will. In order to execute 
this ethical obligation, he or she should exercise discretion with the sensitivity 
necessary to serve the goal of achieving justice. The chapter has been organized into 
three sections and will emphasize the importance of code of prosecutorial ethics. The 
first will summarize developments in prosecutorial discretion in the light of 
negotiations in the travaux perparatorives of the Rome Statute. In addition, some 
important questions will be considered in relation to the role of the Prosecutor. The 
second section will analyze the practice of the Prosecutor power within the ICC 
structure. It will further highlight the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in the 
preliminary phase of proceedings and it will establish the scene for the last section. 
This will evaluate the decision-making process by focusing on sufficient guidelines 
and policy, and whether there is consistency and transparency in the prosecutorial 
decisions. It will also consider a control mechanism available to challenge the power of 
the Prosecutor in order to determine whether or not there is sufficient judicial 
supervision of the Prosecutor. 
 
1. The scope of prosecutorial discretion at the ICC: 
 
  The prosecutor has a moral obligation to bring criminal charges and is responsible 
for the effectiveness of the criminal justice system.15 Moreover, the prosecutor enjoys 
significant influence over individual cases. He or she also has broad discretion to direct 
criminal investigations and determine which individuals to charge with crimes as a 
result, as well as to decide which situations will be rejected as inappropriate for the 
Court.16 Prosecutorial discretion entails both risks and benefits. Therefore, this policy-
making role can provide important efficiency benefits in order to maintain a functioning 
criminal justice system.17 In the context of the ICC, a number of important issues may 
arise in relation to the prosecution system; for instance, the role of ethics and culture in 
prosecutorial decision-making process, the discretion of the prosecutor and political 
interference in prosecutorial policy. Moreover, in considering the importance of the 
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independence and accountability of the Prosecutor of the ICC, it is clearly necessary to 
consider the minimum standards of independence which the Prosecutor should enjoy, 
and to what extent the Prosecutor should be subject to the minimum standards of 
accountability.18 Thus, my emphasis will be on the existing model of the Prosecutor 
which has been granted broad discretion by the Rome Statute.  
 
1.1 Developments of prosecutorial discretion in the travaux preparatorives of 
the Rome Statute: 
  Considering the concerns of state sovereignty, the principle of complementarity was 
given fundamental importance in the negotiation of the Statute in the Preparatory 
Committee and during the Diplomatic Conference.19 In particular, the role of the ICC 
Prosecutor, a key aspect of an effective criminal court, and the extent to which he or she 
should enjoy the power to trigger the jurisdiction of the Court were considered at the Ad 
Hoc and Preparatory Committees for the establishment of the ICC.20 In fact, the power 
of the Prosecutor to initiate an investigation based upon his or her own authority had 
been the particular focus of criticism.21 There were different debates over the 
prosecutor’s power. The ILC draft in 1994 indicated that investigations would generally 
be initiated based upon referral by a state party or the UN Security Council. This draft 
did not allow the Prosecutor to initiate a case, mainly out of fear that an independent 
prosecutor would lead to politically motivated decisions.22 However, the Preparatory 
Committee discussed the question of whether to authorize the Prosecutor to initiate an 
investigation and select cases based on information and communications received from 
different sources, including non-state entities such as individuals, and NGOs.23 In effect, 
the Preparatory Committee discussed granting power to the Prosecutor which would 
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enhance the effectiveness of the Court.24 The rationale for enhanced prosecutorial 
authority was that prosecutorial independence seems an essential requirement of a 
legitimate criminal court.25 The option of having an independent Prosecutor was 
supported by representatives of NGOs, who argued that historically states have been 
reluctant to use existing procedures for invoking human rights mechanisms.26 In 
addition, history demonstrated that governments have committed many international 
crimes against their citizens and granted immunities or amnesties to those responsible.27 
It was also thought that states might be unwilling to initiate proceedings against other 
states because of the ‘political and diplomatic ramifications involved.’28 Therefore, 
different proposals regarding prosecutorial independence were considered at the Rome 
Conference and received critical support from ‘like-minded’ states, which played an 
important role in the development of the Rome Statute.29 In the same way, NGOs such 
as Amnesty International argued that because the Court is ‘a judicial body…its 
Prosecutor must have independence to decide whether to investigate or prosecute.’30  
It is important here to take into consideration the objections to the Court of the United 
States, a permanent member of the Security Council. In fact, the States did not oppose 
the idea of an international criminal court in the negotiation;31 indeed, its delegation had 
a significant role in drafting the Rome Statute.32 However, amongst its objections to the 
Rome Statute, the lack of adequate checks and balances on the powers of the Prosecutor 
and judges is an important one.33 The United States was concerned that the ICC would 
become ‘a focal point for rhetorical assertions about criminality even in cases in which 
the ICC clearly lacks jurisdiction.’34 They further claimed that the Prosecutor as an 
independent organ of the Court is not accountable to ‘any representative body’ or the 
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Security Council.35 At the United Nations Plenipotentiaries Conference on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, the United States Ambassador to the 
United Nations declared that a permanent international criminal court must be part of 
the international order, and that the Security Council is a vital part of this order. From 
the U.S. point of view, the Security Council must play an important role in the Court’s 
triggering mechanisms.36 In addition, it was argued that granting power to the 
Prosecutor to initiate investigation and seek an indictment ‘against anyone in any place, 
will weaken rather than strengthen the Court since prosecutorial decisions will be 
regarded as political.’37 Thus, the United States claimed that the Security Council 
should control the prosecutorial discretion of the Prosecutor,38 running contrary to 
Article 16 of the Rome Statute, under which the Security Council could only defer the 
prosecution for a renewable twelve months.39 Given that the Prosecutor has significant 
discretion in determining which situations and which individuals should be investigated 
and prosecuted by the ICC, the United States argued that the Prosecutor is 
unaccountable due to the independence of the ICC from the permanent members of the 
Security Council.40  
Some delegations proposed a plan for enhancing the accountability of the Prosecutor, 
under which the Prosecutor would be required to file an annual report to the Security 
Council. However, the majority of state delegations at the meeting ultimately voted 
against the plan, claiming that the information revealed by the Prosecutor would 
compromise the confidentiality of the Prosecutor’s investigation.41 It was also argued in 
the ad hoc Committee that UN Security Council referral ‘would reduce the credibility 
and moral authority of the Court, excessively limit its role, [and] introduce an 
inappropriate political influence over the functioning of the institution.’42  
Arab delegations supported the prosecutor's right to initiate investigation 
independently. However, they objected to the UN Security Council's ability to refer a 
situation given that permanent members of the Security Council could block efforts to 
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investigate their own actions.43 As a result, in the final version of the Rome Statute, to 
avoid making the Court formally ‘subordinate to political institutions,’ the Prosecutor 
was granted an investigatory role in situations identified by states, the Security Council 
and on his or her own motion. The Security Council was given only a limited ability to 
restrict the Prosecutor’s discretion,44 although no limitation – given the territorial and 
nationality preconditions to the jurisdiction of the Court - applies in relation to UN 
Security Council referrals.45  
Therefore, the Prosecutor enjoys broad discretion in the initiation and conduct of 
criminal proceedings, such as the selection of the concrete situations and cases for 
investigation or prosecution.46 According to the Rome Statute, the ICC Prosecution is a 
separate organ of the Court 47 and ‘shall be headed by the Prosecutor.’48 Depending on 
whether there is any obligation for the ICC Prosecutor to bring proceedings, it is for the 
Prosecutor to determine if there is sufficient basis for a prosecution and whether he or 
she can initiate an investigation. However, the case must pass the admissibility test 
under the principle of complementarity according to Article 17 of the Rome Statute.49  
 
2. Analysis of the practice of prosecutorial discretion at the ICC  
2.1 Preliminary examination under the Rome Statute:  
There are three kinds of triggering mechanisms pursuant to the Rome Statute. The UN 
Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, as well as a state party, 
may refer a situation to the Prosecutor, or the Prosecutor may initiate an investigation 
independently, proprio motu, with the authorization of the Pre-Trial Chamber.50 The 
Prosecution has the key role and is the only organ of the Court in preliminary 
investigation able to obtain the necessary information and examine national courts to 
make sure that they investigate and prosecute crimes committed within the situation of 
crisis that is the subject of the triggering procedure.51 The Rome Statute, in general, 
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grants the Prosecutor the authority to exercise discretion in selecting and prioritizing 
investigations.52 Article 53 of the Rome Statute, along with the complementarity regime 
based on Article 17, set out some obligations for initiating an investigation and for the 
admissibility of a case.53 As such, no external entity can direct the Prosecutor to charge 
cases against particular individuals.54  
Yet, as Knoop has claimed, ‘no definition of reasonable basis is provided’ and it is the 
Prosecutor, therefore, who is empowered to determine whether this reasonable basis 
exists.55 However, the Prosecutor does have the power to conduct his or her preliminary 
inquiry. The main purpose of this is to gather sufficient information to determine the 
existence of ‘a reasonable basis to believe’ that crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Court have been committed in the situation concerned. For instance, ‘seek[ing] 
additional information from states, organs of [the] United Nations, intergovernmental or 
non-governmental organizations, or other reliable sources that he or she deems 
appropriate’ and ‘receiv[ing] written or oral testimony at the seat of the Court,’ are the 
sort of preliminary investigative steps, based upon proprio motu power, which are 
formulated in Article 15 of the Rome Statute. However, a situation which is referred by 
the Security Council or state party presupposes that they have undertaken a previous 
investigation before formally communicating with the Prosecutor.56  
An important point which arises here is that the preliminary inquiry may be carried 
out confidentially without giving notice to the state concerned, while the initiation of an 
investigation  must always be communicated by the Prosecutor to ‘all state parties’ and 
any states concerned who are not party to the Rome Statute.57 However, there is an 
important distinction between the preliminary inquiry and the investigation. In the 
preliminary phase, ‘the Prosecutor shall establish the personal, territorial and temporal 
parameters that define the referred situation within which those specific facts take 
place.’58 On the other hand, in the investigation phase, and in accordance with Article 
54 (1) (a), the Prosecutor has to ‘establish the truth.’ In doing so, he or she has to 
‘extend the investigation to cover all facts and evidence relevant to an assessment of 
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whether there is criminal responsibility under this Statue,’ and must cover incriminating 
and exonerating circumstances equally.59  
It is also important to note here that the situation as the subject of investigation is 
contained in the Rome Statute Article 13 (a) (b), Article 14 (1), Article 15 (5) (6), 
Article 18 (1), and Article 19 (3), and objectivity is defined by ‘personal, territorial and 
temporal parameters as opposed to a case composed of specific facts allegedly 
committed by identified suspects.’60 In other words, the Prosecutor is bound to 
investigate and prosecute the crimes committed by all the different parties within the 
situation.61 Moreover, the Prosecutor’s determination as to whether there is a 
‘reasonable basis to proceed’ with an investigation must be made in relation to the 
whole situation referred by the state party, and not only with regard to specific acts 
which took place within it.62 It is important to emphasize here that the nature of the 
authority to interpret and define the situation is important. In this regard, a senior ICC 
officer has claimed that there is no authority to interpret what constitutes a ‘situation’. 
For example,  
In the records of the Uganda situation it mentioned that the government 
referred the situation concerning the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) to the 
Prosecutor as well as the situation in Northern Uganda.63 
 
In relation to the assessment of the differences between the admissibility test of a 
situation and that of a case, a senior ICC officer suggested that: 
‘The admissibility test of a case is easier than the admissibility test of a 
situation. In terms of a case, the same individual and the same conduct 
should be considered. However, in the admissibility test at the situation 
level before the opening of an investigation, it is difficult to determine 
what the state is doing and what is sufficient to consider whether the state 
is acting or not. This is complicated and there are no established 
criteria.’64  
 
In relation to the assessment of a situation, he also emphasizes that:  
 ‘The performance of the state in relation to crimes within the jurisdiction 
of the Court is important, and it is difficult to find out whether any 
prosecution and investigation has been done in respect of certain crimes. 
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In doing so, the difficulty is when the state is taking partial action to 
investigate certain crimes but not others, and when they are prosecuting a 
group of certain individuals but not others. The point is there should be 
some standards to do an admissibility test at this stage.’65 
 
He suggests three criteria to consider whether the state is active or inactive.  
 
‘In the situation, three main criteria should be considered; 1- those groups 
that may be involved in the criminality that has taken place; 2- the high 
level individuals in those groups; and 3- not every high level individual 
but those who was involved in promoting that criminality.’  
 
‘The next question is whether the State is unwilling or unable to carry out 
those investigations and prosecutions.’66 
 
As discussed earlier in this section, there are a set of considerations in the Rome 
Statute regarding investigation and prosecution which govern the discretion of the 
Prosecutor in determining whether or not to proceed with a case.67 However, the 
experience of the ad hoc tribunals demonstrated that international prosecutions cannot 
pursue all crimes within a particular conflict, which is the main challenge faced by the 
Prosecutor, and this may cause a discriminatory result and inequality in treatment. It is a 
problematic issue and the Rome Statute is silent about which potential accused should 
be pursued by the Prosecutor.68 Danner has claimed that even the review of the 
Prosecutor’s decision by the Pre-Trial Chamber will not solve this problem, given that 
the Chamber can assess ‘only the lawfulness and not the wisdom of the Prosecutor’s 
decision to investigate.’69 When an investigation has been initiated, the Prosecutor will 
be able to ‘control the way in which an investigation is conducted’ 70 and the 
investigators are accountable to him or her.71 Under Article 53 (2) of the Rome Statute, 
the Prosecutor has discretion not to proceed where ‘there is not a sufficient basis for a 
prosecution.’72 If the Prosecutor decides there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an 
investigation, based upon Article 18(1) of Rome Statute, he or she must notify all states 
parties to the Rome Statute and those states that would otherwise exercise jurisdiction 
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over the crimes.73 Subsequently, if one of these states informs the Court that ‘it is 
investigating or has investigated its nationals within its jurisdiction, the Prosecutor shall 
defer to the state’s investigation of those persons.’74 However, it is questionable how far 
the prosecution submissions can be under seal or confidential regarding such complex 
admissibility procedures.  
Regarding the Prosecutor’s discretion over the decision to charge, it is worth 
mentioning here that Article 16 (4) of the Rome Statute provides that the Prosecutor 
‘may amend or withdraw any charges’ before the hearing to confirm charges on which 
the Prosecutor intends to seek trial.75 However, ‘after commencement of the trial, the 
Prosecutor may, [only] with the permission of the Trial Chamber, withdraw the 
charges.’76    
 
2.2 Prosecutorial discretion in the initiation of an investigation: 
Applying the complementarity principle raises several legal and political concerns, 
notably the difficulty of proving the unwillingness of states to investigate and prosecute. 
In particular, Article 17 (2) contains the conditions and rules of procedure concerning 
the Court’s powers. It stipulates, inter alia, that the ICC can intervene when national 
courts: 1- shield the defendant from investigation and prosecution; 2- there is an undue 
delay in initiating an investigation and prosecution; 3- there exists bias against the 
defendant. The purpose of these rules is to ‘create an incentive for states, and to 
encourage them to develop and then apply their national criminal justice system as a 
way of avoiding the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC.’ 77  
The ICC may exercise its jurisdiction only when the national courts are inactive or are 
‘unable’ or ‘unwilling’ to conduct investigations and prosecutions. Under Article 17 of 
the Rome Statute, the ICC must decide whether the national jurisdiction is willing and 
able to take up the case.78 The Prosecutor is the principal agency responsible for 
safeguarding the complementarity regime during the ‘triggering and criminal 
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procedures.’79 Triggering procedures within the ICC criminal justice system are 
necessary for the initiation of any criminal procedure.80 Therefore, as Olasolo has 
observed, the triggering procedure is precisely the mechanism through which the 
Prosecutor exercises its power to decide whether or not it is going to apply its 
investigative and prosecutorial powers over the crimes committed in a given situation of 
crisis.81 In effect, analysis of national courts investigations and prosecutions are viewed 
in terms of triggering procedures.82  
The Prosecutor on his or her own motion may initiate an investigation with regard to 
an alleged crime committed within a situation of crisis. By doing so, the Prosecutor 
opens a criminal procedure which is subject to a case, which is composed of specific 
facts that allegedly amount to one or more crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court. It 
is important to note that during the investigation stage the Prosecutor is the only party in 
charge of the proceedings until the issuance of a warrant of arrest based on Article 58 of 
the Rome Statute.83 Even after the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the Prosecutor has the 
key role in the application of the complementarity regime. Under Article 19 (3) of the 
Rome Statute, the Prosecutor may seek an admissibility ruling. Moreover, Article 18 
indicates that the Prosecutor has the power to defer an investigation of a case on the 
grounds that a domestic jurisdiction is investigating or prosecuting the specific crime.84 
Furthermore, Article 19 (11) grants the Prosecutor supervisory functions to request 
information on the proceedings from the state concerned.85 The Prosecutor, in 
determining whether to conduct a preliminary examination or investigation, will have to 
consider whether guidelines cover the factors in Article 53 (1) (a) to (c) and Article 17, 
which apply to any state or Security Council referrals. It may be that the most serious 
challenge facing the Prosecutor is in determining which crimes to select for a 
preliminary examination and investigation based on referral by the Security Council, 
pursuant to Article 13 (b), or by a state party, pursuant to Articles 13 (a) and 14.86  
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The determination of criteria in deciding whether to initiate an investigation relies 
largely on subjective decision-making by the Prosecutor. According to Article 53 (1) of 
the Rome Statute,87 the Prosecutor must make a subjective assumption to define what is 
‘reasonable’ in determining whether the case is admissible under Article 17, and 
whether or not there are ‘substantial reasons’ for believing that an investigation would 
not serve the interests of justice. It should be mentioned here that a relevant 
circumstance in one situation may not be relevant in another, and it is up to the 
Prosecutor to make this determination.88 In considering the admissibility of the case, the 
Rome Statute sets out some criteria but does not indicate how to evaluate them.89 In 
determining whether there is a ‘reasonable basis to proceed’, Article 53 declares that the 
Prosecutor must consider whether ‘the information available to the Prosecutor provides 
a reasonable basis to believe that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been or 
is being committed,’ and whether ‘the case is or would be admissible under article 
17.’90 Article 17 itself allows for considerable prosecutorial discretion. Subparagraphs 
(2) and (3) of Article 17 provide some criteria in order to determine ‘unwillingness’ and 
‘inability’91 but McDonald and Haveman have claimed that these criteria still leave 
room for a large degree of prosecutorial discretion. For instance, under Article 17 (2) 
(b), the determination of ‘unjustified delay’ and ‘[bringing] the person concerned to 
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justice’ is vague. Questions arise as to what constitutes an ‘unjustified delay’ and to 
what extent it can be determined by the Prosecutor. Does ‘[bringing] the person 
concerned to justice,’ mean the indictment or arrest of a suspect, or the commencement 
of trial? Which standards should apply for this provision? Also, the context of the crime 
is relevant here. For example, are the standards in armed conflict the same as those in 
peacetime, when criminal justice systems function fully?92  
Determination of the relationship between the unwillingness and the inability of states 
is the other important issue for the Prosecutor. What might appear as unwillingness may 
be de facto inability.93 Consequently, the role of the Court in determining these criteria 
based upon the principle of complementarity is significant,94 since the ICC has a 
mechanism for evaluating national judicial systems.95 There has been considerable 
debate as to whether the ICC’s role is one of assisting states that are unable or 
encouraging states that are unwilling to proceed with the prosecution and investigation 
in a particular case. However, many states ‘may wish not to pursue a particular 
investigation and prosecution because of … political interests.’96 As such, the Court 
may be used as an instrument in a national political conflict and will become politicised. 
Therefore, the Prosecutor should implement standards in a consistent way to determine 
whether states can prosecute at the national level, whether they are therefore unable or 
unwilling and whether the case should come under the ICC’s jurisdiction.97  
Prof. Bassiouni, in relation to the self-referral of a situation to the ICC Prosecutor for 
political reasons, observes that: 
‘There are a range of reasons for a state to refer a situation to the 
Court, some of which could be part of a non-political category of 
facts. However, it might be a situation where the government are 
willing to proceed but because of a lack of control and for political 
reasons may request the Court to pursue the situation. For instance, in 
Uganda the government didn’t want to risk more problems with the 
Lord’s Army so referred the situation to the ICC Prosecutor.’98  
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Wouters has also suggested that self-referral can endanger the legitimacy of the Court, 
since it allows for the prosecution of rebel groups only.99 For instance, the Ugandan 
government referred the situation for the purpose of investigation and prosecution of the 
leadership of the LRA. However, some of the conduct of the Ugandan military could 
equally be the subject of criminal investigations and proceedings by the Prosecutor.100 
Chapter seven will discuss self-referral issues in detail, in relation to the DRC situation 
as one of the state referrals to the Prosecutor. 
 
2.3 The exercise of prosecutorial discretion within the ICC structure: 
The issue of prosecutorial discretion and when and how it can and should be exercised 
is one of the deepest and most difficult questions facing the Court.101 It is important to 
consider the principles according to which the Prosecutor should perform his or her 
moral obligation in multi-cultural world. In practice, national courts may be in a better 
position to initiate proceedings; otherwise, the Prosecutor must intervene and prosecute 
cases based on code of prosecutorial ethics. In this sense, ‘the Prosecutor’s unique brand 
of discretion’ is a new issue for international criminal justice and the question of 
prosecutorial discretion at the ICC has been criticized in the early years of its work.102 A 
key concern relates to the extent to which the Prosecutor should develop his or her own 
prosecutorial guidelines and whether or not the Judges should direct the Prosecutor 
through their judicial interpretation of the Rome Statute.103 In fact, the Prosecutor must 
consider a range of policy and strategy matters in executing his or her ethical duty 
which will have an impact on the framework of international criminal justice. These 
include normative requirements and guidelines for admissibility assessment, the 
selection of cases for preliminary examination or investigation, and the criteria for 
determining whether states are unwilling or genuinely unable to investigate or prosecute 
crimes.104  
Given that the prosecution of everyone responsible for international crimes is not 
possible, selective prosecution is accepted in all legal systems and is consistent with 
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general principles of law.105 The Prosecutor must also consider the development of 
guidelines for prosecution and policy with respect to requests by the UN Security 
Council or the state referral of a situation.106 In addition, it is important to take into 
account to what extent the Prosecutor should limit investigations and indictments to 
situations that fit the standard contexts associated with international criminal 
prosecution.107 As mentioned earlier, making decisions over whether to investigate or to 
prosecute is one of the prosecutorial discretion issues. The timing of indictments is the 
other relevant discretionary issue. This is because the nature of the ICC allows the Court 
to issue indictments during an ongoing conflict. However, the question arises as to 
whether the Prosecutor should investigate and bring charges in situations where the 
conflict is still on-going. Arguably, an investigation into an ongoing conflict makes the 
political consequences of that investigation more sensitive. This is particularly pertinent 
as all of the ICC’s ongoing investigations, notably in the Darfur region of the Sudan and 
the DRC, are taking place in the midst of ongoing conflict. Thus, a question may be 
raised here as to what effect the prosecutorial process may have on efforts to end violent 
conflicts and achieve peace.108 The Rome Statute is silent about the time limit of 
charging within which the Prosecutor can make a decision to initiate an investigation 
into an ongoing conflict. This issue may raise another question about the operation of 
the complementarity regime in terms of the extent to which the Prosecutor can seek 
indictments at times of conflict, especially when states are highly unlikely to be both 
willing and able to pursue prosecutions.109  
It should be noted that the political role of the Prosecutor plays an important part in 
the administration of international criminal justice. Knowledge of the legal framework 
and the operational dynamics of the military and political structures of the concerned 
situation are crucial to determining the individual responsibility of the accused and to 
establish the chains of command. Thus, knowledge for this purpose should not be based 
only upon secondary sources, particularly when there is a parallel mechanism of 
decision-making based upon individuals in their personal capacity and their official 
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position in the chain of command.110 As has been mentioned already, the issue of who 
to prosecute is one of the most important considerations in prosecutorial decision-
making. The international criminal Prosecutor must also consider how far they should 
focus on higher level accused and/or low ranking perpetrators (the logic of targeting so-
called big fish versus small fish).111 Article 1 of the Rome Statute declares that the 
Court ‘shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious 
crimes of international concern.’112 However, selected cases in current situations at the 
ICC have met this criterion in different ways. For instance, in the DRC situation, the 
first case selected concerned recruiting child soldiers. In contrast, in the situation of 
Darfur it was announced that the preference will be for ‘big fish’ in investigating 
crimes.113 Therefore, the question that arises here is why the prosecutor is seeking Al- 
Bashir’s arrest for genocide, the most serious crime with which he can be charged and 
the most difficult to prove.114  
The other key question is whether the Prosecutor should worry about the risks of 
destabilizing delicate political situations through the publicizing of investigations or the 
bringing of charges. The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Louis Arbour, was faced with this question when she 
decided to indict Slobodan Milosevic in 1999.115 Although many observers criticized 
her decision, the ICTY Prosecutor maintained that she had decided independently to 
indict Milosevic from the fear of granting him amnesty by the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO).116 These criticisms and reactions to the Milosevic indictment 
indicate the importance of guidelines when the Prosecutor is exercising his or her 
discretion in controversial cases. Similarly, the ICC Prosecutor encountered this issue in 
relation to the Darfur situation when the request for the issue of a warrant of arrest 
against the president of the Sudan, Al-Bashir, was announced in July 2008. The case of 
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President Al-Bashir of Sudan is distinguishable from other national leaders who have 
been indicted by international courts such as Charles Taylor and Slobodan Milosevic, 
‘on the basis that these prosecutions occurred after a transition to democracy in the 
context of a new national arrangement, and thus have little bearing on the Sudanese 
case.’117 Greenwalt has argued that Prosecutorial authority and its inconsistency with 
governing principles of case strategy for the prosecution at an early stage of the criminal 
justice process will challenge the legitimacy of prosecutorial discretion and complicate 
the work of the ICC.118  
The fourth report of the Prosecutor to the United Nations Security Council declared that 
the Prosecutor ‘is required to focus on the most serious incidents and the individuals 
with the greatest responsibility for those incidents.’119 However, regarding the selection 
of the first suspect in the DRC situation before the ICC, one of the interviewees 
observed that:   
‘Tomas Daylo Lubanga was the only person [for] whom the 
Prosecutor had sufficient evidence, although he charged only for child 
soldiers despite the fact that he was in jail because of different 
crimes.’120  
 
According to the normative basis of the complementarity regime of the Court, the 
Prosecutor should consider law, evidence as well as moral obligations to fulfil his or her 
ethical and legal duty and not simply to win a case. In the DRC situation, the Lubanga 
case seemed to be relatively simple; however it is entering its final phase after six years 
of proceedings. The legitimacy and accountability of the Prosecutor has been further 
criticized by commentators such as Rozenberg, who has claimed that ‘the move against 
Al-Bashir is intended to show that the ICC is willing to pursue difficult cases of high-
ranking officials and to regain some of the legitimacy that the Court has lost in Uganda 
and the Democratic Republic of Congo.’121  
In the Darfur situation, Prof. Bassiouni observed in relation to charging the head of state: 
‘We cannot presume that a national legal system is going to be 
considered unwilling, simply because it was the judgement of the 
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Prosecutor to decide to indict [the] head of state. I think this was a big 
jump.’122  
 
Cayley, in relation to the prosecution of crimes committed in the Darfur region in the 
Sudan, has observed that the governing principles of the case strategy for this situation 
should be set ‘to target those most responsible for the crimes, to concentrate the 
investigation on senior military and political figures and then local level, to concentrate 
the investigation on a very limited number of criminal episodes, to cover all facts and 
evidence for the purpose of the establishment of the truth and to investigate 
incriminating and exonerating circumstances equally.’123 In the Pre-Trial phase, the 
Prosecutor must apply a consistent set of criteria to every case. Moreover, the 
Prosecutor will have to decide how many charges to bring and for what kinds of crime, 
and the reasons behind those choices. The decision as to whether or not to have a formal 
policy in this respect is an important one. This significantly affects the complexity, 
length, and character of the individual cases heard by the Court.124  
It is therefore of critical importance that the Prosecutor should give long and careful 
thought to the issue of prosecutorial discretion and how it should be exercised, especially 
in the initiation of an investigation.125 Precise understanding of the Prosecutor’s 
discretion and its limits requires a review of the procedure by which a case makes its 
way through the Court.126 As such, internal prosecutorial policy can moderate the risk of 
politicized prosecution.127  
 
3. The prosecutorial decision-making process in relation to the 
complementarity regime  
With regard to a challenge to a state’s assertion of inadmissibility, the prosecutorial 
decision-making process carries political implications in prosecution policy and 
practice. This section explores the important character of the prosecutor in the process 
of justice and the extent to which a prosecution policy and pattern operate in the 
decision-making process. Although the Rome Statute empowers the Prosecutor to 
prosecute international crimes, it does not provide sufficient guidance to enable him or 
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her to select situations and cases. In addition, Roach argues that the use of pragmatic 
ethics in the ICC shows how experience and intelligence play an important role in 
governing the consequences of its actions and its case-by-case selections.128  
Prof. Bassiouni, in respect of the application of the principle of complementarity, has 
maintained that:  
 
‘There is no inter-active process between the Prosecutor and national 
legal systems and national prosecutions to show the movement in terms 
of  inter-relationship and cooperation. The Prosecutor should proceed 
based on facts.’129  
  
In addition, as a senior ICC officer has highlighted, there are different perspectives 
about the complementarity principle from the viewpoints of the Chambers and the 
Office of the Prosecutor (OTP).  
‘The complementarity principle which is being applied in the 
Chambers is different from the OTP perspective. OTP have their own 
perspective about unwillingness or inability criteria in assessing the 
admissibility of a case. There has been nothing developed in the ICC in 
terms of unwillingness or inability criteria. However, till now there was 
no challenge in the sense of bringing the problem about unwillingness 
and inability to the fore.’130  
 
This is explored in further detail in case studies (Chapters 5 and 7).  
  
3.1 Overview of prosecutorial guidelines at the ICC: 
 
  The actions of the Prosecutor will inevitably be guided by some code of 
prosecutorial ethics, even if he or she does not acknowledge them. However, 
articulating public prosecutorial guidelines will demonstrate that his or her decisions 
will be taken in a rational and consistent way.131 Guidelines will set out clear standards 
and indicate clarifications in particular during the preliminary examination phase, and 
are important for protecting impartiality and maintaining apolitical prosecutions. Such 
guidelines can provide factors to be taken into account by the Prosecutor when making 
his or her discretionary decision.132 Guidelines in the context of prosecutorial discretion 
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are quite common in national jurisdictions in which the prosecutor has wide 
discretionary power.133 As Greenwalt has claimed, any framework of prosecutorial 
guidelines at the ICC faces a tension between the policy priorities of the ICC and those 
societies which are affected by international crimes.134 Given the fact that there is 
considerable cultural diversity among states and conception of justice, the Prosecutor 
should be sensitive to cultural and religious differences, and unique needs and 
circumstances of each society in order to perform his or her function. For instance, there 
is a prevailing attitude towards the ICC prosecutions among less-developed countries 
which view the Court as an agent and symptoms of imperialism.135  
Therefore, prosecutorial guidelines will assist the Prosecutor in establishing the 
legitimacy and transparency of his or her policies and discretionary decision-making.136 
In fact, the purpose of the Prosecutorial guidelines - including provisions concerning 
investigation and charging decisions - is to promote fair and consistent decision-making 
and to make the prosecutorial process more understandable.137 It would also help the 
Prosecutor negotiate the tension between accountability and independence.138 In this 
sense, it is important whether the content of prosecutorial policy could solve the 
legitimacy challenges posed by the substantive problems of prosecutorial discretion, and 
to what extent appropriate guidelines could narrow the Prosecutor’s range of options.139 
For instance, the Secretariats of the International Association of Prosecutors (IAP) and 
the Coalition for the International Criminal Court (CICC) proposed a Draft Code of 
Professional Conduct for the Office of the Prosecutors of the International Criminal 
Court in 2002.140 This draft code was prepared as a ‘potential tool in shaping the Office 
of the Prosecutor's approach to professional ethics.’141 The draft code of conduct for the 
Prosecutor mentioned that the Prosecutor ‘should be, and appear to be, consistent, 
objective, impartial, and independent.’ Although the draft code of conduct does not 
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address the guidelines regarding prosecutorial discretion, it does emphasise the 
importance of ethical prosecutorial behaviour.142   
The Rome Statute itself does not provide prosecutorial goals in any substantial detail, 
although its Preamble undertook to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of 
‘serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole.’143 The 
prosecutorial guidelines can be constituted from a number of different sources, 
including interrelated guidelines and policies involving the principle of 
complementarity on the basis both of UN Security Council referral and state referral. 
For instance, they can be derived from guidelines for selecting cases for preliminary 
examination or investigation, including cases where it is necessary to determine whether 
states are unwilling or genuinely unable to investigate or prosecute crimes.144  
Clearly, the perceptions of the Prosecutor’s work and how his or her mandate is 
executed are very important, particularly in the early phase of the Court’s work. In order 
to increase transparency and enhance the credibility of the Court as a legal institution, it 
is necessary to identify the guiding principles underlying the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion and to identify criteria which can be applied in each instance in order to 
determine whether the conditions of Article 53(1) of the Rome Statute have been 
fulfilled.145 However, this Article does not provide specific guidance with respect to the 
way in which the Prosecutor should approach this issue.146 Article 17(2) specifies two 
conditions under which the ICC may intervene in the affairs of national judiciary, but 
determining the unwillingness of states is difficult. It requires subjective judgements of 
state intent that may lead to conflicting interpretations of the validity of this intent. For 
example, even if the ICC adequately determines that the national court’s slow 
investigative proceedings constitute an unnecessary delay in the process, it is possible 
that national courts or state leaders will contest this interpretation, especially if it upsets 
their sense of national pride. Thus, the application of the complementarity principle will 
likely turn on the national government’s inability to investigate or prosecute, since the 
determination of inability based on the condition of partial or complete state collapse 
(Article 17 (3) ) presents fewer political obstacles.147  
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It is also important that the Prosecutor explains any additional factors which are 
considered in prosecutorial decision-making regarding the inadmissibility of the case. 
Such a guideline will improve the consistency and coherency of decision-making as 
well as improving the possible amendment of the guidelines.148 In fact, the Prosecutor 
must apply a consistent and publicly articulated standard when deciding which cases to 
investigate and to prosecute. Publication of the prosecutorial guidelines will ensure that 
public expectations are realistic. Furthermore, guidelines must take into account a 
number of other factors concerning the prospects for obtaining sufficient evidence to 
prove that an individual has committed a crime.149 The consistency of the prosecutorial 
guidelines has also been addressed by some NGOs such as FIDH, who propose that 
workable guidelines in determining which crimes should be subject to preliminary 
examination and which cases to prosecute, and the consistency of the application of 
these guidelines, should be considered in the prosecutor’s decision-making process.150  
Therefore, since the Rome Statute entered into force on July 1, 2002, the OTP has 
made efforts to provide a draft policy paper and draft regulations on issues relevant to 
its policy and initial operation. In this regard, the first public hearing was held in 2003 
to address some important issues in this draft such as prosecutorial independence and 
accountability, and the efficiency of investigations.151 In relation to the scope of the 
complementarity principle, it was announced that ‘[n]o clear consensus has yet emerged 
on the appropriate contours for the complementarity practice of the Office.’152 It was 
also observed that there was a need for more detailed standards of impartiality, integrity 
and effectiveness in the operation of the prosecution based upon the Rome Statute. In 
the second public hearing of the OTP, which was held in September 2006, the three 
principles of the prosecutorial strategy were addressed, including positive 
complementarity, focused investigations and prosecutions, and maximizing the 
impact.153 The positive complementarity approach adopted by the OTP means that it 
‘encourages genuine national proceedings where possible; relies on national and 
international networks; and participates in a system of international cooperation.’154 The 
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second principle, that of focused investigations and prosecutions, reflects the policy of 
the OTP of focusing on the most serious crimes and those responsible for these 
crimes.155 The Office also adopted a ‘sequence’ approach, whereby cases inside the 
situation are selected according to their gravity.156  
However, the OTP policy paper indicates that ‘in some cases the focus of an 
investigation by the Prosecutor may go wider than high-ranking officers, if investigation 
of certain type of crimes or those officers lower down the chain of command is 
necessary for the whole case.’157 Bassiouni, with regard to government involvement in 
crimes committed and how responsibility can be proven up the chain command, has 
stated that:  
‘The logic of every proceeding should be considered. For instance, 
considering the function of the local military and local chief of the 
police would lead the Prosecutor to build the chain of command 
responsibility’.158  
 
Although the Prosecutor announced that they will focus on the most serious incidents 
and individuals, the assessment of the seriousness of the crimes is critical for impartial 
prosecutorial decision-making. Otherwise, this could ‘fuel the politicization of the 
ICC’159 since ‘the ICC lacks sufficient political safeguards to protect against the abuse 
of prosecutorial authority’.160 This prosecutorial strategy has been considered by 
different entities such as states parties, the organ of the Court, international 
organizations, NGOs and academia. In this regard, the FIDH, one of the NGOs, in its 
statement on the prosecutorial strategy, declared that ‘there is a fundamental difference 
between the strategy that is announced and the implementation of the outlined 
principles.’161 Therefore, the monitoring of certain situations by the Prosecutor may 
remain unknown. It is argued that even in those cases where it has been made public 
that a particular situation is under preliminary analysis, the Prosecutor should adopt a 
much more proactive role.162 For instance, the situation of Colombia was made public 
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by the Prosecutor in March 2005. However, the communication between the Court and 
Colombia ‘has not been followed up publicly, which has minimized any preventive 
impact of the ICC.’163 With regard to focused investigations and prosecutions, it has 
been argued that this principle is not representative of the range of criminality. For 
instance, in the case of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, the recruitment of child soldiers to 
‘participate actively in the hostilities are crimes of a very serious nature. However, the 
charges for which Thomas Lubanga will be tried are neither representative of the crimes 
committed by the Union des Patriotes Congolais, which he has been leading, nor 
reflective of the victimisation suffered by the communities.’164 
 
3.2 The lack of consistency and transparency of Prosecutorial 
decisions 
  Both the consistency of procedure and the adherence to due process standards are 
crucial in the fact-finding process.165 There are many possible criteria that the 
Prosecutor may use to guide him or her in deciding: (1) whether to initiate an 
investigation and (2) whether to actually prosecute. The complementarity criterion of 
inability and unwillingness are mentioned in the ICC Statute.166 The principle of 
complementarity seems to provide some answers to the question of which cases to 
investigate and prosecute where national jurisdictions are unable or unwilling to do so. 
However, many other factors may be considered when deciding on whether or not an 
investigation should be started.167 The primary role of the Prosecutor in the early stages 
of proceedings is to make a decision as to whether or not the ICC gets involved in 
different situations. Although in the early stages of proceedings the Prosecutor does not 
have the power to investigate, he or she can conduct a fact-finding inquiry. As a senior 
ICC officer asserted:  
‘In preliminary examination, the Prosecutor does not exercise any 
investigation power. The Prosecution conducts a fact-finding 
inquiry to assess the situation’.168 
 
The Prosecutor is entrusted with the first screening of investigations at the national 
level.169 As such, the criteria under which the Prosecutor must select the situations and 
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cases for investigation and prosecution are crucial. The selection criteria were explained 
by the Prosecution in a Draft Paper in 2006.170 It was declared that the selection process 
in the practice of the ICC Prosecution is based upon four guiding principles, including 
independence, impartiality, objectivity and non-discrimination.171 Among these guiding 
principles, it seems that the duties of independence and objectivity have an important 
impact on the selection process. These guiding principles are also highlighted in the 
Draft Policy Paper on Preliminary Examination of 4th October 2010, which explained 
the procedures applied by the Prosecution in the conduct of its preliminary 
examination.172 Although the manner in which the Prosecution selects cases was not 
elaborated in this draft policy paper, it declared pursuant to Article 14 (1) of the Rome 
Statute that ‘the Office of the Prosecutor shall act independently of instructions from 
any external source.’173 It should be noted here that the selection process is independent 
of the cooperation-seeking process, and is conducted exclusively on the available 
information and evidence and in accordance with the Statute criteria and the policies of 
the Prosecutor.174 However, Rozenberg has claimed that in the selection process there 
are instructions from the NGOs, in some cases even demanding the publicising of 
information in relation to the ICC proceedings. There are also prosecutorial problems in 
respect of NGOs; for instance, the trouble of the ICC in the case of Lubanga.175 
The principle of objectivity, which flows from Article 54 (1) of the Rome Statute, 
means that the Prosecutor will consider ‘incriminating and exonerating circumstances 
equally, in order to establish the truth.’176 This has to be applied during the preliminary 
examination phase of situation selection as well as the investigation stage.177 It must be 
stressed here that at the preliminary examination stage, information may be obtained 
from external sources rather than the Prosecutor’s own evidence-gathering powers and 
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will be assessed in terms of its relevance, credibility, and reliability.178 Moreover, the 
selection of cases is ‘an evidence-driven process, also governed by the principle of 
objectivity.’179 Gathering sufficient information and evaluating evidence is the other 
important aspect of prosecutorial decision-making policy. In some cases, sensitive 
information may be provided to the Prosecutor by different entities. Under those 
circumstances, acting in secrecy would have an impact on the legitimacy of the ICC.180 
Therefore, the Prosecutor should not rely on this rationale and refuse to circulate 
prosecutorial guidelines altogether.181 It is argued that this has already caused some 
troubles, some ‘legal battles’,  for the ICC, in particular in the first case arising from the 
DRC situation.182 One of the problems in the case of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo is related 
to the wide interpretation of Article 54 (3) (e) of the Statute by the Prosecutor regarding 
gathering considerable information on a confidential basis. Although the Prosecutor has 
the power to decide whether to disclose these documents and information, in this case 
the prosecution approach and the existence of confidentiality agreements with 
information providers led to complex problems. A single judge in 2006 indicated that 
this approach would be problematic; the Prosecution reconsidered its approach in May 
2008.183  
 
3.3 Accountability mechanisms to challenge prosecutorial discretion 
As discussed earlier, the Prosecutor preserves a significant amount of discretion in 
his or her investigatory, screening, charging, and admissibility determinations. 
Therefore, the importance of the prosecutor’s decision and their application of 
procedural mechanisms raise some important issues such as prosecutorial 
accountability for the use of discretion, how the ICC should assert its judicial authority, 
especially in relation to non-states parties, and how this will affect the struggle for 
political legitimacy.184  
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The notion of accountability includes two functions: answerability and enforcement. 
There are different kinds of accountability to which the Prosecutor is subject in the 
context of international institutions. The accountability mechanisms can be formal or 
informal; ranging from hierarchical budgetary constraints, to internal office policies. 
Before a domestic judge, different actors such as defendants or victims can challenge 
prosecutorial discretion.185 By contrast, international institutions are not generally 
accountable to any particular state. In many cases, member states have been unable to 
change the decision taken by international institutions.186 The Rome Statute grants the 
Prosecutor independence from state control in the identification and investigation of 
alleged perpetrators of international crimes. As such, based upon the ICC’s institutional 
structure, the Prosecutor may pose a danger to world order because of inadequate 
checks on his or her discretion.187 The most important check on prosecutorial authority 
would be in relation to proprio motu investigation, which needs the authorization of the 
Pre-Trial Chamber.188 However, there are no adequate checks on the Prosecutor’s 
discretion to determine how to conduct investigations and prosecutions in the situations 
which are referred by the Security Council or by the state.189  
In the context of the ICC, formal accountability190 is exercised by the ICC judiciary 
and by the state representatives in the Assembly of States Parties (ASP). In other words, 
accountability is not available in the sense of electoral accountability or in the sense of a 
mechanism for determining formal legal responsibility or liability.191 The election of the 
Prosecutor is one of the important decisions made by the ASP. When the Rome Statute 
came into force on July 1, 2002, the ASP decided to elect the Prosecutor by consensus 
in February 2003. The nomination period was from September 9 to November 30, 
2002.192 A number of states considered nominating a candidate for this post but by 30 
November 2002 a candidate had still not been agreed.193 Accordingly, the ASP 
announced the extension of the deadline for the nomination of the Prosecutor, based 
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upon its Resolution ICC-ASP/1/Res.2 on the procedure for the nomination and election 
of judges, the Prosecutor and Deputy Prosecutor. However, no nominations for the 
Prosecutor were made for the attention of the ASP.194 Therefore, the President of the 
Assembly encouraged states to continue ‘to consult informally first on suitable 
candidate(s) in order to ensure that any nominations for this post command the support 
of as many interested states as possible.’195 Subsequently, on March 24, 2003, the 
President of the Assembly announced that the States Parties to the Rome Statute ‘agreed 
informally, and on the basis of consensus, to elect at the forthcoming resumed session 
of the Assembly of States Parties, Mr. Luis Moreno Ocampo, of Argentina, as 
prosecutor of the International Criminal Court.’ He was officially selected on April 21, 
2003 in New York.196 This informal process was not conducted by the more transparent 
method as with the ICC’s judiciary. Thus, the lack of transparency of the method by 
which the Prosecutor was appointed has had a deleterious effect on the independent 
regime of the prosecution.197 Therefore, the Prosecutor should make every effort to 
facilitate a transparent decision-making process in the future.198  
The role of the ASP in assessing the scope of prosecutorial discretion and carrying 
out judicial review of discretionary prosecutorial decision-making - as formal 
accountability mechanisms - is an important aspect of the accountability of the 
Prosecutor’s actions.199 It was supposed that the ASP would act as a strong check on 
the Prosecutor.200 However, Danner has claimed that the ASP is not a sufficient 
mechanism of accountability since the jurisdiction of the Court extends to nationals of 
non-states parties of the Rome Statute and they do not have a representative in the 
ASP.201 They may only send observers to the ASP.202  
The assertion of the ICC’s jurisdiction over nationals of non-states parties, and the 
prosecutor’s determination of what situation and which accused, ensure the political 
sensitivity of the jurisdiction of the Court. An important question may arise as to 
whether the judicial review should apply at every level of prosecutorial decision-
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making.203 As mentioned above, formal accountability, including judicial and electoral 
review by the ASP, is specifically described in the Rome Statute. Apart from that, there 
is only an informal or pragmatic accountability for the Prosecutor’s discretionary 
decisions.204 Based upon this kind of accountability, the Prosecutor might be 
accountable to other entities such as NGOs and non-states parties regarding the 
effectiveness of his or her work. However, ‘there is no one controlling the on/off 
switch to the Office of the Prosecutor.’205 In terms of pragmatic accountability, the 
complementarity regime contains admissibility provisions and may provide state 
control over the Prosecutor’s decision to pursue particular investigations and 
prosecutions. However, some states and NGOs might support the Prosecutor in 
pursuing specific cases. The formal and pragmatic accountability mechanisms of the 
Rome Statute are not sufficient to guarantee the quality of the Prosecutor’s decision-
making. The formal accountability mechanisms - provided by the ASP and the 
judiciary - will not necessarily cause fewer misjudgements. The regime of pragmatic 
accountability, while more sensitive to individual decisions, is ‘dependent on whether 
or not a state or an NGO that wishes to protest against a prosecutorial decision has 
some leverage to use against the Prosecutor at that time’.206  
In this context, a consideration of the procedural limitations on the ICC Prosecutor is 
important to understand how the ICC deals with the prospects of an abusive Prosecutor 
or an imbalance of power that might affect its fairness and legitimacy.207 The Court 
faces difficult and critical challenges in establishing its credibility. It is vitally 
important for the Court to provide the balance between the necessary requirements of 
fairness and the high expectations of victims and the international community208 but 
the ICC Prosecutor’s decisions are only subject to limited control by the Pre-Trial and 
Appeal Chambers of the Court.209 The recent stay of proceedings in the Lubanga case 
is an illustration of this challenge and the difficulty in finding a balance. On the whole, 
it is arguable that one noticeable feature in the working of the ICC until now is ‘the 
ongoing struggle between the Prosecutor and the pre-trial chambers for control over 
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the pre-trial phase.’210 The Pre-Trial Chamber could also be responsible for assessing 
the information provided by non-state actors. Given the influential role played by 
NGOs in the ICTY, the NGOs provide a substantial amount of information or 
eyewitness testimony to the Office of the Prosecutor. But much of this evidence may 
not meet the strict evidential requirements of the ICC.211 For instance, the prosecutor’s 
position in the Lubanga case, according to the Court, amounted to ‘a wholesale and 
serious abuse’ of an exception that allows prosecutors to receive evidence which is not 
in itself admissible, but which could lead in turn to usable evidence.212 
 
3.4 The scope of judicial supervision of prosecutorial investigation in the 
respective national systems 
The Prosecution is an independent organ of the Court, where the pressures of law and 
politics come together.213 This independent body of the Court can determine how to 
conduct investigations and how to present the case before the Court in the different 
stages of criminal proceedings.214 The Prosecutor is also independent from state 
control, although under the principle of complementarity the Prosecutor does not have 
primacy over national authorities.215 Therefore, the relationship between the Prosecutor 
and states tends to be complex. There seems to be a tension which arises from the 
exercise by the Prosecutor of his quasi-judicial role to pursue crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court and to decide high-profile cases.216  
Prof. Bassiouni believes that:  
‘In the course of the process of interaction between national 
jurisdictions and the Court, there might be an excellent cooperation with 
national courts, but then they might decide not to cooperate. In the case 
of the Darfur situation, first they said that we are invoking the 
complementarity principle. Then, they declared that we are not going 
further in respect of concrete cases. Thus, the Prosecutor can say that 
the government is unwilling to proceed and the case is admissible. In 
effect, the complementarity principle on the process becomes the 
question of political opportunity to decide what the national authorities 
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want to do. For instance, if they wanted to consider the situation, why 
did they start to prosecute Kushayb and then release him?’217  
 
In national jurisdictions, the role of the prosecutor very often defines the balance 
between the executive and the judicial powers of the state, and the office is designed to 
be politically independent of government.218 Therefore, the question of prosecutorial 
independence is extremely sensitive, particularly in cases against powerful 
individuals.219 It is crucial for the Prosecutor to provide a balance between the demands 
for prosecutorial independence and the legitimacy challenge posed by the substantive 
difficulties of prosecutorial discretion.220 The tension between independence and 
accountability will be much more critical at the international level. 
However, the questions of how widespread the phenomenon of political prosecution 
is and what the remedy is if an intolerable conflict of interest or other deviation from 
lawful prosecutorial behaviour is uncovered, remain unsolved.221 Morals and 
normative considerations shape the decisions and judgements that define the 
application of law, but such considerations also incorporate the influence of NGOs, 
social movements, and states.222 Judicial power by extension refers to the capacity to 
administer and to enforce the rules of procedure and norms of the Rome Statute. The 
ICC’s judicial power is neither dominant nor strict. Rather, it is flexible insofar as it 
lacks a centralised enforcement mechanism and it is dependent upon the state’s 
cooperation. ‘With the increasing importance of NGOs, it becomes all the more 
important to consider the ICC’s political legitimacy, or how the ICC will justify and 
rationalise its power in terms of its ability to promote and maintain international peace 
and security, whether through deterrence or action aimed at stopping the violence 
caused by the targeted perpetrator.’223 Indeed, the political legitimacy of the ICC 
requires various strategies to address the political overtones of the exercise of the 
Prosecutor’s discretionary power consistent with its legal standards and rules of 
fairness.224 As such, the legal principles and political issues surrounding the application 
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of the complementarity principle and the ICC’s rules of procedure225 must be 
considered. Danner has argued that the prosecutorial role at the ICC may have its own 
political perspective. Especially in an on-going conflict, it would be under external 
political pressure to bring perpetrators to justice, particularly in high-profile cases.226 
Clearly, the ICC prosecution of a head of state has political consequences, and the 
consideration of such political consequences plays a role in the prosecutorial decision-
making process.227 For instance, concerning the Prosecutor’s application for the 
issuance of a warrant of arrest for President Al-Bashir of Sudan, a number of 
commentators have pointed out that the prosecution of a state’s leadership is always a 
political act, and have suggested that there should be some measures to ensure the 
independence of the Prosecutor from unjustified political influence. In addition, it is 
important to focus on the political conduct of the prosecutor as an individual.228 As has 
been mentioned earlier, the Prosecutor enjoys broad discretionary powers in his or her 
investigatory, charging, and admissibility determinations.229 Therefore, the framework 
of prosecutorial independence, and in particular the mandatory complementary 
difference with national proceedings, will impose difficult policy choices on 
independent prosecutors.230 In addition, the enforcement of prosecutorial guidelines 
and the role of judicial review is an important issue in the implementation of 
prosecution policy.231  
The Prosecutor’s role has a considerable impact on the credibility and legitimacy of 
the ICC as a legal institution in general. Therefore, the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion should be subject to the judicial review of the Judges of the ICC.232 In fact, 
the judicial supervision of prosecutorial investigation in respective national systems is 
relevant to an examination of the independence of the Prosecutor.233 Although the UN 
has provided guidelines for prosecutors, these are focussed on state rather than 
international tribunals. As a result, the judicial branch of the ICC, in particular the Pre-
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Trial Chamber, have the freedom to exercise greater supervisory and review powers.234 
The Rome Statute provides some safeguards against abuses of prosecutorial discretion, 
including judicial review of the Prosecutor’s decision to determine the existence of 
reasonable basis to proceed, and finally the independence and impartiality of the 
Prosecutor as a safeguard against potential abuse of prosecutorial discretion.235 
However, this complex judicial review is not ‘uniform for all of the Prosecutor’s 
decisions on the merits of an investigation’ and depends on different procedures in this 
respect.236 Moreover, there are complex Pre-Trial Chamber proceedings provided for 
in the Rome Statute, which could have a crucial impact on admissibility decisions. In 
addition, investigatory and charging decisions must be reviewed for conformity with 
the published prosecutorial guidelines. In particular, the criteria that the Prosecutor will 
use to evaluate domestic authorities and the seriousness of crimes must be viewed in a 
preliminary examination. As such, the power to choose to pursue an investigation lies 
at the heart of the independence of the Prosecutor.237  
The importance of prosecutorial impartiality is the other related issue that must have 
an influence on the Prosecutor’s discretion.238 This duty is related to the requirements 
under which the Prosecutor should investigate incriminating and exonerating 
circumstances equally.239 On the whole, the good faith or bad faith of the Prosecutor is 
an important issue which has a bearing on his or her prosecutorial decision-making. 
For instance, in the status conference in the case concerning Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 
the defence team objected to the ‘prosecution claim that their delays were justified 
because they were acting in good faith and based on the Rome Statute.’240 However, 
the defence argued that delay in relation to disclosure of the incriminating evidence 
was unjustifiable, and to ‘bring us to the Prosecution’s good or bad faith, especially 
when the prosecution signed confidentiality agreements, it shows that this approach 
would lead to serious problems such as delays in the proceedings’.241  
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Conclusion: 
The Prosecutor has an important policymaking role in determining what kinds of 
situations should be adjudicated in the ICC and which accused, among the many 
potential targets, should face prosecution in the ICC. Crucially, the complementarity 
regime gives broad discretion to the Prosecutor to justify the need to intervene in the 
territories of other states. However, it is evident that cultural differences have been and 
will continue to be an undeniable fact of life for all parties involved with international 
tribunals. In other words, there is a tension between the wide diversity of cultural 
traditions and ideologies based on different moral backgrounds, such as African tribal 
laws, and particularly Islamic beliefs and Western liberal traditions. Therefore, the need 
for cultural sensitization in relation to differing norms cannot be underestimated. As 
Almqvist has pointed out ‘without understanding the local culture, i.e. the specific 
norms regulating the transmission and dissemination of knowledge as well as culture-
specific taboos and inhibitions, interrogators and international judges face a serious risk 
of making erroneous assessments of points of evidence’.242 In this sense, the Prosecutor 
cannot facilitate the application of the complementarity regime without being aware of 
cultural differences in ideologies and perceptions of criminal justice. The ICC 
investigations and prosecutions should consider contextual factors; otherwise it is going 
to be one of the biggest difficulties to conduct criminal proceedings and the ICC is open 
to criticism as  a ‘reaction to the evils of colonialism’;243 and this can be used as an 
excuse to avoid responsibility for human rights violations.244 This issue will be explored 
more fully in Chapters 3-7. 
As mentioned earlier, in Chapter Two, the Court’s moral and sociological legitimacy 
demands a code of prosecutorial ethics and the Prosecutor is required to exercise his or 
her power to select situations and cases impartially, without intimidation, and improper 
interference. In doing so, an understanding of cultural diversity has a great impact on 
the efficiency and legitimacy of the ICC prosecutions on the one hand, and its influence 
on the national justice system, and the affected society on the other. This chapter has set 
up the ICC prosecutorial policy in different phases of proceedings and evaluated the 
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need for more guidelines and normative standards on prosecutorial conduct in criminal 
investigations and prosecutions. As far as prosecutorial discretion is concerned, the 
Prosecutor must be sensitive to cultural diversity since there are many different policies 
and ideologies governing criminal justice systems in every country; otherwise a clash of 
legal processes is not avoidable and will have a negative impact on the prosecutorial 
decision-making process. In this regard, a code of prosecutorial ethics, guidelines, and 
rules of law and procedures which blends recognized legal traditions, including Islamic 
law can represent a composite legal process governing international criminal 
prosecutions. 
 Taking into account the current developments of the cases at the Court, two different 
situations will be examined in the following chapters in order to evaluate procedural 
mechanisms in each situation and the way in which the Prosecutor has reacted to the 
situation in the Darfur region of the Sudan and the Ituri region of the DRC. It will 
demonstrate that failure of the Prosecutor to execute his moral duties in an impartial, 
independent and objective manner has led to complex concerns over the possibility of a 
fair trial at the ICC. Furthermore, a lack of consistency and transparency in 
prosecutorial policy and the choices made has invited miscarriages of justice. It can be 
concluded that investment in accountability will produce a significant return in public 
trust and confidence. Conversely, the ‘erosion of public trust and confidence in the 
criminal justice system will be the ultimate price to pay for unjustified secrecy.’245  
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Chapter Four: The Situation in the Darfur Region  
of the Sudan 
 
 
Introduction:  
 
From the beginning of the current conflict in Darfur in 2002, and in particular 
throughout 2003 and 2004, various reports about atrocities committed in Darfur and 
the large number of refugees from Darfur caused grave concern to the international 
community.1 The view that states are free to do whatever they like within their own 
borders has changed in recent times2 and the international community has taken initial 
steps to end impunity for some of the horrific crimes in the region. For instance, the 
Security Council established the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur 
(UNCOI) in September 2004, which submitted its report on widespread and grave 
crimes in Darfur.3 Following the report of the UNCOI, the United Nations Security 
Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, decided in Resolution 1593 on 
31 March 2005 to refer the situation in Darfur since 1 July 2002 to the ICC 
Prosecutor.4 The Security Council referred the Darfur situation to the ICC under 
Article 13 (b) and based on the assumption that Sudanese courts were unwilling and 
unable to prosecute the numerous international crimes perpetrated in Darfur since 
2003.5 The main question to be addressed here, however, is whether the discretion of 
the Prosecutor was exercised correctly in this situation to bring those responsible to 
justice for violations of human rights.  
In this regard, it seems necessary to analyse Sudanese law and practice to examine 
whether an independent and impartial justice system exists in accordance with 
international standards, and whether those most responsible can be brought to justice.6 
Moreover, it is also important to examine whether, as alleged, a sophisticated system 
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of immunities and legal and procedural obstacles to justice exist to prevent victims of 
human rights violations from accessing justice, truth and reparations.7 An important 
question which may be raised here is what were the Khartoum authorities actually 
doing in Darfur? As early as 2004, Sudan and its judiciary began to take action in 
response to the crimes committed within its jurisdiction. In particular, the President of 
Sudan established a National Commission of Inquiry (NCOI) in 2004 to consider the 
performance of the judiciary and to investigate the Darfur crimes.8 The National 
Commission verified that grave human rights breaches had taken place in all three 
states of Darfur and that all parties to the conflict had committed them to varying 
degrees.9 However, according to the UNCOI Report, this National Commission, which 
was under enormous pressure to present a view compatible with the government’s 
position, concluded that while there were incidents of serious abuse, there were not 
widespread or systematic crimes. 10 In incorporating the Kantian concept of 
complementarity into a solution for the Darfur crisis, the role of the Sudanese 
authorities is extremely important, and the Sudanese legal system, as a striking 
example of legal pluralism provides an appropriate test case for an examination of ICC 
sensitivity towards local law.  
The Sudanese government responded to calls for justice in Darfur by establishing 
three sets of special courts in Darfur; special courts in 2001, specialized courts in 2003, 
and new Special Criminal Court on the Events in Darfur (SCCED) in 2005.11 The 
Sudanese Chief Justice of the Supreme Court announced that ‘the Sudanese judiciary is 
capable and desirous of fully shouldering its responsibility in earnest for doing justice 
and restoring rights to their owners, free of any partiality, fear or influence, so that no 
person who has committed an offence may escape punishment, whatever his position 
or rank.’12 However, the President of the SCCED stated that ‘higher authorities are not 
interested in these cases [being] presented to the court or for them to even come to the 
knowledge of the court.’13 In accordance with the findings of different international 
                                                 
7
 ICJ Report, Op, cit., 
8
 Totten, C. and N. Tyler (2008). "Arguing for an Integrated Approach to Resolving the Crisis in Darfur: 
The Challenges of Complementarity, Enforcement, and related Issues in the International Criminal 
Court." The Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology 98(3): 1069-1118. p. 1095.  
9
 National Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, Confidential source, para 19. 
10
 UNCOI report, paras. 459-462  
11
 HRW report, Lack of Conviction: The Special Criminal Court on the Events in Darfur. Op, cit., 
12
 United Nations Security Council, S/2005/403- 22 June 2005- Letter dated 18 June 2005 from the 
Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the 
President of the Security Council  
13
 Rubin, E. “If not Peace, then Justice,” New York Times Magazine, April 2, 2006, p. 48  
 109 
and national bodies, Sudanese special courts may be able to try some of the low-level 
criminals involved in the Darfur crimes while the ICC focuses its efforts on the leaders 
of the human rights violations.14 The impartiality and independence of the Sudanese 
special courts are important criteria in order to determine whether the Sudanese 
criminal legal system is adequate to respond to the levels of criminal conduct which 
have taken place in Darfur.15 The Government of Sudan declined to act at first but then 
reacted to the ICC by creating the domestic tribunal. But perhaps ‘inaction followed by 
hasty action may lend credence to the claim that the Sudanese court was only 
established to shield the accused from liability for their alleged crimes.’16 Therefore, in 
order to prosecute the Darfur crimes, certain procedural measures seem necessary to 
ensure both uniformity and fairness in the application of the law.17 Having said that, 
the procedural laws to be applied by the Court are far from clear, and the hybrid of 
Sudanese statutes, Shari’a, law by decree and references to international law could 
affect the transparency of the Court’s work.18 In fact, although the international 
community has universally recognised international core crimes, diversity of culture 
still plays an important role in international investigations and prosecutions. It is 
crucial to consider, for instance, cultural factors that affect witness testimony, the 
question of applying international crimes in the national context of each situation, and 
the role of culture in sentencing.  
In order to address the adequacy of the Sudanese criminal justice system in relation 
to the Darfur situation, and in the context of the complementarity regime of the ICC, 
the admissibility criteria stipulated in Article 17 of the Rome Statute should be 
examined. In discussing this issue, this chapter is organized into five sections. The first 
section will look at the contextual history of Sudan’s crisis in Darfur. It aims to 
examine the causes of the current Darfur conflict. In particular, the violations of 
international humanitarian law by all parties to the conflict will be considered. The 
second section will grapple with the development of Sudanese criminal justice. It will 
explore how the Islamization process affected the Sudanese Penal Code. There will 
also be consideration of the, consequences of the political dimension of the Sudanese 
criminal justice system, in order to address the fairness of the domestic courts. The 
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fourth section will focus on Sudan’s failure to engage with its international obligations 
regarding international crimes under the Rome Statute. In particular, the operation of 
the criminal justice system in Darfur will be examined. Finally, an overall evaluation 
of whether Sudan’s criminal procedure is inadequate, in terms of Article 17 of the 
Rome Statute, will be attempted. 
 
Contextual history of Sudan’s crisis in Darfur:  
In order to understand the legal system of Sudan and the root causes of the crisis in 
Darfur, it is important to examine briefly the history of Sudan and the origins of the 
complex conflict there.19 In Sudan, the largest country in Africa, 597 tribes speak more 
than 400 languages and dialectics, and practise a variety of religious traditions within 
each of the major groupings: Islam, indigenous African beliefs and Christianity.20 
There are nineteen major ethnic groups and 597 subgroups. In 2000, semi-official 
figures indicated religious affiliations as 70 percent Sunni Muslim, 25 percent 
indigenous beliefs, and 5 percent Christian.21  
Sudan’s history is full of conflict, repression and serious crimes. The Sudanese case, 
as one of the world’s tragic examples of human rights abuses, is a difficult one to 
comprehend due to its Afro-Arab nature, the country acting as a bridge between the 
African continent and the Middle East. In this sense, the geographic context and 
Sudan’s racial, ethnic and cultural composition have all been sources of tension.22 The 
fight to exist and for space to live and the struggle for resources such as land and 
water, necessary to survive, inevitably leads to conflict and violence.23 In this context, 
various ethnic and cultural differences, racial tensions, and differential access to 
natural and financial resources all play significant roles.24 As Le Billon has argued, 
resources can motivate ‘secessions in resource-rich regions. The fear of secession can 
also lead to severe repression by the central government. Southern Sudan with its 
conflict over oil, grazing land and cattle, is an example of how resource control can 
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play into secessionist agendas.’25 It is also important to note here that broad 
generalizations tend to ignore the heterogeneity of the different sides and the fact that 
both the government militias and rebel forces fight among themselves, sometimes 
‘switching allegiances with bewildering alacrity.’26  
On one level, the civil war that has afflicted the country almost continuously since 
independence in 1956 can be seen as a conflict between the Arab Muslim north and the 
black African, and predominantly Christian or animist, south. At a more detailed level, 
other features of the conflict emerge. Alan Phillips, the director of Minority Rights 
Group International, wrote in 1995 that attempts to portray the conflict in North-South 
or Arab-African terms disguise ‘the complexities of a war fought by multi-ethnic 
groups where religious differences colour struggle over access to land or political 
power.’27 That said, Iraq, Iran, Libya and Saudi Arabia have in fact been aiding the 
Sudanese government, while Ethiopia, Chad, Uganda, and the United States Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) programme have aided southern Sudanese rebels.28 
Therefore, there has been a growing crisis of state and society in the Sudan, with civil 
war fuelled by the growing number of refugees, major economic difficulties, and 
political instability.29 The tragedy of Sudan is that all of these factors, prompting 
violent interethnic conflict in Sudanese society, have reached a highly destructive 
level; the economy has collapsed and neither civilian party politics nor military 
revolutionary programmes have been able to overcome the instability in the country.30 
For more than three decades, conflict has continued between north and south.31 In 
1972, the Addis Ababa Accord was signed, ending 17 years of the first civil war, but 
the agreement broke down in 1983 and the civil war over autonomy was renewed. 
Subsequently, on January 2005, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was 
signed, not only to put an end to the southern problem but also to address the problems 
of national governance in Sudan.32 Finally, South Sudan was officially independent on 
July 15th 2011 as the 193rd member of the United Nations.  
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The causes of the Darfur crisis: 
The Darfur region in western Sudan, an area the size of France, was a Sultanate that 
emerged in 1650 in the area of Jebel Marrah. The Fur Sultanate had been independent 
for almost four centuries and was incorporated into the Sudan by the British government 
in 1917.33 Some of its borders were not finalised until as late as 1938. Previously 
administered as one entity, Darfur was divided into three states, North, South, and West 
Darfur, in the early 1990s.34 It is located in the north western region of Sudan, bordering 
Chad to the west, Libya to the northwest, and the Central African Republic to the 
southwest.35 Darfur is ‘variously thought to be made up of between 40 and 150 ethnic 
groups or tribes, with groups ranging in size from a few thousand to a million or 
more’.36 Often nomadic, these groups have many points of similarity but only a loose 
linkage between territory and identity. This mobility has meant that ‘identities in Darfur 
have always been complex, subtle and fluid, with the possibility of individuals or 
groups changing identity in response to political and economic circumstance’.37 Darfur 
is mostly Muslim as well as mostly black. Its conflict is characterized by violence not 
only between Muslims, but also between dark-skinned people who Westerners perceive 
as all being black. The Sudanese government insists that the Darfur conflict is actually a 
decentralized series of smaller disputes, none of them based on a clear racial or ethnic 
divide, and that reports of mass atrocities are exaggerated.38  
There have been sporadic conflicts in Darfur for several decades. Pastoralists from the 
north, including the northern Rizeigat, Mahariya, Zaghawa, and others, typically 
migrate south in search of water sources and grazing in the dry season. Beginning in the 
mid-1980s, when much of the Sahel region was hit by recurrent episodes of drought and 
increasing desertification, the southern migration of the Arab pastoralists provoked land 
disputes with agricultural communities.39 However, the war in Darfur between 27 Arab 
tribes and the Fur did not begin until 1986. It arose as a result of political and land 
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problems.40 By 1986, many incidents involved not only the Arab tribes, but also 
Zaghawa pastoralists who tried to claim land from Fur farmers, and some Fur leaders 
were killed.41 Arab tribes considered they were not sufficiently represented in the Fur-
dominated local administration in Darfur and, in 1987, a number of Arab tribes formed 
what became known as the Arab alliance, aimed at establishing their political 
dominance and control of the region. Meanwhile, Fur leaders came to distrust the 
increasing tendency of the federal government to favour the Arabs, especially since 
Arabs from the northern Nile Valley had controlled the central government since 
independence.42 In 1988-1989 the clashes in Darfur evolved into a full-scale conflict 
between the Fur and Arab communities. The situation developed a more political 
character when the Khartoum government ‘inflamed tensions by arming the Arab tribes 
and neglect[ed] the core issues underlying the conflict over resources: the need for rule 
of law and socio-economic development in the region.’43  
Since tribal war is very common in Africa, the crisis in Darfur needs to be understood 
as a contemporary political fracture rather than an ancient ethnic fault line.44 Since 
Sudan has always been governed by ‘mostly centrist policies, Darfur’s geographical 
remoteness increased its victimization in terms of regional disparities, marginalisation, 
and social and economic injustice.’45 In the view of the Public Congress Party (PCP), 
which is one of the main political opposition forces to the ruling National Congress 
Party (NCP), the Darfur conflict is based on ‘a national, political problem relating to 
issues of freedom, justice, political participation, and good governance.’46 The 
complexity of the Darfur crisis is not only due to Islamism but is also connected to the 
liberation movements and the Umma Party, especially because of the loyalty to that 
party of some of the Islamic leaders within the National Islamist Front (NIF) political 
establishments.47   
The war in Darfur is in many respects a replay of the war in southern Sudan, ‘waged 
with weapons that include ethnic militias, scorched-earth tactics and denial of 
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humanitarian access.’48 In other words, the Darfur conflict is a result of a civil war 
which started in the South and eventually ‘radiated to Darfur.’49 Both wars ‘pit Sudan's 
Islamist, Arab-dominated government against African rebels demanding equal rights 
and an end to decades of neglect.’50 In the South it is the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Army (SPLA) that is doing the fighting; in Darfur it is the similarly named but quite 
separate Sudan Liberation Army (SLA). Professor Fouad Ibrahim has claimed that ‘it is 
often said that the cause of the war in Darfur is the conflict between pastoralists and 
farmers over limited natural resources: water, agricultural land and pasture. No doubt, 
conflicts have always existed over these resources. But they are not the true cause of the 
current brutal war...so that the problem is not resource scarcity but central government 
neglect of the Darfur region.’51  
 It is widely believed that the conflict in Darfur is a tribal one originating in the 
competition for land between pastoralists and crop farmers during the eighties and 
nineties. However, in recent years inter-tribal relations changed and the tribal fight for 
scarce resources became more intense since weapons could be obtained through 
channels via Chad and Libya.52 Inter-tribal conflict has been exacerbated by the arms 
trade in the region as a consequence of the Sudanese civil war as well as Libyan-
inspired efforts to pour arms into the region to fuel rebellions in neighboring Chad.53 In 
this sense, Mahmood Mamdani has claimed that what began as a ‘localized civil war’ in 
the late 1980s developed into ‘a rebellion’ in 2003.54 The current conflict in Darfur was 
initiated by two rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the 
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), who blame the central government in Khartoum 
for many of the region’s problems. These groups claim that Darfurians have been 
consistently marginalized and not allowed to participate in high positions of 
government.55 
The fact that Darfur is underdeveloped is self-evident. However, it is no more 
underdeveloped than several other parts of Sudan. It is particularly difficult to accept 
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that underdevelopment and marginalisation account for the level of focused and 
orchestrated violence aimed at the Government of Sudan since early 2003 – violence 
that was clearly planned for some considerable time beforehand.56 Alex de Waal is one 
of the few recognised experts on Sudan and he has published widely on the subject. He 
has pointedly challenged the ‘Arab’ versus ‘African’ stereotype, stating that, 
‘characterizing the Darfur war as Arabs versus Africans obscures the reality. Darfur’s 
Arabs are black, indigenous, African Muslims – just like Darfur’s non-Arabs.’57 Ghazi 
Suleiman, a well-known Sudanese human rights lawyer, has also claimed that the 
conflict in Darfur has nothing to do with marginalisation or the inequitable distribution 
of wealth. Inherently, it is a struggle between the two factions of the Sudanese Islamist 
movement, the opposition PCP and the ruling NCP.58 Moreover, ‘reorganization by the 
Sudanese Government of President Omar Al-Bashir gave Arab groups new positions of 
power in Darfur, which the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa tribes saw as an attempt to 
undermine their leadership roles and powers’.59 Finally, ‘the outbreak of large-scale 
crimes was prompted by the SLA and the JEM attack on El Fashir airport in April 
2003’.60  
Hoile has suggested that, for all the claims of marginalisation, there can be no doubt 
that conflict within the Sudanese Islamist movement is central to the Darfur conflict.61 
In fact, it is ‘a struggle to seize power in Khartoum and the battlefield is in Darfur.’62 
The ruling NCP split in 2000-2001 with hard-liners under Turabi, many of them from 
Darfur, forming the PCP in opposition to any engagement with Washington and the 
West and opposition to peace in southern Sudan.63 The general-secretary of the Pan 
African Movement and co-director of Justice, Tajudeen Abdul-Raheem, has also 
confirmed this line of analysis. He said, ‘Darfur is a victim of the split within the 
National Islamic Front personified by Hassan al-Turabi and his former protégé, General 
Omar Al-Bashir. Al-Turabi’s support is very strong in Darfur.’64 Richard Cornwell, the 
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Sudan expert at the South African-based Institute of Security Studies, has claimed that 
many Sudanese believe that the JEM was formed as result of the power struggle 
between President Al-Bashir and Hasan Turabi.65 It has also been noted by the 
International Crisis Group that, ‘[t]he belief that the Darfur rebellion has been hijacked 
by disaffected rival Islamists is a main reason behind the government’s refusal to talk to 
the rebels, particularly JEM. The personal rivalry between Vice-President Taha and his 
ex-mentor Turabi for control of the Islamist movement and the country is being played 
out in Darfur, with civilians as the main victims.’66 In response to rebellious activities, 
the Government did not fully trust the army to resist the rebels; instead, it withdrew its 
troops from the rural areas of Darfur and called upon local tribes to assist in the fighting 
against rebels. Several nomadic tribes, known as Janjaweed, responded favorably to the 
government’s call.67 The Janjaweed are primarily ‘camel-herding nomads who migrated 
to Darfur from Chad and West Africa in the 1970s, and from Arab camel-herding tribes 
from North Darfur.’68 The UNCOI noted in its report that some tribal leaders with 
relationships with both local and central Government officials played a key role in 
recruiting and organizing militia members and liaising with Government officials.69 
However, the Janjaweed are not organized in one single coherent structure and multiple 
testimonies and material evidence confirmed for the Commission that, in practice, the 
term ‘Janjaweed’ is being used interchangeably with other terms used to describe militia 
forces working with the Government. The relationship between government and the 
militias was also confirmed by the Commission, based upon some official statements.70  
 
Violations of international humanitarian law and human rights: 
In the early stages of the crisis, the two main aforementioned rebel groups in Darfur, 
the Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M) and the JEM, claimed that they were 
seeking redress for decades of grievances over perceived political marginalization, 
socio-economic neglect, and discrimination. As Berclaut has observed, the situation in 
Darfur is ‘transforming from a highly destructive armed conflict between these two 
rebel groups and the government into a violent scramble for power and resources 
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involving government forces, its Janjaweed allies, various rebel and former rebel 
factions, and bandits.’71 On the one hand, the situation is beyond full control by the 
authorities but on the other, the Government did not take any initiative to protect the 
people.72 The Sudanese government, instead of disarming the militias, has incorporated 
them into security, police and military forces. Indeed, the climate of impunity fostered 
by the unwillingness of the Sudanese government to prosecute serious crimes has 
encouraged government-backed militias and its forces to continue to commit abuses.73 
The strategy of using tribal militias such as the Janjaweed as a proxy has led to tragic 
humanitarian consequences.74 Gross violations of international human rights and 
humanitarian law have been committed by both the Janjaweed armed militia, supported 
by the Sudanese Government forces, and by the armed opposition groups, SLM/A and 
the JEM.75 The NCOI, which was established by Presidential Directive No. 97 of 2004, 
also verified that various violations of human rights were committed in the three Darfur 
States.76 Subsequently, in the past few years, the internal conflict in Darfur has drawn 
major international attention because of the magnitude of its impact on the civilian 
populations within the affected territory.77 In addition, the United Nations Security 
Council, in its resolutions 1556 and 1564, emphasized the urgent need for justice in 
Darfur and reiterated the call for immediate action by the international community to 
end serious crimes committed against the civilian populations there.78 The violations 
include persecution of groups based on ethnicity; murder and wilful killing; rape and 
other forms of sexual violence; torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; 
arbitrary deprivation of liberty; intentional and indiscriminate attacks against the 
civilian population; collective punishment and pillage; illegal internal displacement of 
the population and forcible transfer.79 The conflict have resulted in the deaths of nearly 
300,000 people and forced more than two million to flee their homes.80 Some of the 
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crimes committed in Darfur, as characterised by the UNCOI and by the ICC Prosecutor, 
amount to war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. 
The question of whether or not the violence in Darfur can be called genocide has been 
debated. The UNCOI concluded in its report that the Government of Sudan has not 
pursued a policy of genocide. However, it noted that what had happened was ‘as bad as 
genocide’ and that ‘the Government of Sudan and the Janjaweed are responsible for 
serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law.’81 In addition to 
the UNCOI’s conclusion that ‘the Government of the Sudan has not pursued a policy of 
genocide’82 a number of scholars have criticized labelling of Darfur genocide. For 
instance, Mamdani has argued that the term ‘genocide’ should be avoided in relation to 
the situation in Darfur since such a label gives legitimacy to those who seek to punish 
rather than to reconcile.83 However, Hong has claimed that calling a conflict genocide 
appears to trigger a large obligation under the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1948 (the Genocide Convention) for states parties 
to prevent and to punish the acts in question. In effect, the word genocide carries a 
historical and moral weight that is not present with other types of crimes, and tends to 
create a moral obligation in the view of the public. Hong believes that ‘calling a conflict 
genocide spreads responsibility throughout the international community in a way that 
regular mass killing does not’.84 Although the official position of the United Nations is 
that the atrocities that have been committed in the Darfur region of Sudan were not acts 
of genocide pursuant to plan or policy of the state, mass killings, mass beatings, mass 
rape, and mass violations have taken place85 and what the killing is called should be 
irrelevant.86 It is important, regardless, to bring those responsible to justice in order to 
genuinely investigate and prosecute the international crimes by holding perpetrators 
accountable.87  
Considering the political dimension of the conflict in Darfur, it is important to note 
here that in response to a power struggle inside the ruling party, the Sudanese 
government declared a state of emergency in 1999. Although the emergency status in 
most regions of Sudan has been lifted after the conclusion of the Comprehensive Peace 
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Agreement (CPA) and the adoption of the Interim National Constitution (INC), the state 
of emergency is still in force in Darfur and in Eastern Sudan.88 The state of emergency 
means important legal rights, such as due process guarantees and freedom of assembly, 
are suspended and the President has extraordinary powers to rule by decree.89 In this 
sense, the scale of the violence in Darfur, even before the outbreak of rebellion in 2003, 
led to Khartoum introducing special measures, including this declaration of a state of 
emergency.90 In 2001, three separate sets of special courts were established under the 
state of emergency provisions. In 2003, these special courts were replaced by 
specialized courts. The specialized courts, like the special courts they replaced, have 
jurisdiction over crimes of particular interest to the state. It is worth mentioning that 
judges who sit on the specialized courts are frequently lay people with no legal training 
or have been recruited from the military. The new Special Criminal Court on the Events 
in Darfur (SCCED), established in 2005, has concurrent jurisdiction over the same 
crimes as the specialized courts have.91 
 
Development of Sudanese criminal justice system: 
In order to analyse the Sudanese criminal justice system in relation to the 
complementarity regime of the ICC, the following section will briefly address the 
development of the Sudanese criminal justice system. Some fundamental questions may 
be raised about whether the origins of Sudanese law lie in religious, economic, 
domestic, or military institutions. Sudan’s criminal laws and procedures are historically 
influenced by common law and Egyptian law with some elements of Shari’a.92 El Amin 
has observed that five historical phases generated the significant characteristics of the 
Sudanese legal system during the past five centuries.93 In the year 1504, the first Islamic 
monarchy was established in the Sudan and there were three rival kingdoms in the 
western part of the Sudan: Darfur Kingdom, Kurdufan, and Fung. Darfur Kingdom 
(1500-1916) was established by Arabs and Fur tribes who emigrated from western 
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Africa. The legal system of Darfur Kingdom was based on Islamic laws. In this era, the 
judges were appointed by the Sultan as heads of the court to administer justice.94  
In the early nineteenth century, Sudan was governed by Egypt, which was still part of 
the Ottoman Empire.95  Here, the Islamization of the people was largely the work of 
individual learned men who immigrated to Sudan from Egypt, North Africa, and the 
Arabian Peninsula. Thus, Islam gradually extended its influence upon Sudan’s legal 
system.96 In the period of Turko-Egyptian Conquest, 1820- 1898, the judicial powers 
shifted to the chiefs and heads of the native tribes in the rural areas, supported by 
Egyptian and British personnel. However, the courts were governed by Islamic law. 
Salih has stated that in 1881 the Mahdiya revolution against Turko-Egyptian rule 
‘brought mixed fortunes on Darfur’.97 The Mahdiya legal system of 1881-1898 was 
aimed at modifying or abolishing Sudanese customs, which were socially undesirable or 
contrary to Islamic teachings. Criminal cases were decided in accordance with Shari’a 
and the Mahdi’s teachings.98 Although administering justice and establishing fairness 
was the main stated object of the Mahdi’s mission, it was not fulfilled since all his 
efforts were directed to strengthening his own political powers. In essence, political 
ambitions had a great impact on the realization of justice.99 However, while Shari’a 
courts were established in northern Sudan and Islamic law was practiced throughout the 
area, in southern Sudan most of the inhabitants practiced tribal religions unrelated to 
Islam.100 
During the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, 1899-1956, the legal system was influenced 
by English legal theories rather than by Egyptian theories, which were based on the 
French legal system.101 In 1899, a Criminal Procedure Code was enacted which was 
drafted by a British lawyer in the Egyptian service.102 The Code of Criminal Procedure 
was an adaptation to the needs of the Sudan of precedents taken from India and from the 
Ottoman Empire and African Orders in Council. The resultant Code was ‘neither 
British, Indian, French, nor indeed wholly marked with the characteristics of the system 
in force in any other country. It was a scheme, which may correctly be called Sudanese, 
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in so far as it was truly framed with a special view to meet the requirements of the 
Sudan.’103 In fact, the Code of Criminal Procedure was not to apply to the whole of the 
Sudan at once, but it was to be extended gradually to all the various provinces. 
Administrators were given power to introduce the Code with adaptations suitable to the 
needs of their province.104 The Penal Code, introduced at the same time, adapted the 
Code drafted by Lord Macaulay for India to the needs of the Sudan.105 The Sudanese 
Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure of the year 1899 were subsequently 
amended on August 1, 1925.106 According to the amended criminal laws, judicial 
powers were given to army officers, governors, district commissioners, police officers, 
and sheikhs. Special judicial powers were given to the tribal heads by the Chief Courts 
Ordinance of 1931 and, later, native laws were issued to control, prohibit, or restrict 
certain activities, and a Shari’a legal system was established to deal with the personal 
affairs of Muslim people.107 
In November 1958 the military took power, suspended the transitional constitution, 
and dissolved the parliament and the political parties. In this era, full legislative, 
executive and judicial powers were invested in a supreme council of the armed 
forces.108 In theory, the judiciary should have been independent in the performance of 
its duties but, since 1958, the country's various military governments have routinely 
interfered with the judicial process.109 This era witnessed a series of struggles amongst 
the political parties, and disagreement between the secularists and Islamic state 
supporters remained as an obstacle.110  
On September 5, 1966 the whole chapter of the Constitution dealing with the judiciary 
was amended to set up supreme (civil and Shari’a) Courts and to confer on Shari’a 
division a status of full independence and equality. According to this amendment, the 
judiciary consisted of the civil division headed by the chief justice and Shari’a division 
headed by the chief qadi and were independent from each other.111 Prior to Nimeiri's 
consolidation of the court system in 1980, the civil courts considered all criminal and 
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most civil cases. The Shari’a courts, comprising religious judges trained in Islamic law, 
adjudicated for Muslims in matters of personal status, such as inheritance, marriage, 
divorce, and family relations. However, the fully independent status of these divisions 
did not survive more than three years and a new judiciary Act 1969 conferred on 
Shari’a courts the power of executing their judgements.112 The structure of the legal 
system changed again in 1983 when an Islamic state was declared by Nimeiri;113 
Shari’a was decreed to be the national law in September of that year and the 
government announced that it would apply hudud punishments to Sudanese 
jurisprudence.114 In other words, the President of the Republic decided to Islamize the 
legal system, nullifying all existing criminal justice laws.115  
New Penal and Procedural Acts incorporating hudud punishments were enacted.116 
The Civil Transaction Act 1984, the new Penal Code 2003, the Code of Criminal 
Procedure 2003 and the Civil Procedure Act were all enacted to facilitate the ‘just and 
fast execution’ of the newly implemented hudud.117 Some previous offences such as 
theft were modified to reflect the hudud punishment of amputation, reserved for more 
serious cases, while the hudud offence of adultery and fornication was redefined to 
include rape and sodomy.118 Subsequently, the High Court of Appeal, as well as all 
lower courts, was required to apply Islamic law exclusively.119  
Mayer has claimed that, in the Sudan, Islamization programmes ‘have been disrupted 
by political turbulence and have been wracked by protracted civil war.’120 It seems that, 
in the Sudanese legal system, political and legal processes cannot be sealed off from one 
another. The law and the courts are weak in the face of political power. The political 
class may directly regulate institutional decisions, refusing to allow decentralized 
institutional decision-making and the outcome of the legal process is often determined 
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by political relationships and personal connections.121 The influence of politics on the 
judicial process can be seen during the state of emergency, which was imposed by the 
Sadiq Al-Mahdi regime in 1987. The government had extensive authority, in areas 
declared to be emergency zones in the southern and western areas of the country, to use 
detention powers on people suspected of sympathy with the rebellion, and to arrest and 
preventively detain for an indefinite period anyone suspected of contravening 
emergency regulations.122 Moreover, in July 1989, the Revolutionary Command 
Council for National Salvation (RCC-NS) declared a state of emergency for the whole 
of Sudan and issued Decree No. 3, which gave the President the power to appoint and 
dismiss all judges.123 As a consequence, the court system was seriously backlogged and 
the judiciary was less independent of the executive than previously. Under the authority 
of this decree, President Al-Bashir dismissed more than seventy judges because they 
were allegedly not sufficiently committed to applying the Shari’a in their decisions, and 
replaced them with supporters of the regime. The effect of these actions was to make the 
judiciary directly responsible to the President. 
 
Consequences of the political dimension of the Sudanese criminal 
justice system: 
The 1998 Sudanese constitution asserts the independence of the judiciary. Nevertheless, 
the judiciary appears to have been manipulated and politicised during the last decade.124 
Human Rights Watch (HRW) and other non-governmental organizations have 
documented that, although widespread crimes have been committed by Sudanese 
government forces and the Janjaweed, there have been no meaningful efforts to 
establish accountability for violations of international humanitarian law in Sudan by the 
government or the rebels.125 Instead of acknowledging state responsibility for the scale 
and gravity of the crimes committed in Darfur, senior Sudanese officials continue to 
deny and evade such responsibility for the atrocities. A series of committees set up 
presumably to deal with these issues have produced no meaningful results.126 The 
Government of Sudan, in order to strengthen domestic criminal justice, has set up 
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several special courts, commissions, committees and other bodies to investigate and 
prosecute crimes in Darfur. However, most observers do not believe that enough has 
been done to bring those responsible to justice, which demonstrates shortcomings in the 
working of the Sudanese criminal justice system.127 For instance, in the view of HRW 
the Sudanese government has done little to demonstrate ‘its professed intent to ensure 
justice for the crimes committed in Darfur during the conflict.’128 From a Kantian point 
of view, there can be a tendency to move between the universal and the local law, and 
implicitly accept different levels of law through global, regional, and national down to 
very local. However, the Darfur situation illustrates the importance of different legal 
patterns which complicate the diffusion of legal order.  
The Interim National Constitution (INC) was passed by the National Assembly on 
July 6, 2005 as part of the January 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the 
government and the southern-based rebels.129 The adoption of an INC sent a positive 
signal for peace and promised the beginning of a period of transition to democracy, 
respect for the rule of law, and promotion of human rights.130 However, although the 
INC guarantees fair trial rights, there are concerns about the independence of judges 
since statutory laws do not fully guarantee due process rights. In practice, detainees are 
often not informed about their rights. The National Security Act and emergency 
legislation provide broad powers of arrest and detention that lack safeguards and may 
facilitate human rights violations. In addition, there is no legislation to provide effective 
protection of victims and witnesses to ensure that they do not suffer when coming 
forward to report a crime or to seek a remedy, especially in the course of conflict.131  
The lack of political will to take these cases begins at the lowest levels, as police often 
refuse to take complaints from victims and do not investigate cases brought to them. 
Victims or witnesses who report crimes to the police often face indifference, harassment 
or possibly even arrest. In particular, victims of sexual violence are treated with 
disregard by the police.132 The UNCOI observed that very few victims registered 
                                                 
127
 REDRESS report, Accountability and Justice for International Crimes in Sudan, Op, cit., 
128
 HRW report, Lack of Conviction: The Special Criminal Court on the Events in Darfur, Op, cit.,  
129
 UNCOI Report, Op, cit., 
130
 ‘Interim National Constitution of the Republic of Sudan’, Republic of the Sudan Gazette, Special 
Supplement, No. 1722, 10 July 2005, at  
unmis.unmissions.org/Portals/UNMIS/CPA%20Monitor/Annexes/Annex%201-
%20Interim%20National%20Constitution%20of%20Sudan%20-%20FIXED.pdf [accessed on 10th 
September 2011]  
131
  REDRESS report, Accountability and Justice for International Crimes in Sudan, Op, cit.,  
132
 HRW report, Lack of Conviction: The Special Criminal Court on the Events in Darfur, Op, cit.,   
 125 
official complaints regarding crimes committed against them due to a lack of confidence 
in the criminal system. Moreover, of the few cases where complaints were made, most 
were not properly pursued.133 In other words, victims and witnesses do not enjoy 
protection and thus active participation of victims in criminal proceedings is still largely 
unknown in Sudan’s criminal justice system.134 In the case of hudud crimes, if a woman 
chooses to pursue a complaint that she was raped, for instance, but fails to prove it, she 
could face charges of adultery and be in danger of facing criminal charges punishable 
by death or lashing. In this regard, HRW has concerns about procedural rights that may 
undermine defendants’ right to receive a fair trial.135  
With regard to the rights of the accused, according to the special courts decree, the 
accused cannot exercise the right to be represented by a counsel of choice. In addition, 
counsel has limited time to cross-examine prosecution witnesses and defence witnesses, 
and there are restrictions for visiting the accused in detention to facilitate the 
preparation of his defence.136 Moreover, Sudanese military courts fail to meet with 
international standards of fairness. Military trials do not provide procedural safeguards 
or an effective appeal process for death sentences, and have sometimes taken place 
when legal representation was denied or when the defence lawyers were given only one-
day’s notice prior to the commencement of a trial.137 Also, the 1991 Criminal Procedure 
Code contains provisions that prevent the effective prosecution of these acts. In fact, as 
the UNCOI noted, the law provides wide powers to the executive and grants immunity 
from prosecution to many state agents.138 Sudan has enacted many immunity provisions 
that ‘impede the prosecution of those in the military, police and security agencies 
responsible for the crimes in Darfur.’139 For instance, Article 33 of the National Security 
Forces Act of 1999, article 45 of the Police Act 2007 (article 46 of the former Act) and 
article 34 of the Armed Forces Act 2007, all provide immunities for state officials for 
any acts committed in the course of their duties. The immunities shield officials from 
any civil suits or criminal prosecutions unless the head of their forces approve such 
legal action. In practice, immunity legislation has resulted in impunity for serious 
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human rights violations.140 Babiker has argued that people are still being evicted from 
their land without due process, judges are under political pressure, critics of human 
rights violations risk being jailed, harassed and tortured.141 International bodies have 
held that criminal laws in Sudan have facilitated violations because they are overly 
broad and contain offences and punishments that in themselves violate human rights. 
The laws do not proscribe international crimes in line with international definitions, and 
provisions such as immunity legislation have resulted in impunity for officials.142 They 
have also failed to protect individuals from crimes committed by or with the consent of 
state officials.  
Concluding observations by the United Nations Human Rights Committee, decisions 
by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and reports by national and 
international bodies and organisations, have all identified such failings and called upon 
Sudan to undertake the necessary reforms.143 For real justice to take hold in Sudan, the 
criminal laws need to be changed in order to implement the Bill of Rights contained in 
the INC, and to better ensure human rights protection, particularly for the most 
vulnerable members of society. In this sense, victim’s rights and impartial and effective 
investigation must be guaranteed, and judges and prosecutors must be fully independent 
in their work.144 The criminal law may require a reform of both substantive provisions 
and procedural norms. An example would be the definition of torture, war crimes and 
crimes against humanity in line with international standards (substantive) and the 
related question of lifting immunity for officials suspected of having committed such 
crimes (procedural).145 The National Assembly on 24 May, 2009 adopted amendments 
(Chapter 18) which penalize perpetrators of crimes against humanity, genocide and war 
crimes. This is a positive development in legal reform in Sudan, as the Criminal Code of 
1991 did not include these three categories of crime.146 However, the African Union 
High-Level Panel on Darfur (AUPD), in its report entitled ‘Darfur the Quest for Peace, 
Justice and Reconciliation’, considered that without formal definition within the 
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Sudanese legal system there will continue to be a certain degree of uncertainty about 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL), which might prove problematic for a source of 
criminal law.147  
 
Sudan’s failure to engage with its international obligations regarding 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes under the ICC 
Rome Statute:  
 
Two main bodies of international law apply to the Sudan in relation to the conflict in 
Darfur: international human rights law and international humanitarian law, which seek 
to guarantee safeguards for persons subject to criminal justice proceedings.148 Sudan, as 
a party to some human rights treaties, is obliged to respect the human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of all persons within its jurisdiction. These treaties include the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,149 the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),150 the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), etc. In compliance with 
these laws, implementation is effected by the national authorities and by international 
bodies such as the ICCRC, the UN and the ICC.151 Accountability for serious violations 
of both international human rights law and international humanitarian law is provided 
for in the Rome Statute.152 Sudan has signed but not yet ratified the Statute and 
therefore is bound to refrain from ‘acts which would defeat the object and purpose’ of 
the Statute.153  
In this regard, the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) observed that, based upon 
the principle of pacta sunt servanda, the Government of Sudan is also bound to 
implement treaties, and any obligation arising from them, in good faith. Interestingly, 
the ICJ report noticed that ‘a corollary of this general principle of international law is 
that the authorities of a particular country cannot escape their international 
commitments by arguing that domestic laws prevent them from doing so. They cannot 
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cite provisions of their constitutions, laws or regulations in order not to carry out their 
international obligations or to change the way in which they do so.’154 In addition to 
international treaties, the Sudan is also bound by customary rules of international 
humanitarian law. The core of these customary rules is contained in Common Article 3 
of the Geneva Conventions. It contains the most fundamental principles related to 
respect for human dignity which are to be observed in internal armed conflicts. These 
principles and rules are thus binding upon any state, as well as any insurgent group that 
has attained some measure of organized structure and effective control over part of the 
territory.155  
A number of provisions of these treaties are of particular relevance to the armed 
conflict in Darfur. For instance, ‘the right to fair trial; the right not to be subjected to 
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; the right not to be 
subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention; the obligation to bring to justice the 
perpetrators of human rights violations.’156 The UNCOI, based upon its mandate from 
the United Nations Security Council, analyzed reports from different sources including 
government, inter-governmental organizations, various United Nations mechanisms, as 
well as non-governmental organizations. The UNCOI found that military engagements 
between government and rebel forces have resulted in severe violations of the rights of 
civilian populations, including hundreds of incidents involving the killing of civilians, 
summary executions, rape and other forms of sexual violence, torture, abduction, 
looting of property and livestock, as well as deliberate destruction.157 In addition, the 
National Commission of Inquiry reported that ‘grave human rights breaches took place’. 
In fact, the NCOI admitted that incidents of civilian killings were committed by all 
parties to the conflict in Darfur and violated Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949.158 However, as the UNCOI asserted, the National Committee 
attempts in its report to justify the violations rather than seek effective measures to 
address them.159 The UNCOI claimed that the National Commission was ‘under 
enormous pressure to present a view that is close to the Government’s version of events. 
The report of the National Commission provides a glaring example of why it is 
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impossible under the current circumstances in Sudan for a national body to provide an 
impartial account of the situation in Darfur, let alone recommend effective measures.’160  
The Government of Sudan has taken some steps to investigate international crimes in 
Darfur in order to demonstrate that Sudan is willing and able genuinely to investigate 
and prosecute international crimes there.161 According to one view, ‘the Government 
has taken some steps, which however constitute more a window-dressing operation that 
a real and effective response to large scale criminality linked to the armed conflict.’162 
As a result of the report of the NCOI and its investigative committee, the Chief Justice, 
in accordance with the Emergency Act 1997, established the special courts in 2003.163 
Following the report of the UNCOI, the United Nations Security Council, acting under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, decided in Resolution 1593, on 31 March 2005, to refer 
the situation in Darfur from 1 July 2002 to the Prosecutor.164 On June 7, 2005, one day 
after the Prosecutor announced that he was opening investigations into the events in 
Darfur, the Sudanese authorities established the SCCED to demonstrate the 
government’s ability to handle prosecutions domestically with reference to Article 17 of 
the ICC Rome Statute.165 An amended decree, issued in November 2005, broadened the 
SCCED’s jurisdiction to include international humanitarian law, and established three 
permanent seats for the Court in El Fasher, Nyala and Geneina, the capitals of North 
Darfur, South Darfur and West Darfur respectively.166 The jurisdiction of the Nyala 
Criminal Court for Darfur’s incidents was extended to cover ‘actions which constitute 
crimes pursuant to the Sudanese Criminal Act, other penal laws and the international 
humanitarian law.’ The jurisdiction of the Nyala Criminal Court, though important, only 
covers one part of Sudan and not the entirety of the country. According to the 
REDRESS this appears to allow the SCCED to try war crimes. It is less clear whether 
the amendment also covers genocide and crimes against humanity.167   
The Government of Sudan stated in 2005 that it had identified around 160 suspects for 
investigation and prosecution for crimes in Darfur. However, by mid-2006, the first 
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Special Court (SCCED) had only carried out six trials from a total of 13 cases.168 
According to the report of HRW, the Court’s first operation indicates that there is no 
genuine willingness on the part of Sudanese authorities to ensure that the perpetrators of 
the atrocities in Darfur are brought before the SCCED for prosecution. Nor is there 
evidence that the SCCED has the capacity to try these cases effectively even if 
appropriate cases were brought before it.169 In practice, investigations are slow, there 
are few prosecutions, the jurisdiction of the Special Court and other courts is not always 
clear, and judges work from a distance, as many of them are based in Khartoum. Most 
cases before the SCCED concern ordinary crimes such as armed robbery, receipt of 
stolen goods, possession of firearms without a licence, intentional wounding and 
murder. This gives the misleading impression that the crimes committed in Darfur are 
acts of banditry, ignoring the widespread and systematic nature of crimes. The 
defendants in cases before the SCCED are mainly low-ranking military officials and 
civilians.170 HRW observed that Sudanese authorities have failed to press charges before 
the SCCED for a single major atrocity committed in Darfur and no state official has 
been charged based on command responsibility for these crimes.171 So far, the SCCED 
has tried eight cases involving 30 defendants - 21 military or law enforcement officials 
and nine civilians. The charges against military and police personnel have included the 
murder of detainees, the killing of a student demonstrator, robbery and one case of rape. 
‘Five low-ranking officers were sentenced to prison and five others sentenced to death, 
out of which two were executed by hanging in May 2007 and another two released 
because of an amnesty, eleven other soldiers were acquitted.’172 Sudanese law does not 
criminalise most of the 51 counts enumerated in the ICC’s arrest warrants for two 
Sudanese officials. Even after a November 2005 Decree broadened the jurisdiction of 
the SCCED to include international humanitarian law, the Court still applied only the 
Sudanese Criminal Act 1991.173   
The establishment of the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) by Security 
Council Resolution 1547, in early 2004, was an important step taken by the 
international community in order to investigate conflicts in Sudan.174 Due to the 
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escalating crisis, the Security Council, in its resolution 1556 (2004), extended its 
mandate in relation to Darfur. As part of its broad mandate to further peace, 
humanitarian assistance, recovery and development, UNMIS was established to 
maintain a human rights programme with several human rights monitors working in 
Darfur.175 UNMIS, through consultations with officials, has continued to promote 
expanded access to justice, right to counsel, and due process in the courts of Sudan. 
However, many serious gaps remain between international standards and Sudanese laws 
governing criminal laws and procedure. ‘Some gaps in due process are cited as cause 
for political grievances. The lack of express right to counsel in pre-trial proceedings was 
recently cited by the JEM when protesting the convictions and death sentences of its 
members for crimes against the state.’176 It is important to mention that the National 
Assembly, on 20 May 2009, adopted several amendments to the Criminal Procedure 
law, as well as amendments to the Criminal Code, by adding a new chapter defining 
crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes.177 It has been claimed that these 
amendments ‘come on the heels of the arrest warrant issued by the ICC for President Al 
Bashir, and a few days after a Darfurian rebel figure presented himself to the ICC in 
response to an ICC summons.’178  
The ICJ observed that, despite the November 2005 Decree, which broadened the 
SCCED’s jurisdiction to include international humanitarian law, and the 2005 Interim 
National Constitution, which provides a basis for the application of international law in 
Sudan under Article 27, the SCCED applied only the Criminal Act in the eight cases 
before it. In fact, the Special Criminal Act (SCA) does not criminalise the acts 
mentioned above in the report of the UNCOI, nor most of the 51 war crimes and crimes 
against humanity alleged to have been committed by Ahmad Harun and Ali Kushayb, 
for which the ICC issued arrest warrants on 27 April 2007 to direct them to appear 
before the ICC.179 Therefore, while the Special Court may end up trying some low level 
offenders, the ICC will still have to try the key players, especially key government 
officials indicted by the ICC.180 The ICJ stated that the local mechanisms established by 
the Government to investigate human rights violations in Darfur have failed to produce 
any transparent findings and charges brought before the Special Court did not reflect 
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international crimes.181 Thus, the Government of Sudan continues not to have the 
political will, and the Sudanese justice system continues to be unable to prosecute 
adequately perpetrators of gross violations of international human rights law and serious 
violations of international humanitarian law.182 In this regard, the president of the 
SCCED, Judge Mahmoud Mohammad Akbam, has claimed that ‘the court has been 
unable to hold accountable individuals who may have committed grave crimes because 
of the reticence of witnesses and the general insecurity in the region.’183 Other 
representatives of the Sudanese government have also stated that they cannot investigate 
or prosecute individuals responsible for crimes in Darfur because witnesses refuse to 
come forward and identify the perpetrators.184 Akbam has also said that the reason for 
the lack of accountability in Darfur is that ‘higher authorities are not interested in these 
cases to be presented to the court or for them to even come to the knowledge of the 
court.’185 Furthermore, the African Union High-Level Panel on Darfur (AUDP) in 
February 2009 observed that the Special Prosecutor of the SCCED had announced that 
three men, including Ali Kushyab who is the subject of an outstanding ICC arrest 
warrant, had been charged with criminal offences. However, those cases have not yet 
come before a court.186  
 
Overall evaluation of whether Sudanese criminal procedure is 
inadequate in terms of Article 17 of the ICC Rome Statute:  
As discussed previously, complementarity is operationalised in the form of an 
admissibility examination set forth in Articles 17-20 of the Rome Statute. Article 17 
sets out the substantive principles of complementarity, while Article 18 and 19 provide 
its procedural components.187 Unwillingness and inability are the most important 
admissibility criteria according to the provisions of Article 17.188 Darfur represents the 
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first time a situation was referred to the ICC involving crimes taking place in the midst 
of ongoing conflict within the territory of a state that is not a party to the Rome Statue. 
It also marks the first time that the Security Council has referred a case to the ICC, as it 
is permitted to do under the Rome Statute.189 In this context, the Darfur situation sheds 
light on the development and assessment of the complementarity regime of the ICC, 
since the regime provides the ability to prosecute international criminals on behalf of 
the international community.190  
In fact, Darfur is the first ICC case in which a question of complementarity has been 
raised between the ICC’s jurisdiction and the jurisdiction of concurrently established 
national courts such as those in Sudan.191 Although the Rome Statute does not define 
what constitutes a genuine prosecution, the drafting history indicates that the term 
allows for subjectivity in determining the unwillingness of a state to prosecute.192 
Article 17 of the Rome Statute states that the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC may 
determine a case is admissible before the ICC under the complementarity principle if 
national proceedings were initiated for the ‘purposes of shielding the person from 
criminal responsibility’, or were not conducted ‘independently or impartially.’193  
As mentioned in the previous section, the gravity of the crimes and inadequacy of 
domestic Sudanese accountability mechanisms - as documented by the UNCOI - 
became the basis for the Security Council's referral of the Darfur situation to the 
Prosecutor in Resolution 1593 of 2005.194 The Government of Sudan reacted to the ICC 
by creating a domestic tribunal. However, in the ICC case against Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo, the Court decided that in order for a case to be inadmissible before the ICC under 
the complementarity principle as a result of concurrent national court proceedings, these 
proceedings must ‘encompass both the person and the conduct which is the subject of 
the case before the Court.’195 As previously noted, the Special Court for Darfur was 
replaced by special courts for each of the three Darfur regions, North, West and South 
Darfur, and completed only thirteen cases, which were against low-level suspects. None 
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of them was charged with crimes of the same gravity or magnitude as those in the 
Prosecutor’s Application against Harun or Kushaby.196 The UNCOI stated that, ‘the 
measures taken so far by the [Sudanese] Government to address the crisis have been 
both grossly inadequate and ineffective, which has contributed to the climate of almost 
total impunity for human rights violations in Darfur.’197 In this sense, Hewett has argued 
that ‘inaction followed by hasty action may lend credence to the claim that the Sudanese 
court was only established to shield the accused from liability for their alleged 
crimes.’198 Moreover, regarding the operation of domestic authority, the UNCOI 
implicated the current Khartoum government in atrocities committed in Darfur, stating 
that any court established by ‘this government will naturally be suspected of lacking the 
crucial elements of independence and impartiality.’199 The findings of the AUPD have 
also illustrated that the absence of political will, impunity for the crimes committed in 
Darfur, an unwillingness to use the law to attend to violations of human rights, and 
failure to reform the judiciary, are the major obstacles to justice in Darfur.200  
The 2005 Interim National Constitution stipulates in Article 128 that ‘the judges of the 
National Supreme Court and all judges of other national courts shall be independent and 
shall perform their functions without political interference.’ However, the Sudanese 
judiciary remains largely under the control of the executive.201 The judiciary in the 
Sudan is ‘largely subservient to the Government.’202 The judiciary is not truly 
independent and many judges have not been selected primarily based on their legal 
qualifications and can be subject to pressure through a supervisory authority dominated 
by the Government. Furthermore, unfair trials are built into the system of justice.203  
However, the independence and impartiality of the Sudanese justice system and its 
ability to tackle impunity and deliver fair trials has been further undermined by a web of 
military, security, police and other exceptional courts that do not comply with 
internationally accepted procedures, and assist in protecting state officials from being 
accountable under the law.204 Members of the police forces who commit offences that 
are considered crimes under the Criminal Act 1991, or other supplementary law, can 
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only be tried before Police Courts established by the President, unless the 
Commissioner of Police decides to refer them to ordinary courts. This rule applies to all 
cases except for huddud or qisas crimes (special crimes in violation of Shari’a).205 As 
previously mentioned, Shari’a was refined and strengthened in Sudan’s criminal law by 
the Criminal Act of 1991 and is still the basis of law in Darfur. In 1991, Shari’a was 
applicable to all of Sudan with the exception of the southern region. Under the Interim 
National Constitution of July 2005, following the January 2005 Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) with the southern rebels, Shari’a is applicable to all of Sudan with 
the exception of the southern autonomous region.206 However, the question of where 
Shari’a punishment may be administered in the Sudan raises further critical difficulties 
in terms of territorial application of the Bill of Rights of the Interim Constitution.207 In 
addition, the Sudanese legal system and the compatibility between Islamic law and 
human rights law may raise particular controversies. For instance, the Criminal Act of 
1991 lays down many Islamic penalties which are inconsistent with the provisions of 
relevant international human rights treaties to which the Sudan is party. Such penalties 
include limb amputations for theft or robbery, public flogging for consumption or 
possession of alcohol, stoning to death for adultery, and the death penalty for apostasy 
and waging war against the state.208 Amnesty International maintains that Sudan's legal 
ratification of Shari'a under the Criminal Act of 1991, ‘coupled with the fact that some 
areas of Darfur are still governed under a continued state of emergency decree, creates a 
tangled web of legal complications that could hamper any efforts for transparency in the 
Special Courts prosecution proceedings.’209  
As noted before, in 2004 Sudan and its judiciary began to take action in response to 
the crimes committed within its jurisdiction in the form of the National Commission of 
Inquiry and Special Courts to investigate Darfur crimes. In Sudan, these special 
jurisdictions are established either by the Chief Justice or by the President and not by 
the law, and are composed of a majority of military judges who are accountable to the 
executive. These jurisdictions contravene Article 14 of the ICCPR and paragraph 5 of 
the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary,210 which provide that 
everyone has the right to be tried by ordinary courts or tribunals according to 
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established legal procedures. In other words, they are in violation of the basic rights to 
fair trial guaranteed by international standards, as cases before such Special Courts are 
heard summarily, their decisions immediately executed, and appeals against convictions 
must be made to the District Chief Justice within seven days.211 Despite the CPA and 
INC promulgation of human rights, Sudanese criminal legislation has not been 
harmonized with international human rights law and due process standards, and as a 
consequence it does not contain comprehensive substantive legal definitions of crimes 
exclusively related to sexually based violence in the context of armed conflicts. For 
instance, rape crimes are mixed with adultery under the regulations of the Criminal 
Code, 1991. The Evidence Act, a part of this Code, requires a very strict and 
complicated evidentiary procedure for rape crimes, which results in impunity for most 
of the perpetrators.212 Moreover, the procedural law does not provide judicial 
mechanisms to prevent, investigate and punish serious gender based violations nor 
effective remedies to victims of sexual violence that allow them to seek meaningful 
redress. Even the newly adopted Armed Forces Act 2008 that brought into Sudanese 
law a whole chapter on International Humanitarian Law, codifying crimes during war, 
does not address sexual violence as a crime during armed conflicts.213 In this context, 
the ICC Prosecutor should be aware of the ideas and values of local traditions, 
particularly Shari’a jurisprudence in Sudan where Islamic law is recognised as a main 
source of law.  
Jan Pronk, the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Sudan, has 
observed that the Darfur situation represents ‘anarchy and a total collapse of law and 
order’, in which ‘the border lines between the military, the paramilitary and the police 
are being blurred.’214 Restrictive laws that grant broad powers to the executive have 
undermined the effectiveness of the judiciary, and many of the laws in force in Sudan 
today contravene basic human rights standards.215 Senior counsel to the International 
Justice Programme at Human Rights Watch, Sara Darehshori, has maintained that ‘there 
is no real effort on the ground to prosecute and ultimately bring justice to the 
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victims.’216 Amnesty International, in relation to the operation of the Special Courts, 
also claims that the trials have failed to meet international standards of fairness in a 
number of ways. Some defendants were only allowed to meet their lawyers for the first 
time after their trial had begun and others were convicted on the basis of confessions 
extracted under torture.217  
 
Conclusion: 
The Sudanese system of criminal justice has been heavily influenced by Shari’a and 
the judiciary has historically been under control of government. This system, due to lack 
of independence and impartiality, has failed to deliver fair trials in the national judicial 
system on the one hand, and to comply with international accepted procedures on the 
other. In fact, criminal laws in Sudan have facilitated violations since they are overly 
broad and contain offences and punishments that themselves violate human rights. The 
laws do not proscribe international crimes in line with international definitions, and 
provisions such as immunity legislation have resulted in impunity for officials. In short, 
they have failed to provide adequate protection against serious crimes that have taken 
place in Darfur.218 The shortcomings of the Sudanese criminal justice system have been 
identified in a number of reports by national, regional and international bodies. The 
reports made clear that the Government of Sudan was not taking sufficient action to 
investigate and prosecute the international crimes genuinely, including by holding the 
perpetrators accountable.219  
Although the Government of Sudan has taken some steps to investigate international 
crimes in Darfur in order to demonstrate that they are willing and able genuinely to 
investigate and prosecute such crimes, neither the commissions nor the special courts 
set up to deal with serious crimes have investigated any possible links between 
individual crimes and the chain of command of the army and other forces. Furthermore, 
there has not been any attempt to establish the systematic nature of the crimes and the 
role of higher-ranking officials in them.220 The National Commission of Inquiry which 
was established by the government to investigate specified crimes in Darfur, concluded 
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that crimes committed in Darfur were the result of rebel activities and that they were not 
sufficiently widespread to consider as crimes of international concern under the Rome 
Statute. The government furthermore declared that, according to the fact that 
complementarity is the core premise of the Rome Statute; the Sudanese competent 
authorities are willing to finalize the process of investigations and prosecutions based 
on their national laws of procedure. 
However, according to the findings of UNCOI, the International Commission of 
Jurists and other national and international bodies, recent investigatory bodies and 
courts set up by the Government to address human rights law in Darfur have not 
delivered justice. The courts are neither independent nor impartial, and a range of 
national laws make the courts incapable of providing justice in a way that reflects the 
gravity of the crimes and conforms to international standards. The special courts have 
never addressed the criminal responsibility of senior-level Sudanese officials in relation 
to Darfur. In fact, the sophisticated system of immunities, guaranteed by the 
Constitution and various laws, protects military, police and other Government officials 
from prosecution for human rights violations.  
In addition, the special court trials do not consider the large scale attacks, as described 
by the UNCOI and many NGO investigations, involving the killing of civilians, torture, 
enforced disappearances, rape etc., conducted on a widespread and systematic basis.221 
The failure to address legal and structural obstacles appears to underscore the lack of 
political will of the Sudanese Government to bring to justice state officials and members 
of the Janjaweed militia operating in conjunction with government forces responsible 
for gross human rights violations in Darfur.222 In the view of the impunity it grants, the 
judicial system has demonstrated that it lacks adequate structures, authority, credibility, 
and willingness to effectively prosecute and punish the perpetrators of the alleged 
crimes in Darfur.223 In particular, many serious gaps remain between international 
standards and Islamic law in Sudan governing criminal matters and procedure.224 It was 
mentioned earlier in chapter two that Kantianism has provided the inspiration for much 
of our thinking about universalism in criminal justice and according to this model; one 
cannot isolate questions of domestic justice from those of international justice. There is 
a clear tension for Islamic states which seek to impose their Islamic beliefs in practice, 
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on the one hand, while expressing a liberal inclination towards the securing of human 
rights on the other. However, the Kantian set of imperatives are still crucial in all 
attempts  to move the global judicial condition towards some kind of cosmopolitan civil 
society. Islamic criminal law recognizes some of the basic rights of defendants, such as 
the presumption of innocence, the principle of legality and non-retroactivity, the 
intention of the perpetrator, and duress. However, such rights do not address the more 
pressing issue of the lack of specificity of the elements of core crimes under the Rome 
Statute. An Islamic perspective on various elements of crimes of gender highlights the 
conflict between Shari’a and ICC provisions, and it is a particular example of the 
general tension between domestic and international law in underdeveloped legal 
systems - Shari’a has never provided a comprehensive system of codes and it is only a 
path for striving towards God’s will. Sudan’s legal system and the compatibility 
between Islamic law and international criminal justice may raise particular 
controversies,225 which need to be considered in the ICC prosecutorial decision-making 
process with regard to particular cases.  
Overall, the Prosecutor came to conclusion that the Sudan is unwilling to genuinely 
investigate; thus, there is reasonable basis to initiate an investigation into the situation in 
Darfur. The next chapter will examine the legitimacy of prosecutorial discretion in 
making admissibility assessment with regard to particular cases in the Darfur situation. 
In particular, the ethical quality of prosecutorial performance will be analyzed in 
relation to different phases of the proceedings before the Court and the Prosecutor’s 
selection of cases. While this chapter has examined the factual basis of the situation on 
the ground, the next chapter will explore how the Prosecutor has reacted, in order to 
assess the relevance of the normative approach established in Chapter Two to the 
operation of Article 17 of the Rome Statute.  
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Chapter Five: Decision-Making Process in  
the Darfur Situation 
 
Introduction: 
International crimes are almost always committed within a system of atrocities where 
intellectual authors make the plans, leaders order or incite the commission of the crimes, 
and lower ranked persons carry the plans out.1 As far as administration of justice 
concerned, it is crucial that the Prosecutor apply the law in a manner that is impartial, 
equitable and independent. Prior to the establishment of the ICC, the selection of 
situations and cases before international criminal jurisdictions had been ‘highly political 
and not very transparent.’2 As Schabas has pointed out, ‘in contrast with both 
Nuremberg and the ad hoc tribunals, the judicial oversight of the Prosecutor in the 
selection of cases is considerably more robust’3. 
Having said that the ICC Prosecution is the ‘principal agency responsible for 
safeguarding the complementarity regime during the triggering and criminal 
procedures’4 a complex issue may be raised here is when the ICC should interfere in a 
national criminal proceeding. At the heart of the complementarity principle is the ability 
to prosecute international criminals in a state’s national courts on behalf of the 
international community, or ‘to have in place mechanisms to arrest and surrender to the 
ICC persons that the ICC seeks to prosecute.’5 The Prosecutor’s unique brand of 
discretion is a new issue for international criminal justice6 and the Prosecutor must 
consider a range of policy and strategy questions which will have an impact on the 
framework of international criminal justice.7 In fact, the Prosecutor must be able to 
exercise his or her discretion based on a normative approach, which accommodates its 
moral and legal duties in order to produce effective criminal investigations and 
prosecutions of human rights atrocities. However, as Kantian normative theory has its 
roots in post-Enlightenment rationalism; it represents a form of a secular liberation 
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theology movement, which is in sharp contrast with the aspiration of some Islamic 
countries, such as Sudan.  As Stigen has noted, bringing criminals to justice before any 
court requires a complex body of procedural law, and the Prosecutor must address the 
issue of how to detect national failure in order to proceed, considering at what stage, 
how and by whom, the admissibility and prosecutorial discretion are to be settled.8  
The Security Council’s referral to the ICC regarding the conflict in the Darfur region 
of Sudan sheds light on the development and meaning of the complementarity regime 
provided in the Rome Statute.9 A number of interesting issues have arisen in light of the 
Security Council’s first referral to the ICC, including the extent to which the Prosecutor 
is bound by the terms of any Security Council referral. In other words, will the 
Prosecutor of the ICC be implicitly bound by findings of the Council’s investigation? 
Considering the operational difficulties of conducting an investigation with limited 
investigative resources, ‘there may be a temptation to rely heavily upon 
predeterminations that will inevitably accompany Security Council referral’.10 When the 
Security Council refers a situation to the ICC, an a priori determination by the Security 
Council as to how cases should be allocated remains problematic.11 Furthermore, it 
must be asked whether the admissibility criteria will still apply, or whether such referral 
effectively vests the ICC with primacy vis-a-vis national jurisdictions.12  
Prosecutorial discretion at the ICC has been subject, in this context, to critiques in the 
early years of its work regarding the application of the complementarity principle. In a 
way, prosecutorial authority, and its inconsistency with governing principles of case 
strategy for the prosecution at an early stage of the criminal justice process, challenge 
the legitimacy of prosecutorial discretion and may complicate the work of the ICC. As 
Ropper has noted, the Darfur case is the most challenging case before the ICC, and 
Sudan will be a test case not only for the ICC but ultimately for the international 
community as to whether it is truly committed to ending the cycle of violence and 
impunity.13 The purpose of this chapter is to examine to what extent prosecutorial 
policy has been effective and transparent in evaluating the admissibility assessment in 
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the given situation. The first section of this chapter will analyse the decision-making 
process in the Darfur situation in terms of prosecutorial policy, in order to explore how 
the ICC Prosecution has made its decisions on the admissibility of situations and cases. 
In this regard, the Prosecutor’s requests for the issuance of warrants of arrest and the 
decisions which were made by the Pre-Trial Chamber will be examined. The second 
part of this chapter will evaluate the exercise of the discretionary power of the 
Prosecutor based upon core ethical principles of transparency, independence, and 
impartiality in prosecutorial policy, and the legitimacy of prosecutorial discretion. 
 
1. Analysis of decision-making process:  
Several issues are raised by the Darfur cases, such as admissibility, command 
responsibility and sovereign immunity.14 However, the following analysis attempts to 
focus on admissibility issues alone. The prosecution of a matter before the ICC and the 
process leading to the decision to prosecute normally requires very considerable 
investigation, information gathering, and often high levels of confidentiality and 
information or witness protection. Contact between the Prosecutor and the national 
authorities becomes extensive during the course of an investigation and any request for 
arrest and surrender or any prosecution.15 The selection process involves comparative 
analysis and, while the Prosecutor will have access to the whole crime base, the judges 
will only be able to compare the present case with previous cases that the Prosecutor has 
brought before the Court.16  
 In the Darfur situation, the Prosecutor must show to the Pre-Trial Chamber that the 
efforts of the Sudanese national courts are not genuine and that the ICC therefore may 
retain its jurisdiction over the case.17 Sudan is a non-state party to the ICC and it was 
the Security Council who first referred the situation to the ICC. Therefore, coming to 
terms with ‘an ad hoc agreement’ based upon Article 12 of the Rome Statute does not 
apply in this case.18 Even though Sudan is a non-state party, they are a signatory to the 
Rome Statute, and as such have certain obligations to refrain from ‘acts which would 
defeat the object and purpose’ of the Rome Statute. Therefore, the argument can be 
                                                 
14
 Elagab, O. Y. (2009). "Indicting the Sudanese President by the ICC: Resolution 1593 revisited." The 
International Journal of Human Rights 13(5): 654-667. p. 662.  
15
 Plessis, Op, cit.,  
16
 Stigen, Op, cit., p. 404. 
17
 Hewett, Op, cit,.  
18
 Thompson-Flores, T. (2009). "The International Criminal Court: Will it Succeed or Fail?". from 
works.bepress.com/thomas_thompson_flores/1/ [accessed on 10th September 2011].  
 143 
made that by committing war crimes and crimes against humanity Sudan has violated its 
obligations.19  
 
1.1 Referral of the Darfur situation to the ICC: 
As prosecutorial discretion is formulated, neither states parties or the Security Council 
can instruct the Prosecutor to investigate or prosecute.20 At the Rome Conference, the 
issue of the relationship between the Security Council and the Court was one of the 
most pressing. The finally agreed system of Security Council referral indicated the 
ability of the Council to refer situations to the Court under Article 13 (b) of the 
Statute.21 However, for a referral to be made pursuant to Article 13 (b), the Council 
must act under Chapter VII of the Charter.22 It is arguable that the Security Council 
referral of the Darfur situation to the Prosecutor is the first opportunity to explore the 
complex relationship between the Security Council and the power of the Prosecutor.23 It 
is worth mentioning here that while Article 12 details the preconditions to the exercise 
of the Court’s jurisdiction in the case of State Party referrals or proprio motu 
investigations, Security Council referrals are only subject to the jurisdictional 
limitations of the crimes themselves and the operation of Article 17. In this sense, 
Security Council referrals are required to focus upon a ‘situation’ and not an 
individual.24  
The general principles of admissibility as articulated in Article 17 of the Rome Statute 
do not distinguish between trigger mechanisms for prosecution.25 As was addressed in 
chapter three, the complementarity regime also applies in the event of a Security 
Council referral since Articles 17 and 19 of the Rome Statute do not indicate any 
exception for these. Under such an approach, the ICC would remain free to make an 
independent and final determination of issues of jurisdiction and admissibility.26 In 
response to the Security Council referral of the Darfur situation, the Prosecutor noted, 
‘before starting an investigation, I am required under the Statute to assess factors 
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including crimes and admissibility; I look forward to cooperation from relevant parties 
to collect this information.’27  
However, there has been a debate over the extent to which the Prosecutor is bound by 
the terms of Security Council referral made in March 2005. For instance, Jens David 
Ohlin has argued that in cases of Security Council referral, prosecutorial discretion to 
make a determination about the initiation of an investigation is inconsistent with the 
role of the Security Council.28 He has further pointed out that when the Security 
Council invokes its authority in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter in 
making a referral to the Court, such referrals are mandatory ‘to restore peace and 
security.’29 Therefore, prosecutorial discretion would be restricted and it is not for the 
Prosecutor under Article 53(1) to determine whether there is a reasonable basis to 
proceed.30 Article 103 of the UN Charter stipulates that ‘in the event of conflict 
between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present 
Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations 
under the present Charter shall prevail.’31 Thus, Ohlin has suggested that the process of 
Security Council referrals limits the prosecutor’s independence and that the prosecutor 
has no power to ignore a referral made by the Security Council.32   
By contrast, Crawford has noted that ‘[o]nce a crime has been referred by the 
Security Council, the normal requirements of the Rome Statue will apply, including 
independent prosecution’.33 In his view, the Security Council cannot instruct the 
Prosecutor to investigate a situation or to prosecute a specific individual.34 Article 
53(1) of the Rome Statute stipulates that the Prosecutor must conduct a full analysis of 
‘the information made available to him or her’ for the purpose of determining whether 
a ‘reasonable basis’ exists.35 Furthermore, Gallavin has maintained that Security 
Council referrals are still subject to examination by the Prosecutor under Article 17 and 
19 of the Rome Statute;36 the Prosecutor has the authority to ‘judicially review referrals 
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and deferrals of the Security Council.’37 In other words, the Court would be required to 
review a Security Council decision to determine whether the requirements of 
complementarity had been met. The notion of complementarity does not otherwise 
apply in cases of Security Council referral, since it has already determined ‘a 
reasonable basis to initiate an investigation’ into the concerned situation.38 Gallavin 
has asserted that the Prosecutor must be bound by the provisions of the Rome Statute. 
As it stands, he or she does not have any obligation based on whether a situation is 
referred by a state or the Security Council.39 Security Council referrals are still subject 
to scrutiny by the Prosecutor under Articles 17 and 19 of the Rome Statute40 and in 
addition, Article 53, which establishes the admissibility requirements necessary for the 
Prosecutor to decide whether or not to proceed with an investigation, also applies to 
Security Council referrals.41  
The Prosecutor, in determining whether to conduct a preliminary examination or 
investigation, will have to consider whether guidelines cover the factors in Article 53 
(1) (a) to (c) and Article 17, which apply to any state or Security Council referrals. The 
most serious challenge facing the Prosecutor will be in determining which crimes to 
select for a preliminary examination and investigation based on referral by the Security 
Council pursuant to Article 13 (b), or by a state party pursuant to Article 13 (a) and 
14.42 Under the Statute, the Prosecutor is entrusted with a broad measure of discretion 
with respect to what additional steps should be taken in relation to information 
received. The Office of the Prosecutor must analyse information in order to determine 
whether the statutory threshold to start an investigation is met: there must be ‘a 
reasonable basis to proceed’.43 In the case of Darfur, prior to the initiation of the 
investigation on 1 June 2005, the Office of the Prosecutor carried out a fact-finding 
process in relation to national proceedings concerning alleged crimes in Darfur, based 
upon information that was gathered from witnesses and organisations active in the 
region. The Prosecutor concluded that ‘there were cases that would be admissible 
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within the situation in Darfur because there were no national proceedings focusing on 
the most serious crimes and on those who bear greatest responsibility for those 
crimes.’44 Furthermore, it was stated that once specific cases are selected within a 
situation for full investigation, the Office assesses the admissibility of those cases.45 
The informal expert paper on the principle of complementarity in practice noted that 
admissibility is not an issue for litigation and judicial determination, but rather a matter 
for the Prosecutor to consider and assess in their decision over whether to proceed with 
an investigation and whether there could be cases that would be admissible within the 
situation in Darfur since 1 July 2002.46 According to Articles 17 and 53 of the Rome 
Statute, the Prosecutor has the primary role at an early stage of proceedings, with the 
decision whether or not the ICC gets involved in different situations resting with him 
or her. Establishing the admissibility of the case is one of the important factors in 
determining whether there is a reasonable basis to open an investigation.47 In this 
context, a senior ICC officer has asserted that:  
‘In the preliminary examination, the Prosecutor does not exercise any 
investigative power. The Prosecution conducts a fact-finding inquiry to 
assess the situation.’48 
 
In making this assessment, the Prosecutor takes into account the nature of the alleged 
crimes, as well as information relating to those who may bear the greatest responsibility 
for such crimes.49 As outlined in Chapter Three, decision-making on whether to 
investigate or prosecute is one of the issues of prosecutorial discretion. The issue of 
when and how prosecutorial discretion should be exercised is one of the deepest and 
most difficult questions facing the Court.50 Given the purpose of the Rome Statute, 
which is to put an end to impunity in any given situation, prosecutorial policy should 
focus only on the seriousness of crimes committed, rather than on military conflict, in 
selecting military or political leaders who have been involved in a particular conflict. 
The assessment of the seriousness of the crimes is critical for impartial prosecutorial 
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decision-making; otherwise it could ‘fuel the politicization of the ICC’.51 The question 
of who to prosecute is the other important issue which should be considered in 
prosecutorial decision-making, and how far the Prosecutor should focus on higher-level 
accused and/or low ranking perpetrators.52 Thus, it is important to consider how far the 
Prosecutor is accountable for his or her admissibility and charging decisions. Article 1 
of the Rome Statute declares that the Court ‘shall have the power to exercise its 
jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern.’53 
However, selected cases in current situations at the ICC have met this criterion in 
different ways. For instance, in the situation of DRC, the first case selected concerned 
recruiting child soldiers. In contrast, in the situation of Darfur, it was announced that 
there will be a preference for ‘big fish’ in investigating crimes.54 The crucial question 
here is why the prosecutor has not sought to bring charges against any further members 
of Sudan’s political and military leadership. We may also ask why the prosecutor is 
seeking Al- Bashir’s arrest for genocide, the most serious crime with which he can be 
charged and the most difficult to prove.55  
 
1.2 Decision-making process of the Prosecution: 
In 2005, the Security Council, pursuant to Resolution 1953, asked the Prosecution to 
report every six months to the Council on actions taken and on upcoming activities in 
the Darfur situation.56 So far, fourteen reports have been submitted. However, the 
following section will mainly focus on the first four reports in order to analyse the 
Prosecutor’s strategies and methodology in assessing this situation. The first report of 
the Prosecutor to the Security Council pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005) established that 
for the purpose of analysing the admissibility of cases, the Office of the Prosecutor 
(OTP) had studied the Sudanese institutions, laws and procedures. In this context, the 
Government of Sudan had provided information relating to the Sudanese justice system, 
the administration of criminal justice in various parts of Darfur, traditional systems for 
alternative dispute resolution, and also furnished copies of materials relevant to the 
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report of the National Commission of Inquiry.57 The Office also gathered information 
regarding multiple ad hoc mechanisms that have been created by the Sudanese 
authorities in the context of the conflict in Darfur, such as the Committees against Rape 
established by a Ministerial order in 2004, the Special Court created under the Special 
Courts Act in 2004, the Specialized Courts that replaced them pursuant to a decree 
issued by the Chief Justice (also in 2004), as well as the National Commission of 
Inquiry (NCOI) and other ad hoc judicial and non judicial committees.58 In light of the 
information reviewed, on 1st June 2005 the Prosecutor determined the existence of 
sufficient evidence to believe that there were cases that would be admissible in relation 
to the Darfur situation. The Prosecutor emphasised that the decision to initiate formal 
investigation was about the absence of criminal proceedings relating to the cases on 
which the OTP was likely to focus.59 That is, the admissibility assessment is a case 
specific assessment and not a judgement of the Sudanese justice system as a whole.60 In 
other words, the Prosecution highlighted that admissibility assessment is an ongoing 
assessment that relates to the specific cases to be prosecuted by the Court. Once 
investigations have been carried out, and specific cases selected, the Prosecution will 
assess whether or not those cases have been the subject of genuine national 
investigations or prosecutions. An informal policy paper of the Office of the Prosecutor 
maintains that the unwillingness test cannot be based on the outcome of proceedings - 
for example, on the acquittal of an obviously guilty person.61  
In accordance with the policies and strategies of the Prosecution, the second report of 
the Prosecutor to the Security Council indicated that the investigation focused on a 
selected number of criminal incidents and those persons bearing greatest responsibility 
for those incidents, based on an analysis of the evidence collected as a result of a full 
and impartial investigation.62 However, the report highlighted that the continuing 
insecurities in Darfur represented a serious obstacle to the conduct of effective 
investigation into alleged crimes there by national judicial bodies seeking to bring to 
justice those responsible.63 Therefore, given the on-going violence and attacks in 
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Darfur, and the absence of an effective system of witness protection, investigation 
activities by the ICC had taken place outside Darfur.64 There is an important question 
which may be raised here: within a context of on-going violence, as well as a complex 
process of political transition, how would the Prosecutor be able to select specific cases 
and assess whether or not those cases are the subject of genuine national investigations 
or prosecutions (that is, whether such proceedings meet the standards of genuineness set 
out in Article 17 of the Statute)? Furthermore, the Prosecutor by taking a Kantian 
universalist approach ignored the fact that Islamic religious tradition plays an important 
role in the Sudanese legal system.    
 Interestingly, the Prosecutor, in his third report to the Security Council, claimed that 
identifying those individuals with greatest responsibility for the most serious crimes in 
Darfur was a key challenge to the investigation.65 Furthermore, the full investigation of 
those individuals with greatest responsibility for the most serious crimes, and an 
assessment of the admissibility of cases, required the full support of the Security 
Council and the unfettered cooperation of the international community, in particular the 
Government of Sudan and all parties to the conflict.66 However, the strategy announced 
by the Prosecutor of a sequence of cases, rather than a single case dealing with the 
situation, is problematic given the complexities associated with the identification of 
those individuals bearing greatest responsibility for the crimes.67  In its fourth report, the 
Prosecution maintained that the Office was completing an investigation and had 
collected sufficient evidence to identify those who bore the greatest responsibility for 
crimes against humanity and war crimes, including the crimes of persecution, torture, 
murder and rape.68 The continued commission of such crimes by different groups and 
shifting factions within these groups was also the subject of investigation and analysis.69  
 
1.3 Pre-Trial Chamber decisions on Darfur cases: 
Although the evidence collected and analysed by the Prosecutor confirmed the 
complex nature of the conflict in Darfur and the nature of the challenges facing the 
identification of specific individuals,70 the Prosecutor announced that the Office was 
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seeking to finalise the preparation of the submission to the Judges by February 2007.71 
Thereafter, the Office announced that they had finished their review, that sought ‘to 
determine whether the criteria to initiate an investigation are satisfied’, and concluded 
that such an investigation was warranted.72 With regard to assessing the admissibility of 
cases, the report noted that the Prosecutor requested in November 2006 an updated 
account from the Sudanese government on their national proceedings. It concluded that 
although there had been indications of developments, such as the arrest of 14 
individuals, including Ali Kushayb, in relation to the commission of core crimes, ‘these 
indications did not appear to render the current case inadmissible.’ 73 After examining 
the application of the Prosecutor and all the evidence and information submitted, the 
Judges rendered their decision on 27 April 2007 that the arrest of the two suspects was 
necessary.74 Therefore, the Pre-Trial Chamber issued warrants of arrest against Ahmad 
Muhammad Harun, former Minister of State for the Interior and current Minister of 
State for Humanitarian Affairs of the Sudan, and Ali Kushayb, a militia leader, for war 
crimes and crimes against humanity.75 The Chamber also concluded that, according to 
the Prosecution’s application, ‘there appeared to be no proceedings, which were 
ongoing or had taken place in relation to Harun and Kushayb, which formed the basis of 
the Prosecutor’s application.’76 Therefore, the Chamber found that ‘without prejudice to 
any challenge to the admissibility of the case under Article 19 (2) (a) and (b) of the 
Statute or any subsequent determination, the case falls within the Court’s jurisdiction 
and appears to be admissible.’77  
The seventh report of the Prosecution to the Security Council claimed that ‘the 
prosecutorial policy is transparent in regard to admissibility assessment and the 
selection of cases’;78 however, it did not demonstrate how this process worked in the 
given situation, particularly when the opening of the second and third investigations in 
relation to ongoing crimes by all parties was announced. The report noted that the 
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Office was proceeding with two new investigations. It stated that the second case in the 
Darfur situation was investigating the question of who is maintaining Harun in a 
position to commit crimes and who is instructing him and others, remarking that ‘the 
official denial of such crimes is a characteristic feature of the case under 
investigation.’79 The Prosecution maintained that ‘decisions to commit crimes, to deny 
crimes, [and] to disguise crimes are taken at the highest level. Denial of crimes, by 
authorities that vowed to protect Darfurians, is an additional harm to the victims.’80 
Therefore, on 14 July 2008, the Prosecution presented the second case to Pre-Trial 
Chamber I and requested a warrant of arrest against the Sudanese President, Al-Bashir, 
on seven counts of crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes 
allegedly committed in Darfur.81 On March 3, 2009, the Pre-Trial Chamber issued an 
arrest warrant for President Al- Bashir, which listed seven counts: five counts of crimes 
against humanity and two counts of war crimes.82  
The third case focused on a rebel attack during the Haskanita incident, targeting AU 
and UN peacekeepers and aid workers in September 2007.83 On 20 November 2008, the 
Prosecution presented its third case to Pre-Trial Chamber I against three rebel 
commanders allegedly responsible for the Haskanita attack.84 The ICC prosecutors 
charged Abu Garda and other unnamed rebel commanders with leading an attack on 
African Union (AU) peacekeepers that left 12 soldiers dead and wounded eight others 
according to court documents. The counts include war crimes of violence to life, 
intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles 
involved in a peacekeeping mission, and pillaging.85 A summons to appear was issued 
instead of an arrest warrant as Abu Garda had communicated to the ICC that he would 
appear voluntarily.86 This was the first time the court had issued a summons to appear in 
any case. On May 18, 2009, Abu Garda appeared before a judge at the ICC.87 Arguably, 
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an investigation into an on-going conflict makes the political consequences of any 
investigation more sensitive. This is particularly pertinent as all of the ICC’s ongoing 
investigations, notably in the Darfur region, the Sudan and the DRC, are taking place in 
the midst of ongoing conflict.88 The view of the Prosecutor, as stated in his Office’s 
policy paper on the interests of justice, is that the ICC is not concerned with the interests 
of peace but justice.89  
 
2. Evaluation of the exercise of discretionary power by the Prosecutor: 
 The Security Council referral of the Darfur situation to the Prosecutor presents one of 
the first test cases of the manner in which the ICC will interpret the Rome Statute’s 
criteria for whether a state is genuinely willing and able to try ‘suspected atrocity 
perpetrators who otherwise fall under the Court’s jurisdiction.’90 Heller has maintained 
that ‘the situation of the Sudan is an excellent example of the shadow side of 
complementarity’,91 meaning that the Sudanese government is more than willing and 
able to investigate and prosecute members of rebel groups as well as low-level 
government officials and soldiers. In this sense, the Special Courts have been governed 
by a selective prosecution strategy which violates international due process in order to 
make those defendants easier to convict.92  
 
2.1 Assessment of the preliminary examination: 
The Prosecutor acts on behalf of the world community and is vested with the authority 
to investigate and prosecute crimes of concern to the international community as a 
whole. Therefore, the community should be heard. Moreover, a public debate regarding 
prosecutorial policies is ‘a sound democratic feature, which can only promote justice.’93 
Such discussion would indicate public engagement, which in turn might amplify the 
positive effects of the Rome Statute and the complementarity principle. However, the 
Prosecutor should ‘never make a certain prosecutorial decision for the purpose of 
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satisfying popular opinion.’94 The sensible approach is to clarify the criteria on the basis 
of which inability and unwillingness to prosecute should be determined.95 According to 
the Annex to the ‘Paper on some policy issues before the Office of the Prosecutor’, one 
of the important tasks of the Prosecutor has been the development and refinement of a 
clear methodology and general practice for the handling of information submitted to the 
Office. 96 In the Prosecutor’s policy paper, the prosecutor outlines the four guiding 
principles of his office in the selection of situations and cases: independence, 
impartiality, objectivity, and non-discrimination.97 However, the criteria upon which the 
Prosecutor’s discretion is being exercised are complex,98 and the methodologies for 
assessing those criteria are vague; particularly in the selection of situations, the 
assessment of preliminary investigation, and charging decisions.99  
In relation to the assessment of the preliminary examination of the situation, a senior 
ICC officer has suggested that: 
‘If the concerned State is not conducting initial proceedings, thus it is a 
case of inaction. And other criteria are irrelevant because inaction of the 
State allows the Court to declare that the case or situation is admissible 
automatically. However, it should be considered when, where, and 
which criteria must apply in the State in order to which the state is 
acting. There are no criteria. The OTP has tried to create some criteria 
but they are not public and we don’t know how far they have gone.’100  
 
The ICC prosecution, however, believe that at this very early stage when the 
Prosecutor must decide whether to proceed with an investigation, complementarity is 
assessed in a more general way by analyzing whether possible cases arising under the 
situation concerned have been investigated at the national level.101 Both with regard to 
the factual basis and in terms of admissibility, the Prosecutor only has to analyse the 
situation as a whole and does not need to target specific cases in the preliminary stage; 
it is certainly not necessary to have enough information to prove all elements of the 
crimes or to have evidence against specific individuals.102 In this sense, in the early 
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phases of the investigation, the Prosecutor first identifies one or more events within a 
situation in order to establish the existence of particular cases.103  
It is important to point out that there is a difference between the admissibility test of a 
situation and the admissibility test of a case.  
‘[T]he admissibility test of a case is easier than the admissibility test of 
a situation. In terms of a case, the same individual and the same conduct 
should be considered. However, in the admissibility test at the situation 
level before the opening of an investigation, it is difficult to determine 
what the State is doing and what is sufficient to consider whether the 
State is acting or not? This is complicated and there are no established 
criteria.’104 
 
2.2 Legitimacy of the Prosecution policy 
Although the actions of the Prosecutor will inevitably be guided by some principles, 
even if these are unacknowledged105, an articulation of public prosecutorial guidelines 
must assist the Prosecutor in establishing the legitimacy and transparency of his or her 
policies and discretionary decision-making.106 As mentioned in Chapter Three, the 
purpose of the Prosecutorial guidelines - including provisions concerning investigation 
and charging decisions - is to promote fair and consistent decision-making and to make 
the prosecutorial process more understandable.107 In essence, guidelines will set out 
clear standards and indicate clarification, in particular during the preliminary 
examination phase.108  
As mentioned in the Darfur background chapter, the war and the involvement of 
different parties in the Darfur conflict are complex, particularly when it comes to 
identifying those individuals who are most responsible for mass crimes.109 Regarding 
the strengthening of the legitimacy and accountability of the Prosecutor, Greenwalt has 
argued that Prosecutorial authority, and its inconsistency with governing principles of 
case strategy for the prosecution at an early stage of the criminal justice process, 
challenges the legitimacy of prosecutorial discretion and will complicate the work of 
the ICC.110 For instance, in relation to the prosecution of crimes committed in the 
Darfur region in the Sudan, it was proposed that the governing principles of the case 
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strategy for this situation should be set ‘to target those most responsible for the crimes, 
to concentrate the investigation on senior military and political figures and then local 
level, to concentrate the investigation on a very limited number of criminal episodes, to 
cover all facts and evidence for the purpose of the establishment of the truth.’111 The 
risk of politically motivated investigations might be the outcome of the abuse of 
political discretion by the Prosecutor,112 and a failure to exercise cultural sensitivy in 
the context of the situation in Darfur. When a situation is referred by the Security 
Council, an investigation is automatically opened if the Prosecutor decides that there is 
a ‘reasonable basis to proceed.’113 In doing so, the Prosecutor should consider reports 
of violations of international criminal law by all parties to the conflict, in addition to 
the report of the UNCOI and other local and international organizations and academic 
experts.114 However, although Security Council referral may help to strengthen the 
cooperative relationship between the Prosecutor and the Council, it also raises 
important concerns with regard to the potential abuse of prosecutorial discretion by the 
Prosecutor.115  
 
2.3 Independence and political interference in prosecutorial policy  
As far as the Darfur case is concerned, the Prosecutor should be aware at all times of 
the political context that is self-evident in his role, prosecuting and not engaging in 
politicised prosecution.116 Critics of ICC prosecutions argue that criminal trials can be 
selective, politicized, and prevent social and ethnic reconciliation.117 Elagab has claimed 
that ‘the Prosecutor of the ICC is in a difficult position. He is supposed to act as a 
Prosecutor dealing with a legal case, but that is not strictly true, as he unwittingly 
involved himself in the political aspect of the case of Darfur’.118  
Since the aims of prosecutorial policy have an impact on the administration of 
international justice, the role of the Prosecutor should be only to apply the law and not 
to become politically involved. As Human Rights Watch have maintained, ‘political 
factors [do not] constitute a legitimate basis for the Prosecutor’s decision to initiate an 
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investigation or prosecution.’119 On the other hand, according to Goldstone, ‘however 
powerful the aspiration for neutral principles, experience and common sense suggest 
that law can never be entirely divorced from its surrounding environment.’120 Thus, the 
Prosecutor has been given the necessary political discretion to evaluate the 
appropriateness of starting a criminal prosecution in order to achieve a certain political 
goal identified as the interest of justice.121 Clearly, political considerations must not be 
disregarded; however, rushing into indictments is not advisable. The question of the 
right timing ‘in order to exercise a genuine threat while minimizing potential political 
risks will always be crucial’.122 Kastner has suggested a pragmatic approach that takes 
into account the political effects of indictments in order to show the ICC’s willingness 
and capability to act independently and impartially in Darfur.123 According to this 
strategy, the Prosecutor should start by ‘selecting a similar number of individuals from 
the various warring parties in order to avoid appearing partial’.124 It is worth mentioning 
here that Stigen has suggested that the Darfur referral could not have been made without 
‘an extensive dialogue between the Council and the Prosecutor.’125 Security Council 
Resolution 1672 named four individuals allegedly responsible for crimes committed in 
Darfur.126 In choosing individuals from the different warring parties, the Security 
Council sought to appear as impartial as possible, which was an important step.127 
However, the Prosecutor noted that ‘impartiality does not mean that we must 
necessarily prosecute all groups in a given situation. Impartiality means that we will 
objectively apply the same criteria for all, in order to determine whether the high 
thresholds of the Rome Statute are met.’128  
 
2.4 Critique of the Darfur cases:  
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the Prosecutor, in order to comply with the 
complementarity principle, determined that his case against the two Sudanese suspects, 
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Ahmad Harun and Ali Kushayb, was admissible for prosecution at the ICC since the 
Sudanese courts had not brought a case against Harun while the pending case against 
Kushayb, who was in domestic custody, was related to different crimes.129 Therefore, in 
early 2007, the Prosecutor requested that the Pre-Trial Chamber issue a summons for 
the two suspects to appear before the Court, rather than a warrant that would have 
constituted a stronger mandate for their arrest.130 Peskin has claimed that by asking the 
Pre-Trial Chamber to issue a summons, the Prosecutor sought to increase the chances of 
the suspects’ appearance in The Hague by demonstrating his desire to avoid legal 
confrontation.131 However, in late April 2007 the Pre-Trial Chamber rejected the 
prosecution’s request for a summons and issued arrest warrants instead.132  
The performance of the Prosecutor regarding ‘the protection of victims and the 
preservation of evidence’ in the region of Darfur was criticised by Antonio Cassese and 
Louise Arbour when they reported to the Pre-Trial Chamber that victims would benefit 
from more visible involvement by the Prosecutor in Darfur.133 In June 2006, the 
Prosecutor reported to the Security Council on the Darfur situation and stated that ‘the 
continuing insecurity in Darfur is prohibitive of effective investigations inside 
Darfur’.134 Arbour has noted that ‘it is rare that there can be a complete assurance to 
victims’ for their protection and that testifying will always be a risk. ‘The existence of 
such a risk, however, cannot be held by itself as reason sufficient not to undertake any 
investigation at all. If that were the case, few investigations in a conflict or post-conflict 
situation would be capable of significant progress.’135 She has argued that ‘it is possible 
to conduct serious investigations of human rights during an armed conflict in general, 
and Darfur in particular, without putting victims at unreasonable risk.’136 In this regard, 
in 2005 Cassese criticised the Prosecutor’s failure to undertake even ‘targeted and brief 
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interviews’ in Darfur137 and advocated swift prosecutorial action: ‘By pinpointing the 
five or so most responsible, establishing the chain of command and issuing arrest 
warrants, the Sudanese leadership would come under serious pressure to cooperate’.138 
The Prosecutor replied to Cassese that this was a ‘matter over which the Office of the 
Prosecutor alone enjoys discretion and the strategy does not currently involve 
investigative operations in Darfur.’139 However, Flint and de Waal have claimed that 
‘court sources say that in 2006 an ICC delegation visiting Khartoum was invited to 
travel to Darfur but the Prosecutor didn’t call Khartoum’s bluff and didn’t push at the 
door.’140  
The Darfur situation, particularly the Al-Bashir case, poses challenges for the ICC in 
relation to the efficacy of the prosecutions of international crimes in furthering justice 
and accountability for international criminal justice.141 Lutz has asserted that the 
discussions surrounding the Al-Bashir case ‘have brought into sharp focus the exercise 
of the ICC OTP’s discretion and its impact on the politics of international criminal 
justice. The OTP had, until June 2008, exercised its discretion rather cautiously.’142 
Indeed, the challenges of the Darfur situation may serve to undermine the legitimacy of 
the ICC prosecution.143 That is to say, the legitimacy of the ICC requires various 
political strategies in order to address ‘the political overtones of the exercise of the ICC 
Prosecutor’s discretionary power consistent with its legal standards and rules of 
fairness.’144  
For instance, concerning the Prosecutor’s application for the issuance of a warrant of 
arrest for President Al-Bashir of Sudan, a number of commentators have pointed out 
that the prosecution of a state’s leadership is always a political act.145 Gosnell notes that 
an arrest warrant issued for ‘a sitting head of state is nothing less than a demand for 
                                                 
137
 Cassese, A. ‘Observations on Issues Concerning the Protection of Victims and the Preservation of 
Evidence in the Proceedings on Darfur Pending Before the ICC,’ ICC-2/05, August 25, 2006.  
138
 Arbour, Op, cit,.   
139
  Ibid.,  
140
 Case Closed: A Prosecutor Without Borders, www.worldaffairsjournal.org/articles/2009-Spring/full-
DeWaalFlint.html  [accessed on 10th September 2011]  
141
 Oette, L. (2010). "Peace and Justice, or Neither? The Repercussions of the al-Bashir Case for 
International Criminal Justice in Africa and Beyond." Journal of International Criminal Justice 8: 345-
364. p. 346. 
142
 Ibid., p. 357.  
143
 Ibid.,  
144
 Roach, Politicizing the International Criminal Court: the Convergence of  Politics, Ethics, and Law, 
Op, cit., p. 4.  
145
 Harrison, T. (2008, 21 July 2008). "What Does it Mean for the Prosecutor to be a Political Actor?". 
from www.csls.ox.ac.uk/documents/Harrison.pdf [accessed on 10th September 2011] 
 159 
regime-change’.146 The Prosecutor’s effectiveness depends precisely on claims of 
objectivity and impartiality.147 Therefore, there should be some measures to ensure the 
independence of the Prosecutor from unjustified political influence.148 Bamu has argued 
that ‘it seems the ICC has learnt little from its experiences in the Uganda situation and 
the ICC Prosecutor is playing politics rather than law - in an attempt to intimidate  
Al-Bashir into faster negotiation of a peace deal and resolution of the Darfur conflict 
and possibly handing over the other two suspects from Sudan.’149 The Prosecutor must 
be aware of the relationship between Arab-Islamic culture and Western culture while 
pursuing arrest warrant of Al- Bashir. While the West will generally resort to official 
legal institutions and instruments to resolve conflicts, Arabs and Africans rely more on 
socio-cultural formations and values. Hence, most Arab and African governments 
instinctively condemned the indictment as politically motivated.  
It seems evident that a state headed by a widely supported leader will not easily 
cooperate with the Court if the leader is subject to a prosecution and threatened with 
arrest. Given these conditions, we may ask why the Prosecutor, who has not yet 
succeeded in arresting the first two accused, would engage himself in this pernicious 
and unrealistic direction. This kind of strategy in the exercise of his mandate risks 
weakening his authority.150 It is worth mentioning here Cassesse’s opinion that if the 
Prosecutor ‘intended to pursue the goal of having Al-Bashir arrested, he might have 
issued a sealed request and asked the ICC’s judges to issue a sealed arrest warrant, to be 
made public only once Al-Bashir travelled abroad’151, instead of publicly requesting the 
warrant, allowing Al-Bashir to avoid arrest simply by remaining in Sudan. Peskin has 
further claimed that the Prosecutor’s move, as a strategic attempt to persuade Al-Bashir 
to hand over the suspects, was ‘emblematic of the Prosecutor’s propensity to play the 
politics of conciliation with a defiant state.’152  
Bamu also added that the ICC is playing politics by trying to force the Security 
Council into engaging fully with Sudan to end the conflict.153 Schabas has described the 
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request by the Prosecutor for an arrest warrant for the Sudanese President ‘as the most 
spectacular move to date by the ICC’.154 Schabas has suggested that ‘this is Moreno-
Ocampo’s third blunder after having already failed with the first trial and facing labour 
relations problems.’155 Rozenberg has asserted that ‘the move against Al-Bashir is 
intended to show that the ICC is willing to pursue difficult cases of high-ranking 
officials and to regain some of the legitimacy that the Court has lost in Uganda and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo.’156 Meanwhile, Goldstone has claimed that while it 
would surely be foolish for any prosecutor to bring criminal charges for the purpose of 
ending a war, many remain sceptical that the Prosecutor does not, in practice, give 
consideration to the impact of its decisions on the prospect of continued conflict.157 As 
such debate demonstrates, there has been some criticism of the Prosecutor on the Darfur 
matter for moving directly from the mid-level indictees charged in 2007 to the July 
2008 arrest warrant application against President Al-Bashir.158 Prof. Bassiouni, in 
respect of the Sudanese government’s involvement in crimes committed, and the 
responsibility for these crimes up the chain of command, has stated that: 
‘The logic of every proceeding should be considered. For instance, 
considering the function of the local military and local chief of the police 
would help the Prosecutor to build the chain of command 
responsibility.’159  
 
He further maintains that:  
‘We cannot presume that a national legal system is going to be considered 
unwilling simply because it was the judgement of the Prosecutor to decide 
to indict the head of state. I think this was a big jump.’160  
 
In fact, knowledge of the legal framework and the operational dynamics of the 
military and political structure of the concerned situation are crucial to establishing the 
chains of command. Knowledge of the evidence for this purpose should not be 
considered based only upon secondary sources, especially when there are parallel 
mechanisms of decision-making for individuals in their personal capacity versus their 
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official positions in the chain of command.161 Since the judges will certainly be subject 
to ‘immense international scrutiny and political expectations, the inevitable subjectivity 
of these judgements [about issuing the arrest warrant for Al-Bashir] provide[ed] an 
opportunity to tinker with the procedural rules. This is especially problematic given that 
the data accumulated by the Prosecutor is almost entirely secondary.’162  
Ginsburg has suggested that the ICC has a legal and political imperative to make its 
prosecution credible. On the other hand, states may sometimes need another type of 
credible promise, namely not to prosecute or to grant an amnesty. Ginsburg has called 
this tension ‘the clash of commitment.’163 In this sense, he believes that the decision to 
indict a sitting head of state is a high-risk strategy for the Prosecutor that brings the 
clash of commitments to a head. 164 It can provide a challenge and an opportunity for 
the ICC judges, who need to establish a reputation of producing decisions that generate 
compliance.165 Clearly, the Prosecution of a head of state has political consequences and 
the consideration of such political consequences plays an important role in the 
prosecutorial decision-making process. Passing a sensitive case to the Judges from the 
Prosecutor would create an unnecessarily complex relationship between various organs 
of the Court. On the other hand, the delay in deciding on the issue of an arrest warrant 
on the part of the Judges would ‘reinforce prejudice and doubts, including the possible 
suspicion of Judges’ involvement in back-door negotiations, to the detriment of [the] 
Court’s independence.’166  
The Prosecutor’s decision-making in the Darfur situation has also been challenged by 
some Sudan analysts, such as Julie Flint and Alex de Waal, who have criticized the 
‘zealous pursuit’ of Al-Bashir and the Prosecutor’s legal judgment in seeking a 
genocide charge against the president.167 Alex de Waal, commenting on the ICC 
Prosecutor’s determination to charge President Al-Bashir with genocide, argues that ‘he 
would have been better advised to confine his charges to the events of 2003-04, when, 
according to the Court’s own crime base data, about 90 percent of the killings took 
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place’168 Regarding the credibility of the prosecution, de Waal and Flint wrote just 
before the Prosecutor filed his request for an arrest warrant that: ‘Evidence of such a 
[murderous] plan is purely circumstantial. There are daily crimes of violence in Darfur 
and the government has failed to provide security for the camps. But when the 
prosecutor alleges there is a centralized conspiracy to destroy the social fabric of Darfur, 
describes the whole region as a crime scene, and makes comparisons with the Nazis, we 
feel he is going beyond the facts and risks jeopardizing the credibility of the 
prosecution.’169  
Regarding the ICC’s third case on Darfur, the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber I dismissed all 
charges against Bahr Abu Garda, formerly of the Justice and Equality Movement, in 
connection with the attack that killed 12 African Union peacekeepers in Haskanita in 
2007.170 The message from the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber I to the Prosecutor was ‘you 
showed us the crime but not the criminal.’171 The Court concluded that there were no 
substantial grounds to believe that Abu Garda issued orders because it found there are 
no substantial grounds to believe that he was even in a position to issue orders on the 
date of the Haskanita attack.172 Flint has claimed that the Pre-Trial Chamber decision on 
the confirmation charges is ‘an astonishing tale of incoherence, inconsistency and poor 
legal practice.’173 Moreover, regarding the weakness of the Prosecutor’s case, one of the 
three PTC judges, Judge Cuno Tarfusser, filed a separate opinion - not to dissent with 
the decision to decline to confirm the charges against Abu Garda but to say that the case 
was not even worthy of consideration.174 He said, ‘[t]he lacunae and shortcomings 
exposed by the mere factual assessment of the evidence are so basic and fundamental 
that the Chamber need not conduct a detailed analysis of the legal issues pertaining to 
the merits of the case.’175 
De Waal claims that the decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber regarding Abu Garda case 
poses some sharp questions about the strategy followed by the Prosecutor in this case, 
such as ‘What process of investigation was followed in this case?’176 The Chamber 
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explicitly left the door open for the Prosecution to request the confirmation of charges if 
such a request was accompanied with additional evidence in the future,177 but the ICC 
judges’ comments and findings are surely damaging for the Office of the Prosecutor. Is 
the Prosecutor going to focus on attempting to prove that he is right about Abu Garda 
and the ICC judges wrong, or is he going to do what Darfurians want him to do? 
Namely, concentrate on putting in the dock those responsible for the destruction of their 
communities and the deaths of their families.178 
 
 
Conclusion: 
Darfur represents the first time a case has been referred to the ICC involving crimes 
taking place in the territory of a state that is not a party to the ICC. The case also marks 
the first time the U.N. Security Council has referred a case to the ICC as it is permitted 
to do under the Rome Statute.179 It is considered that the complementarity regime also 
applies in the event of a Security Council referral since Articles 17 and 19 of the Rome 
Statute do not indicate any exception for such referrals. Under such an approach, the 
ICC would remain free to make an independent and final determination of issues of 
jurisdiction and admissibility.180 As Crawford has noted, ‘[o]nce a crime has been 
referred by the Security Council, the normal requirements of the Statue will apply, 
including independent prosecution’.181 Article 53(1) of the Rome Statute stipulates that 
the Prosecutor must conduct a full analysis of ‘the information made available to him or 
her’ for the purpose of determining whether a ‘reasonable basis’ exists for 
prosecution.182 The Prosecutor has the authority to ‘judicially review referrals and 
deferrals of the Security Council.’183 In other words, the Court is required to review a 
Security Council decision to determine whether the requirements of complementarity 
have been met.184 As Brubacher has noted, ‘the Prosecutor of the ICC represents the 
accusations and interests of the entire international community and must therefore 
weigh the interest of the parties to the case with those of the international community. 
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[It is] within this view that the criteria for public policy interest, as expressed in Article 
53, must be identified and interpreted.’185 In addition to the concerns of the world 
community as such, the exercise of discretion must also address the need to ensure the 
Court’s credibility, the need for successful proceedings, and the need to establish a 
meaningful role for the Court.186  
In the Darfur situation, the Sudanese government made some effort to show that 
domestic courts meet the complementarity criteria. However, there were some major 
obstacles to the achievement of justice in Darfur, notably the lack of political will, the 
poor enforcement of law and order, the failure to reform the judiciary, etc. Moreover, it 
has been suggested that there is a tension between Shari’a and international standards 
and that there is a need to adopt new approaches and techniques to reconcile them with 
contemporary democratic values and international standards of justice. In other words, 
the Prosecutor should consider taking into account the need for cultural sensitivity since 
up until now, crimes of gender violence have been actively prosecuted in a number of 
outstanding Darfur cases; particularly the arrest warrant for Al-Bashir which includes 
rape as a predicate act of genocide.187 In fact, the Darfur situation is an extreme example 
of the impact of cultural difference on international criminal proceedings where ICC 
crimes are not compatible with Sudanese criminal law and procedure. For example, rape 
is difficult to prove in accordance with Islamic rules of evidence because of the 
differential weight of evidence. In this context, the exercise of prosecutorial discretion 
has been controversial. This suggests that the repressive state practices of some Islamic 
states will continue to provoke further conflict between domestic and international 
criminal law. Therefore, it is the Prosecutor’s obligation to be cautious about local 
traditions notwithstanding that the ICC investigators and prosecutors are taking a 
Kantian approach in order to secure justice and eliminate disorder when national 
authorities fail to do so.  
In the Darfur situation, the effectiveness of international criminal prosecutions 
depends on support from the public and governments. The ICC Prosecution policy has 
been treated with suspicion both by the public and the Sudanese government, due to a 
lack of transparency and clarity of prosecutorial strategies in relations to focus on 
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African and Muslim countries. Above all, the Darfur situation highlights the fact that 
the Prosecutor needs to accept the idea of legal and normative pluralism rather than 
relying on a legitimate claim to a monopoly of authority and force.  
Although there have been some developments in the Darfur cases at the Court, it 
seems that a lack of consistency in the prosecutorial policy and different approaches to 
different situations have led to complex issues over the possibility of a fair trial at the 
ICC.188 This will be explored more in the next chapter in the DRC situation which was 
referred to the Prosecutor by the Congolese government. This provides the opportunity 
to analyse the normative dimension of prosecutorial decision-making in a very different 
context and under circumstances of self-referral.  
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Chapter Six: The Situation in the Ituri Region of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)  
 
 
Introduction: 
There is complication in the case of the DRC, where contradictory views of justice 
are prevalent. On the one hand, justice is fervently desired but, at the same time, 
people do not trust it in practice. Historically, the Congolese have seen a lot of 
inconsistencies between the written law and the reality on the ground. A justice 
system rife with corruption, lacking independence, prone to being partial and easily 
influenced by others’ opinions and desires, and marred by double standards, has 
helped to contribute to this distrust. Judges, meanwhile, ‘complain about the 
conditions in which they work and think they are also victims of politics’.1  
Over the past decade, the people of the DRC have endured horrific atrocities at the 
hands of a multitude of armed groups, foreign forces, militias and the national 
Congolese army. The victims are ordinary citizens who have suffered massacres, 
torture, widespread sexual violence, forced displacement and property loss. Impunity 
for grave violations of human rights has long been the norm in the DRC. Only a small 
number of perpetrators have been arrested and brought to justice; dozens of others 
have been promoted to senior positions in the Congolese army or the government. As 
one Congolese lawyer recently commented, ‘in Congo we reward those who kill, we 
don’t punish them.’2 Since August 1998, the DRC ‘has been enmeshed in one of 
Africa's most internationalized wars’,3 directly involving six other countries. The 
armies of Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi, together with Congolese rebel groups, were 
pitted against the government of the DRC, who were supported by Zimbabwe, 
Angola, and Namibia.4 In many parts of the eastern DRC, such as Ituri, South Kivu 
and northern Katanga, the fighting between armed groups continues today with 
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widespread human rights crimes including ethnic massacres, sexual violence, and the 
recruitment of child soldiers.5 
In this context, the UN Security Council Resolution 1493(2003) prepared for the 
departure of the European Union (EU) forces by authorizing the Ituri with a 
strengthened mandate.6 In addition, the UN Secretary-General Annan outlined the 
violence occurring in Ituri, especially between the Hema and Lendu ethnic groups, 
from February through May 2003, and recommended the creation of the United 
Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) to 
operate in Bunia beginning in August 2003.7 The individuals and armed groups that 
have carried out massacres, murders, rapes, inhumane acts such as cannibalism, and 
other crimes in Ituri must bear primary responsibility for them. But armed forces and 
political movements under the control of the government are also responsible for 
having provided military and other support to local groups with abysmal human rights 
records.8  
National courts clearly have the responsibility to undertake the fight against 
impunity and thereby contribute to the rebuilding of the nation. However, the 
significant question arises as to whether domestic courts have prosecuted any of the 
serious crimes committed during the wars. There is no legislation ‘domesticating’ the 
Rome Statute which defines such crimes; which is to say that there is no law to 
integrate the crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the ICC into national law and 
grant national courts jurisdiction in this regard. Thus, these serious crimes may only 
be prosecuted by military courts since the adoption in 2002 of the military criminal 
code, which includes the crimes stipulated in the Rome Statute.9 In this sense, with no 
prospect of prosecution by the domestic DRC national legal system in sight, President 
Joseph Kabila referred ‘the situation of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court 
allegedly committed anywhere in the territory of the DRC since the entry into force of 
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the Rome Statute’ to the Prosecutor on 1 July 2002.10 As early as July 2003, the 
Prosecutor indicated that the Ituri region of the DRC was his first priority.11  
In the DRC situation, the ICC investigation must take account of different branches 
of the criminal justice system, civil and military, which in turn may differ as far as 
investigative and prosecutorial standards are concerned in the application of the 
complementarity regime. In this context, the role of the Prosecutor is crucial in 
obtaining a true picture from the people of the region and raising the standard of local 
trials in accordance with rule of law principles.12 This chapter aims to assess the 
adequacy and effectiveness of the existing mechanisms for criminal justice in the Ituri 
region of the DRC with regard to Article 17 of the Rome Statute. It will focus on 
several aspects of the national justice system in order to highlight some of the most 
significant problems undercutting the capacity of national courts in the DRC to 
prosecute serious human rights crimes. In discussing this issue, this chapter is 
organized into three sections. The first will look at the contextual history of the 
DRC’s crisis in Ituri. It attempts to examine the causes of the Ituri conflict. In 
particular, the violations of international humanitarian law by all parties to the conflict 
will be considered. The second section will address the development of the Congolese 
justice system. It will explore the military justice reforms and the operation of the 
justice system in the DRC. Finally, an overall evaluation of Congolese criminal 
procedure will be attempted in order to allow for an analysis of the inadequacy of the 
Congolese criminal justice system in light of Article 17 of the Rome Statute. This will 
be undertaken in the subsequent chapter.  
 
Contextual history of the DRC’s crisis in Ituri: 
The DRC is the third-largest country in Africa and the biggest country in the Great 
Lakes region, which also includes Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, and Tanzania. This 
region has been overwhelmed by a decade of devastating conflicts, in part following 
                                                 
10
 Prosecutor receives referral of the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, ICC-OTP-
20040419-50, from www.icc-cpi.int  
11
 Schabas, W. (2008). "Complementarity in Practice: Some Uncomplimentary Thoughts." Criminal 
Law Forum 19(1): 12. p.11.  
12
 Institute for War & Peace Reporting, (2008). Sexual Violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
p. 15.  
 169 
the regional destabilization caused by the Rwandan genocide.13 The Republic of 
Congo became independent in 1960 and General Joseph Mobutu Sese Sesko, chief of 
staff of the army, seized power in a military coup on November 24, 1965. He renamed 
the country ‘Zaire’,14 and began a three-decade rule of tyranny, absolute concentration 
of power, and widespread corruption from which the country is still trying to recover. 
It has been involved in armed conflict ever since.15   
The final days of Mobutu’s reign took place in the aftermath of the 1994 Rwandan 
Genocide in which an estimated 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus were slaughtered 
by Hutu extremists. Faced with the advancing army of the predominantly Tutsi 
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a mass exodus consisting of thousands of civilians, as 
well as Hutu perpetrators of the genocide, fled west from Rwanda into neighbouring 
Zaire, resulting in a humanitarian disaster in the east of the latter country.16 Eastern 
Zaire also became a base from which the transplanted Hutu Power regime began 
launching attacks into Rwanda. In 1996, Rwandan and Ugandan forces invaded Zaire 
under the pretext of fighting Hutu rebels in the country.17 In 1996, Congolese 
dissidents with the support of neighbouring Angola, Rwanda and Uganda, established 
the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre18 (AFDL), 
headed by Laurent-Desiré Kabila. The AFDL invaded Zaire from the east, Mobutu 
fled and the AFDL entered Kinshasa in May 1997. Laurent Kabila became President 
of the country, which he renamed the Democratic Republic of the Congo.19 This 
period of the DRC’s history, from 1996 until the instalment of Kabila, has become 
known as the ‘First Congo War’.20  
Following Kabila’s ascension to power, his Ugandan and Rwandan allies were 
allowed to remain in the DRC and received military and economic benefits.21 
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However, tensions soon arose between Kabila and these allies, and in August 1998 a 
mutiny in the Congolese army triggered ‘Africa’s First World War,' arguably the 
deadliest conflict since the end of World War II.22 Rwanda and Uganda were initially 
allies, but later became adversaries during the conflict. Each backed the creation of a 
rebel movement and sent its own army to eastern Congo. In response, Kabila 
requested military assistance from members of the Southern African Development 
Community. Angola, Zimbabwe, and Chad responded to this request and sent their 
own armies to the DRC; Angola and Zimbabwe played a key role in preventing the 
fall of Kinshasa to the rebels and their foreign allies.23 This new conflict marked the 
beginning of the ‘Second Congo War’.24  
The International Rescue Committee, in its report in 2008, announced that as many 
as 5.4 million people may have died from war-related causes in the DRC since 1998.25 
In the summer of 1998, two rebel movements – the Rassemblement Congolais pour la 
Démocratie (RCD) in the east, and the Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo 
(MLC) in the Orientale and Equateur provinces – launched attacks on the Kabila 
government. The RCD was primarily backed by Rwanda and the MLC by Uganda, 
while Zimbabwe and Angola supported the government. Therefore, the war in the 
DRC combined local, national and international elements.26 By 1999, the war had 
reached a military stalemate. The country was divided into four zones: one controlled 
by the government, the MLC controlling the north, and the two RCD factions (RCD-
Goma backed by Rwanda, and RCD-ML backed by Uganda) in the east and north-
east. The government and rebel-controlled areas alike continued the patterns of 
governance dating back to the colonial era: of distributing access to land, economic 
resources and rights to select local communities to ensure their loyalty, while fuelling 
competition with other communities to prevent united local opposition.27  
In 1999 the major parties to the war signed the Lusaka Peace Accords, resulting in 
the deployment in 2000 of a United Nations force, MONUC, to monitor arrangements 
for ending the conflict.28 The 1999 Lusaka Accords between Rwanda, Uganda, 
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Kabila’s government and its international allies, made provision for a ceasefire, the 
withdrawal of foreign troops, the arrival of a UN peacekeeping mission (MONUC) 
and the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD) process.29 A significant moment in the 
conflict came at the beginning of 2001 when President Kabila was shot by one of his 
bodyguards, later dying from his injuries. The Congolese Parliament voted Kabila’s 
son, Joseph Kabila, to take power.30 The Inter-Congolese Dialogue led to an inclusive 
power-sharing agreement, which was signed by delegates in Pretoria on December 17, 
2002. By the end of 2002, all Rwandan, Angolan, Namibian, and Zimbabwean troops 
had withdrawn from the DRC. Ugandan troops officially withdrew from the DRC in 
May 2003.31 However, parts of the east of the country remain in conflict. In this 
uncertain environment, questions of justice are critical, especially when a number of 
those appointed to government positions have been accused of involvement in serious 
human rights abuses. If there is no justice, local populations may cause further 
violence by taking matters into their own hands. This has already been witnessed in 
Ituri, north-eastern Congo, where the culture of impunity has further fuelled the cycle 
of ethnic violence, allowing opposing groups to believe they are justified in carrying 
out revenge killings for crimes committed against them.32  
A number of independent reports, including those by a United Nations Panel of 
Experts and by International Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs), have 
documented the link between the conflict in the DRC and the exploitation of natural 
resources.33 In fact, much of the DRC’s armed conflict is driven by competition for 
control of natural resources and land. Also, rebel movements or their allies have used 
diamonds to finance armed conflict.34 Therefore, in June 2000, in response to reports 
of widespread illicit resource exploitation, the President of the Security Council 
requested the UN Secretary-General to establish a Panel of Experts on the illegal 
exploitation of the DRC's natural resources and other forms of wealth, focusing 
especially on conflict in Ituri Province and elsewhere in the northern DRC since 1998. 
He also requested the Panel research and analyse the links between the resource 
                                                 
29
 Davis, Op, cit., 
30
 Justice in the Democratic Republic of Congo: A background, Op, cit., 
31
 Gordon, Op, cit., 
32
 HRW report, "Democratic Republic of the Congo: Confronting Impunity.", Op, cit.,  
33
 HRW report, "Ituri: 'Covered in Blood' Ethnically Targeted Violence In Northeastern DR Congo.", 
Op, cit., 
34
 Ezekiel, A. (2007). "The Application of International Criminal Law to Resource Exploitation: Ituri, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo " Natural Resources Journal 47: 225-245. p. 226. 
 172 
exploitation and the continuation of the conflict in the DRC.35 The Panel delivered six 
reports and interim updates to the Security Council from 2001 to 2003, documenting 
the role various rebel groups, proxy groups, armies, and the governments of 
surrounding countries and their officers and officials play in natural resources 
crimes.36 The Panel systematically documented the ways in which massive 
exploitation of natural resources was linked to the military conflict, arms trafficking, 
and human rights abuses in the DRC.37 In general, the militias, rebel groups and 
criminal elements in the Congolese government military and security personnel have 
participated in mass murder, large-scale sexual violence, and numerous other human 
rights violations.38 Crimes documented by the Panel and various NGOs include forced 
labour, kidnapping, mass rape and sexual slavery, mutilation, and mass murder. The 
Panel’s reports emphasize that these crimes are both in aid of, and financed by, the 
profits from illegal appropriation of natural resources in the Ituri forest and elsewhere 
in the eastern DRC.39  
All parties to the conflict have been guilty of these violations of international 
humanitarian law, the incidence of which has increased and become more serious 
over time. Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC), Union of Congolese Patriots, 
authorities have been responsible for the majority of these recent cases, often charging 
the agencies and their workers of being complicit with the Lendu.40 Killings have also 
been attributed to the Congolese army or to government-backed militias, who are 
alleged to have committed massacres in Ituri, Kivu, North Katanga and Maniema. For 
instance, in 2002, at least 68 persons were killed and 3,500 houses were burnt down at 
Ankoro by the government armed forces. Elsewhere in North Katanga, Mai Mai 
militias supported by the government are responsible for acts of cannibalism, as well 
as looting and burning houses and constantly harassing civilians. On the government 
side, military, police and security services are reported to torture detainees. Common 
methods include being whipped, beaten with belts or metal tubes, burnt by cigarettes 
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or otherwise assaulted. Allegations are not investigated and victims do not receive 
reparation. 41 
 
The cause of the Ituri conflict: 
Ituri forms part of the eastern province Orientale, whose capital is Kisingani. Ituri is 
made up of five territories: Aru, Djugu, Irumu, Mahagi and Mambasa, with its capital 
in Bunia.42 Ituri is one of the richest areas of the Congo with deposits of gold, 
diamonds, coltan and oil and an important cross-border trade with Uganda.43 The 
competition for control of these resources by combatant forces has been a major 
factor in the evolution of the crisis in Ituri as in the rest of the DRC.44 The war in Ituri 
is a complex web of local, national, and regional conflicts that developed after a local 
dispute between Hema and Lendu was exacerbated by Ugandan actors and aggravated 
by the broader international war in the DRC.45  
Ituri is home to eighteen different ethnic groups, with the Hema/Gegere and 
Lendu/Ngiti communities together representing about 40 per cent of the inhabitants. 
The other major groups are the Bira, the Alur, the Lugbara, the Nyali, the Ndo-Okebo, 
and the Lese.46 After the Belgians withdrew, the Hema elite were left as a landowning 
and business class and as the administrative core, with greater access to wealth, 
education and political power,47 with Hema elites seeking to assert or protect their 
control of the political and economic spheres in Ituri.48 Land-motivated local conflicts 
periodically emerged (1966, 1973, 1990, and 1997) between Hema landholders and 
Lendu communities that felt disadvantaged and marginalised. These conflicts were 
mediated before they could escalate into large-scale fighting, and the great majority of 
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poor Hema were rarely involved.49 In this sense, the Ituri conflict is a conflict between 
the agriculturalist Lendu and pastoralist Hema ethnic groups,50 although historically 
there has been a high degree of co-existence between the two groups and 
intermarriage has been common.51  
‘After the discovery of the resource-rich highlands of Irumu and Djugu, the Ituri 
region was of particular interest to the Belgian colonists… on the eve of colonialism, 
the Hema dominated both the political and economic fields’.52 Belgian colonial rule 
exacerbated ethnic divisions between the two communities, however, by trying to 
reorganize traditional chieftaincies into more homogeneous groups and by favouring 
the Hema over the Lendu.53 After independence, the Hema were not only in a more 
favourable position to take over the plantations left by the Belgian settlers, but they 
also had the intellectual, political and financial resources to manipulate Mobutu’s 
state to their advantage and increase their economic domination.54  
Therefore, the conflict in Ituri should be understood as a complex of dynamics 
which expresses the inner logic of the existing local social, economic and political 
order.55 The conflict originally began as an economic conflict, but soon evolved into 
an ethnic one. Violence committed by traditional Lendu communities in the course of 
protecting their land eventually evolved beyond simply targeting landowners to 
targeting anyone of Hema ethnicity.56 When a small number of Hema allegedly 
attempted to bribe local authorities into modifying land ownership registers in part of 
the Djugu district of Ituri, the Lendu decided to retaliate. In the absence of a strong 
local authority the incident quickly turned into a confrontation between the two 
communities.57 According to a report of the Integrated Regional Information 
Networks (IRIN), ‘one month before the first eruption of violence Lendu chiefs had 
warned the Hema of an imminent attack, ordering them to leave their land and 
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crops’.58 In response, the Hema started organizing armed groups to defend their 
property. On 5 September 2002, Lendu combatants brutally slaughtered almost a 
thousand Hema and Wabira in the local hospital of the Nyakunde.59 Fighting in the 
Ituri and Kivu provinces intensified in late 2002 and early 2003, partly because of the 
withdrawal of Rwandan and Ugandan troops as part of peace accords signed in 2002. 
The Ugandan, Rwandan and the DRC governments have been widely accused of 
supporting rival military groups, often defined along ethnic lines.60  
Uganda occupied Ituri from 1998 to 2003, when the last of its troops returned to 
Uganda in accordance with the Luanda agreement of September 6, 2002. Uganda’s 
withdrawal immediately increased instability in the region, and external support from 
Kampala, Kinshasa, and Kigali flowed in to fill the power vacuum and gain control of 
the resource-rich region.61 Ethnically based armed groups continue to fight against 
each other as well as against soldiers of the national army and the UN peacekeeping 
force, MONUC. War crimes and crimes against humanity have been committed 
following systematic abuses of human rights,62 with combatants often using sexual 
violence to target persons of ethnic groups seen as the enemy. According to the 
October 2004 estimate of humanitarian agencies, eight to ten persons were being 
raped each day in the town of Bunia and a limited number of other locations in Ituri.63  
Five armed political groups are contesting control of Ituri. Uganda, at one time or 
another, has backed all these groups, often simultaneously. The Rassemblement 
congolais pour la Démocratie – Mouvement de Liberation (RCD-ML), Congolese 
Rally for Democracy – Liberation Movement, is led by Mbusa Nyamwisi, while the 
UPC is led by Thomas Lubanga. This group, formed in April 2002, is drawn almost 
exclusively from the Hema ethnic community. Internal divisions subsequently 
emerged within the UPC, with one faction favouring alliance with Rwanda and 
another with Uganda. This latter faction emerged as a new armed political group, the 
Front pour l’Intégration et la Paix en Ituri (FIPI), led by Gegere Chief Kawa Mandro 
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Panga. Beyond these major armed political groups are a number of other armed 
groups and militias operating in Ituri. The Hema militia are now closely identified 
with the UPC (or the FIPI), while Lendu / Ngiti militia have increasingly allied 
themselves with the RCD-ML.64 Since early 2002, the RCD-ML has sought ‘greater 
rapprochement with the DRC government,’ and has reportedly been supplied with 
arms from Kinshasa although this has been denied by government officials.65 Early in 
2002, the involvement of the Kinshasa Government centred on the military assistance 
that it provided to RCD-ML in Beni. Kinshasa sent trainers, weapons and also some 
military elements in support of the Armée Populaire Congolaise66 (APC), which was 
reportedly sending weapons supplies from Beni to Lendu militia.67  
These national groups, as well as local ethnic groups in Ituri, have been and, in 
some cases, still are supported by the Ugandan, Rwandan and DRC governments.68 In 
fact, the availability of political and military support from external actors, whether 
national governments or rebel movements, has encouraged local leaders to form new 
groups, generally based on ethnic loyalty.69 Armed groups have committed war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, and other violations of international humanitarian 
and human rights law on a massive scale in Ituri. Human Rights Watch estimates that 
at least 5,000 civilians died from direct violence in Ituri between July 2002 and March 
2003. These victims are in addition to the 50,000 civilians that the UN estimates have 
died there since 1999.70 Armed groups have also committed summary executions, 
forcefully abducted persons whose whereabouts remain unknown, and arbitrarily 
arrested and unlawfully detained others, some of whom they subjected to systematic 
torture. The UPC conducted a ‘man hunt’ for Lendu and other political opponents 
shortly after taking power in August 2002. Many Lendu were arrested. In addition, 
Human Rights Watch has observed that senior UPC military officers were in charge 
of two prison areas that became infamous places of summary execution and torture.71  
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Development of the Congolese criminal justice system: 
The DRC military justice system is linked to the ordinary justice system through a 
complex series of appeals, at the centre of which is an appeal on the grounds of the 
unconstitutionality of the laws applicable before the military courts.72 Congolese 
military justice has a long tradition of serving either as an ‘emergency’ system (justice 
d’exception) or as a judicial structure more or less similar to the ordinary courts.73 
Introduced at the same time as the Force Publique, the private army raised by King 
Léopold II for his Etat Indépendant du Congo (Congo Free State), military justice 
initially operated from 1888 onwards in the form of emergency courts termed conseils 
de guerre. Their jurisdiction was limited at the time to serious military misconduct 
committed by members of the Force Publique.74 This system was maintained with 
minor modifications until 1958, when magistrates began to sit on the conseils de 
guerre. A provisional military justice code was drawn up for the first time in 1964. 
The first more or less complete reform of military justice took place in 1972, with the 
introduction of a code de justice militaire (code of military justice). This code 
organised the military courts for the first time into a complete judicial system, distinct 
from that of the ordinary courts. It introduced a procedure applicable to these courts 
and established rules for their jurisdiction. It also defined the offences falling under 
the jurisdiction of these courts as well as the corresponding sentences.75  
The penal code adopted by the Congo Free State in 1888 remained in force until it 
was replaced by the penal code of 1940. This later code was not abandoned at 
independence but has since undergone a variety of amendments, the most important 
of which was the creation in 1963 of a set of crimes concerning public order and state 
security. Unlike the penal codes of other French speaking states, the Zairian code does 
not distinguish among different classifications of criminal offences and refers to all of 
them as ‘infractions.’76 The 1974 constitution ‘imbued Zairian criminal law’ with 
certain fundamental principles, but in practice these principles are often violated.77 
For example, although habeas corpus and bail do not exist, people arrested are 
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supposed to be brought before a magistrate within forty-eight hours of arrest. This 
principle is rarely adhered to, however, and often those arrested are held for months 
without a hearing. People who can afford bribes buy their way out of detention 
without ever having been formally charged.78 After the fall of Mobutu in 1997, 
President Laurent Kabila came to power with a deep suspicion of anyone associated 
with the Mobutu regime, especially the judiciary. He abolished all previously existing 
military tribunals and replaced them with a single military court (the Cour d’Ordre 
Militaire79 - COM).80 Military law was organised by government decree 1962-060 of 
25 September 1962, and amended by the decree of 23 August 1997, which introduced 
a military law and institutions code and created the military court.81 The COM was 
the result of the deep suspicion with which the Kabila government regarded anyone 
who previously worked in the justice system under Mobutu as well as the preference 
of members of the new army to directly handle the arrest of such people and 
adjudication of their cases outside of the courts. During the five years of its existence, 
the COM was characterized by a total violation of due process and violations of basic 
guarantees of a fair trial, including an accused’s right to appeal and to a counsel of his 
choice.82 In early 2003, the government abolished the COM and replaced it with new 
military tribunals. Nevertheless, the Cour de la Sureté de l'Etat 83, a special tribunal 
established in the 1970s to prosecute political offences, continues to try members of 
the opposition, journalists, and union leaders without due process.84  
Congolese law does not proscribe genocide, war crimes, and crimes against 
humanity; these violations are addressed only in military courts, where their 
definitions do not conform to international standards.85 In fact, one of the principal 
problems of Congolese justice is the ‘militarisation of the justice system’; that is, the 
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extension of the jurisdiction of military courts to the detriment of ordinary courts.86 
Over time, through a loose interpretation of the applicable laws, military courts have 
progressively extended their jurisdiction over civilians beyond legal provisions. The 
abuses of the COM were part of the reason for the military justice reform of 2002, 
which attempted to confine military justice within its traditional role as justice for 
members of the armed forces. However, the reform was only partial. In many cases, 
the codes of 2002 confirmed military court jurisdiction over civilians.87 This 
extension of their jurisdiction to encompass civilians is contrary both to the 
constitution and to the African and international standards applicable in the DRC. The 
military justice reform instituted by Acts no. 023-2002 of 18 November 2002 on the 
military justice code, and no. 024-2002 of 18 November 2002 on the military criminal 
code, only addressed these issues very partially. The Minister of Justice has therefore 
initiated another reform process, which is still ongoing. The serious crimes mentioned 
above may only be prosecuted by military courts since the adoption in 2002 of the 
military criminal code, which includes the crimes stipulated in the Rome Statute.88  
The legal and institutional framework of Congolese military justice was extensively 
modified by the ratification of the Rome Statute in March 2002, and by the enactment 
of the military justice code and the military criminal code in November 2002. These 
three legal instruments made it possible to prosecute members of the armed forces and 
members of armed factions for serious crimes committed during the series of armed 
conflicts taking place since 1996.89 In 2005, the adoption of the constitution of the 
Third Republic, which contains fundamental principles aimed at integrating military 
courts and judges into the ordinary justice structure, made it possible to establish rules 
governing military justice. The new constitution made the decisions of military courts 
subject to review by civilian high courts, and placed military judges under the 
supervision of the Judicial Service Commission. The successive reforms of military 
justice have tended towards the progressive integration of the rules of ordinary 
criminal procedure into military justice procedures and the establishment of a 
permanent court system responsible for enforcing justice in relation to the crimes 
stipulated under the military criminal code, which is separate from, but largely 
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inspired by, the ordinary criminal code.90 Although it constituted an obvious positive 
difference in relation to the previous legislative framework, the legislative reform of 
2002 remained largely insufficient, and allowed obstacles to the right to a fair trial to 
persist in military courts. For one thing, the military justice reform was not 
accompanied by a similar reform of the civilian justice system. Consequently, the 
most serious offences committed during the armed conflicts that have recently 
affected the Congo are now under the sole jurisdiction of the military courts, due to 
the lack of a law granting jurisdiction to ordinary courts.91 It is in this sense that the 
military courts have extended their jurisdictions to encompass civilians.92 
In the DRC, the history of the judiciary in the entire post-colonial phase has been 
marked by corruption and a lack of independence, integrity, and wealth 
infrastructure.93 Only a very small number of the serious crimes committed in the 
DRC during the series of wars that have followed each other since 1996 have been 
brought to court, and proceedings have taken place in military courts only.94 Human 
Rights Watch has observed that there are key deficiencies in the DRC justice system 
that undermine its capacity to bring justice for serious crimes.95 There are many 
reasons why there is an absence of effective access to justice in the DRC, including 
the physical distance between the victim and the organs of justice (police, prosecutor 
and judge) combined with a lack of legal assistance, institutional obstacles to the 
effective pursuit of proceedings, and social obstacles such as ignorance of the law.96 
Mainly, it faces institutional problems relating to a lack of independence of the 
judiciary, poor infrastructure, nonexistent training, inadequate investigations, and a 
failure to protect fair trial standards and the rights of the accused.97  
 
Lack of independence:  
Amongst the major issues facing military justice, it is important to note the problem 
of independence. Post-colonial constitutions of the DRC, including the current 
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transitional constitution, have asserted the principle of the separation of powers and 
recognized three branches of government. But, despite clear references to judicial 
independence, the constantly growing power of the executive since the mid-1970s has 
resulted in de facto subordination of the judiciary to the executive branch. In fact, the 
judiciary has lost the relative independence it once enjoyed in the late 1960s and early 
1970s.98 Consequently, the democratic reforms of the early 1990s restated the 
importance of a separation of powers and the judiciary showed significant signs of 
independence. In a celebrated ruling in 1992, for example, the Supreme Court refused 
to apply the 1967 authoritarian constitution that the President wanted. On August 16, 
1993, the president of the Supreme Court and the Procureur général signed a joint 
statement declaring void the measures for dismissal and transfer of judges arbitrarily 
decreed by the Prime Minister.99 By constitutional mandate, the President of the 
Republic presides over the Council of Ministers and is assisted by the Minister of  
Justice. The chairmanship of these executive officials over the Conseil Supérieur de 
la Magistrature (CSM) (Superior Council of Magistrate) needs to remain only 
symbolic to avoid undue infringement of the independence of the judiciary. However, 
the Minister of Justice assumed oversight functions, undermining authority of the 
CSM and making clear the government’s will to exert tight control. In 1998 the 
Minister of Justice fired 315 judges and magistrates without even consulting the 
CSM.100  
It should be noted here that military courts continue to enforce provisions of the 
laws of 2002 which authorise them to judge civilians and people who are only very 
indirectly linked to the armed forces. This extension of the jurisdiction of military 
courts is taking place at a time when the political, institutional and legal pressures that 
have traditionally formed obstacles to the independence of military judges are 
growing. Thus, the control of the military command over the decisions of military 
prosecutors is increasingly direct. Similarly, political interference in legal decisions is 
increasingly common, partly due to the fact that the reform of 2002 increased the risks 
of prosecution of political stakeholders, many of whom have been recruited from 
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amongst the former heads of armed factions and who have committed crimes for 
which they are prosecuted in military courts.101  
In the DRC there is no mechanism to ensure the fairness and independence of an 
investigation. The prosecutor enjoys large discretionary powers — called the 
‘opportunity of prosecution’ (opportunité de poursuite) — to decide whether a 
particular crime warrants investigation. However, neither a juge d’instruction (an 
investigating magistrate in a civil law system) nor rules of disclosure exist to counter-
balance the one-sided investigation by the prosecutor. This discretionary power may 
only be overruled by a complaint filed directly before the court by the victim of the 
crime.102 In fact, pre-trial investigation is usually one-sided and in some cases does 
not take place at all. Unlike many countries in francophone Africa, and most civil law 
countries, the investigative functions are not separate from the functions of 
prosecution, and the state prosecutor both investigates and prosecutes. For such a 
system to work, the prosecutor and the defence must be put on an equal footing, at 
least formally. They both must be able to investigate and have the opportunity to 
present the results of their investigations. Evidence must be disclosed to each other; 
‘no side must be allowed to conduct a trial by ambush.’103 
The right to a fair trial stated in Articles 19 to 21 of the constitution, and in Article 7 
of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, is constantly violated in 
military courts. The principle of equality of arms between the prosecution and the 
defence is generally sacrificed on the altar of a speedy trial and the corps discipline 
that the judges associate with military justice.104 The inquisitorial nature of the 
preliminary investigation in Congolese procedure deprives the accused of adequate 
access to the prosecution file before the trial and thereby puts the accused at a 
disadvantage in relation to the prosecution in terms of case preparation. By not being 
allowed access to the prosecution file before the beginning of the trial, the accused 
cannot make a list of defence witnesses because of the impossibility of knowing the 
allegations that he or she will have to refute.105 In addition, judges have been granted 
extensive discretionary power by the military justice code in the conduct of the trial 
proceedings. Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa (OSISA) maintained in its 
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report that military judges regularly abuse their power when they make a decision as 
to whether and under what conditions defence witnesses will be heard. Moreover, 
judges use their discretionary powers to agree to hear prosecution witnesses without 
disclosing their names to the defence. Therefore, the defence is vulnerable to the 
surprise effect created by the prosecution and the judges who do not even give the 
defence sufficient time to prepare to refute the evidence produced by the 
prosecution.106  
In relation to the prosecutors, OSISA furthermore noted that they directly attach to 
the executive branch in an advisory capacity. In times of peace, the highest-ranking 
prosecuting judge, the Judge Advocate General (auditeur général), acted as a legal 
advisor to the Minister of Defence, whilst in times of war he or she acts as a legal 
advisor to the President of the Republic. The judge advocate general is also the head 
of the military judiciary and therefore takes precedence over the presiding judges. 
This illustrates the limitations on the independence of presiding judges with respect to 
the prosecution, which also ‘confirm[s] by the recognised power of the judge 
advocate’s department (auditorat militaire) to convene hearings in military courts’.107  
 
Lack of personnel: 
Institutional problems in the Congolese judicial system have also been broadly 
examined by Human Rights Watch. They report that the lack of well-trained 
personnel is one of the most serious problems in the Congolese judiciary. At 
independence in 1960, there was not a single trained Congolese lawyer in practice. 
The government recruited foreign judges from Africa and Haiti to fill the vacuum left 
on the bench by the Belgians.108 In the early 1960s, the first graduates of Congolese 
law schools joined the bench. In fact, in the Congolese judicial system, judges and 
prosecutors are appointed directly from law school without court experience. They 
enter a hierarchical structure where they depend on their superiors for job assignments 
and promotion. There must be specialized training for judges and a self-regulatory 
mechanism for promotion and such specialized training was provided in the early 
1960s through the Ecole Nationale de Droit et d’Administration, a judicial college 
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which lasted only a few years. Since that time, there have been no effective training 
programs for judges and prosecutors.109  
The legal system collapsed during the wars. As Human Rights Watch has observed, 
the legal system does not appear able to meet the requirements of modern, 
independent and community justice that is accessible to the entire population, despite 
the fact that the fight against impunity is crucial in the restoration of a state of law in 
the DRC. The DRC’s existing legal system is considered to be part of the executive, 
where judges are simply agents of the executive and are deemed administrative 
officers. Despite the separation of powers under the transitional constitution, no 
reform to date has effectively separated the three traditional branches of power. The 
DRC’s legal system suffers from a chronic staff shortage, with a total of 2,053 judges 
(1,678 civil court judges and 375 military courts judges) representing a ratio of one 
judge for more than 29,225 inhabitants. In the country’s interior, particularly in the 
east, there is such a severe shortage of judicial personnel that courts can no longer 
hear cases, public prosecutor offices cannot conduct investigations, and those prisons 
that are still standing are being closed.110  
  
Pre-trial detention: 
Pre-trial detention is another problem in the operation of the justice system in the 
DRC. According to Article 27 of the Criminal Code, pre-trial detention may be 
exercised for crimes punishable by a prison term of a minimum of six months. The 
initial detention period of 15 days may be extended by a maximum of three extensions 
of no more than one month each. However, according to a recent survey conducted by 
Avocats Sans Frontières (ASF), the basic legal principles of pre-trial detention are 
simply not respected by the courts. Up to 75 per cent of detainees in Congolese 
prisons are awaiting trial.111 Pre-trial detentions ordered by military judges are 
generally too long and the procedure does not allow detainees to refer to a judge to 
investigate whether their detention is lawful. Thus, defendants being prosecuted by 
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military courts spend long periods of time in pre-trial detention without any way of 
knowing when the investigating judge intends to put them on trial or even whether he 
or she has any intention of doing so.112  
 
Corruption: 
Corruption is widespread in the justice sector. Due to the years of war and economic 
stagnation, the judicial system suffers from the logistical and financial problems that 
trouble other sectors of government. As Human Rights Watch has reported, it is 
common practice to bribe judges or other judicial officials to influence the outcome of 
an investigation or a trial,113 partly because governmental corruption has resulted in 
extremely low pay for federal judges. Moreover, less than half of the required 180 
courts exist, and the lack of judicial power allows violence to continue without 
reprimand.114 Corruption may occur at any level of the judicial process and has a 
serious impact on access to justice for Congolese citizens. For example, in order to 
obtain free legal aid, individuals must present a certificate of indigence. While such a 
certificate should in principle be issued free of charge, all levels of the judicial sector 
(bar associations, magistrates and governmental officials) indicate that the local 
authorities will charge an applicant anywhere between US $15 and US $30 to issue a 
certificate of indigence. Similarly, some police officers will ask victims of criminal 
offences for ‘fees’ in order to look for and arrest individuals who have committed a 
criminal offence.115 In addition, many Iturians complain that they have to pay a fee of 
US $5 or more in order to initiate any judicial proceedings. These people are also 
often ignorant of whom to turn to in order to bring a case to justice. Therefore, the 
population accuses the judicial system of being corrupt or unfair.116  
Lack of confidence in the judiciary’s administration of justice is widespread. 
Politicians and businesses are reluctant to bring their disputes to the courts, and the 
general population similarly lacks confidence in the judiciary. It is estimated that only 
a very small percentage of disputes end up in courts of law, not because parties to the 
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disputes have better options, but because they are so suspicious of the judiciary that 
they prefer other means, including the police, security services, the military, or 
traditional arbitration in rural areas. Also, victims of human rights abuses are 
generally reluctant to utilize judicial mechanisms for redress.117 It is worth mentioning 
that a lack of witness protection and the fear of testifying are depriving the judges of 
the means to investigate crimes committed in Ituri. Many witnesses, when summoned, 
insist that they will only talk to the investigative judges on the condition that they are 
not called to testify in court.118 Referring to the threats and the climate of insecurity, 
the DRC Chief Prosecutor proposed that cases be investigated locally, but that the 
trials take place elsewhere as a possible solution to the lack of safety for witnesses.119 
However, conducting investigations in Bunia and holding trials in Kinshasa seemed 
like a poor compromise between witness safety and effective prosecutions.120 It is 
worth mentioning that Congolese law gives the Minister of Justice the power to issue 
an ‘injunction’ to the Chief Prosecutor of the DRC to initiate a trial and prosecute 
certain crimes before any jurisdiction. However, the Congolese government did not 
give the prosecutor any mandate relating specifically to the prosecution of the 
perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed during the conflict 
in Ituri.121 Human Rights Watch, in its report in 2004, noted that the criminal justice 
system in Ituri faces many challenges, including security conditions, the inadequacy 
of the existing criminal law, the shortage of police resources required for 
investigation, the lack of material and financial resources to support investigative 
judges, and the absence at the government level of a clear policy for fighting 
impunity.122  
The district of Ituri had long been deprived of an effective legal system, during 
which time armed groups imposed their own law.123 Under the law regarding the 
organization and powers of the judiciary, the main town in all districts must have a 
regional court. The case of Ituri is a departure from this principle. As is the situation 
throughout the country, the problem with the legal system had already arisen in Ituri 
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even before the outbreak of inter-ethnic conflict in eastern DRC. In Ituri, a district 
inhabited normally by over 4.5 million people, there is only one court, with head 
offices in Bunia.124 As mentioned earlier, in the eastern part of the country in 
particular, there is a shortage of judges, physical facilities, training opportunities and 
infrastructure. There is such a shortage of judges in nearly every civil and military 
court that some courts cannot hear cases at all. There is also a severe shortage of 
courts since they are only located in urban centres, despite a law from 1979 providing 
for tribunals to be set up in most rural areas (tribunaux de paix). Moreover, the legal 
framework cannot guarantee effective judicial independence as the courts are under 
the authority of the Executive through the Department of Justice.125 This has meant, 
as Human Rights Watch remarked, that one of the judicial system’s challenges is ‘the 
absence at the governmental level of a clear policy for fighting impunity.’126 
It is also important to mention here, concerning the number of members of the legal 
service, that there were only four judges and four members of the State Counsel for 
the entire population of Ituri in 2004.127 Like most public services, the legal system 
has been weakened by a separation from the central hierarchical structures based in 
Kinshasa. It has become difficult for those being tried from Ituri to follow the 
progress of their cases at the Court of Appeal in Kisangani,128 meaning that the Court 
of Appeal is insufficiently independent from the perpetrators of crimes, particularly in 
cases where the judiciary may be linked to certain leaders. With rare exceptions then, 
no cases have been brought to justice over the violence perpetrated in the context of 
inter-ethnic conflict. This is creating a general sense of frustration and a desire for 
justice on the part of all communities in Bunia.129  
 
Reform of the judiciary in the Ituri: 
Mass atrocities occurred in Ituri between 1998 and 2003.130 When Ituri's bloody 
inter-ethnic conflict came to an end in late 2003,131 a UN assessment mission found 
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that the judicial system in Bunia had entirely collapsed.132 However, there have since 
been some developments in the Congolese criminal justice system; for instance, the 
Joint Committee for Justice and the Action Plan ‘Comité Mixte de la Justice and the 
Action Plan’.133 In 2004, through an initiative by the European Commission, the 
Congolese justice sector underwent an in-depth audit, which clearly demonstrated the 
need for radical reform. In order to address the many issues listed in the audit report, 
the Comité Mixte de la Justice (CMJ) was formed. The Ministry of Justice and the 
European Commission preside jointly over the CMJ.134  
Subsequently, the European Commission launched a pilot project to reform the 
judicial system in the east of the country, which had been devastated by the 
fighting.135 The EU project was called REJUSCO (Restoring Justice to the East of the 
DRC) and took place in Ituri. It was the EU's main justice project in DRC and 
supported reforms in the judicial system, particularly the effort to reopen the court in 
Ituri.136 The project was funded jointly by the European Commission, the 
Netherlands, Belgium and the United Kingdom to the tune of 11.7 million euros. As 
part of the process, judges, prosecutors and administrative staff underwent extensive 
training, and court buildings and other related infrastructure was constructed or 
renovated.137 The project sought to provide access to justice in various ways, such as 
rebuilding court houses, providing basic equipment, furniture and transportation, and 
facilitating mobile courts in areas where there have been no courts for decades, as 
well as training programmes.138 The programme had three phases. The first phase 
intended to ensure the functionality of places of justice and detention, the second 
phase to ensure the operation of justice, and the last phase for monitoring and legal 
awareness.139 The project had two main objectives: to quickly establish a system of 
arrest and pre-trial detention for those who committed serious criminal offences; and 
to re-establish minimally functioning local police, judicial, and correction structures 
with the capacity to provide basic policing, conduct pre-trial detention hearings, 
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detain prisoners, complete criminal investigations, and hold some criminal trials.140 In 
November 2003, a six-month project was initiated to help restore the criminal justice 
system in Bunia. With support from the European Commission, the Ituri court 
resumed its work, having been closed since May 2003 when its judges had to flee 
deteriorating security conditions. This short-term funding helped judges and 
investigative judges start working again years after the court had been closed, but 
many serious problems remain.141 The project was implemented by a Belgian 
nongovernmental organization, and within a few months the Bunia judicial system 
started functioning. As ICTJ reported, by the end of July 2004, 440 cases were under 
investigation and 42 judgments had been rendered.142  
The International Bar Association has observed that efforts to reform the DRC’s 
justice sector are guided by the principles set forth in the 2007 Comité Mixte de la 
Justice (CMJ) (Joint Committee for Justice) Action Plan, and the 2009 Feuille de 
route du Ministère de la justice pour l´exercice  (Roadmap of the Ministry of Justice), 
which together identified three particularly urgent actions to fight impunity and 
improve the credibility of the justice system: hiring and training magistrates, bringing 
justice closer to the Congolese population, and strengthening the control, oversight 
and renovation of infrastructures of the justice system. Moreover, changes to the 
DRC’s judicial structure in the country’s new constitution created new higher courts 
and added a need for new administrative and specialist courts at the provincial and 
local level in an effort to improve access to justice.143 According to the recent 
constitution which was adopted in 2006, the court system is divided into three 
separate jurisdictions: the judicial (civil and criminal) jurisdiction, the administrative 
jurisdiction and the military jurisdiction. As part of this reform, the Supreme Court of 
Justice (CSJ)(Cour Suprême de la Justice) is divided into three separate high court 
instances: The Cour Constitutionnelle (Constitutional Court), the Cour de Cassation 
(Supreme Court) and the Conseil d’État (Supreme Court for administrative 
matters).144 The work of the CMJ resulted in the 2007 Action Plan; based on this, the 
Ministry of Justice issued its Roadmap in early 2009. This Roadmap takes a shorter 
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perspective (six to twelve months) than the Action Plan and concentrates on visible, 
quick-impact activities. It indicates as its two fundamental objectives the fight against 
impunity and the improvement of the credibility of the justice system, to be achieved 
via the implementation of the 2006 constitution and the improvement of the working 
conditions of the judiciary. The creation of the CSJ is a positive step towards a more 
independent judiciary, but it faces several serious problems. For instance, its General 
Assembly is made up of more than 100 members, which makes decision-making slow 
and expensive.145  
Over time, although there has been some progress in this area, open attacks on the 
independence of military justice officers continue to be conducted on a regular basis 
by members of the executive branch, the military command and the military justice 
hierarchy itself. Interference by the executive branch in the administration of military 
justice is not a new phenomenon;146 it has been claimed by OSISA that there has been 
repeated interference from the political authorities. During the war, the government 
entered into alliances with certain rebel movements against other ones and, as a 
consequence, ties have developed between the government and certain movements, 
driving the government to counteract the independence of military justice in order to 
protect leaders of armed factions from being prosecuted in military courts.147  
 
Violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law: 
To the extent that the government of the DRC is supporting militia groups in Ituri, it 
also has legal obligations for the conduct of what can be seen as ‘proxy forces’.148 The 
DRC has ratified the main international human rights treaties, including the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, and the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child. The DRC is also a party to the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and the Convention against Torture and other 
Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, but has not signed its 
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Optional Protocol.149 Therefore, the DRC is under an international obligation to take 
legal action against many of the crimes that have been committed in the conflict. 
National laws are also available; in particular Law No 8-98 adopted on 31 October 
1998 by the Congolese Transitional Council, which provides the basis to prosecute 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.150  
In the context of the ICC, the DRC signed the Rome Statute on September 8, 2000, 
and ratified it on April 11, 2002. The project for law implementation of the Statute of 
the ICC was drafted in July 2003 by standing committee for reform of Congolese law 
at the request of the Minister of Justice following a year-long drafting process that 
involved the participation of magistrates, law professors, members of national and 
provincial bar associations, and the NGO community. The draft law provides a 
comprehensive definition of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide 
consistent with the Rome Statute. It spells out the way in which the DRC government 
and judicial authorities will work with the ICC to prosecute such crimes. It provides 
for important safeguards of fair trial and respect for the rights of the accused for all 
crimes under Congolese law, as guaranteed by the transitional constitution, that are 
lacking in the current code of criminal procedure.151 Despite its ratification, the DRC 
has yet to actually adopt the bill formally incorporating the Rome Statute into 
Congolese law. The Permanent Commission of Congolese Law Reform handed the 
draft to the government two years ago. It has been a matter of debate for several years 
and some speculate that certain officials are resisting the legislation because of fears 
that they may themselves end up being prosecuted.152 However, given the monistic 
nature of the Congolese legal system, the Rome Statute is already part of domestic 
law even in the absence of an implementing law.153  
The Congolese civil court system has exclusive jurisdiction over serious 
international crimes, consistent with international law. Under the 2002 Military 
Criminal Code currently in force, military tribunals have exclusive jurisdiction over 
these crimes. The proposed draft Rome Statute implementation bill was submitted to 
the National Assembly in March 2008. This is the second Rome Statute 
implementation bill introduced before parliament. The first was submitted in 2005 
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during the time of the DRC’s political transition. After the 2006 elections, the 
transitional parliament was dissolved and pending bills expired at that time. This 
meant that a new Rome Statute implementation bill needed to be presented for 
consideration by Congo’s elected parliament. Passing the bill would also pave the 
way to much-needed discussions concerning the appropriate mechanisms for 
addressing mass atrocity crimes committed between 1996 and June 2002.154 The 
proposed draft Rome Statute implementation bill would primarily modify provisions 
of five Congolese laws: first, it would modify the Criminal Code to include genocide, 
war crimes, and crimes against humanity as defined in the Statute. It would also set 
life imprisonment as the maximum sentence for such crimes and enact provisions 
ensuring the independence of judges. The Criminal Procedure Code would be altered 
to include provisions enhancing the protection of defendants’ and victims’ rights, 
introduce procedures to facilitate cooperation between Congolese courts and the ICC, 
and strengthen due process standards and fair trial provisions. The Code on Judicial 
Organization and Jurisdiction would be changed to confer jurisdiction over 
international crimes to the appeals courts of the civil court system and would 
designate a panel of five judges for international crimes trials, with the possibility of 
creating mixed panels of judges from the Congolese civil and military justice systems. 
Finally, the Military Criminal Code would enact provisions removing genocide, war 
crimes, and crimes against humanity from the jurisdiction of military courts, and the 
Code of Military Criminal Procedure would remove the military court system’s 
jurisdiction over international crimes.155 
 
Overall evaluation of the adequacy of Congolese criminal procedure: 
The serious nature of the crimes committed in Ituri on the one hand, and the deficient 
operation of the Congolese legal system on the other, makes action by the ICC one of 
the rare international initiatives which can fight against impunity and respond to the 
growing need for justice on the part of the population of the DRC.156 From the 
Kantian point of view, the ideals  of universalism must take precedence over cultural 
sensitivity. While cultural awareness should not be the basis for ignoring violations of 
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serious crimes in different parts of the world, neither should the international 
prosecutor adopt a strictly universal approach that ignores the unique circumstances 
underlying each situation, such as that of Ituri. However, this must in no way detract 
from the role which the DRC’s own legal system has to play in fighting impunity. It is 
essential that the transitional government, with the support of the international 
community, sets up a global programme to rebuild the national legal system, so that 
the national courts have the resources required to take cognizance of the violations of 
international human rights law and international humanitarian law.157  
Although the constitution of 2006 recognised the power of the President of the 
Republic to replace civilian courts with military courts in times of war and under 
certain conditions, the constitution clearly restricted the personal jurisdiction of 
military courts to the members of the armed forces and police forces only. However, 
military courts continue to apply the provisions of the military code of justice, 
enshrining the jurisdiction of military courts over civilians under several different 
circumstances. For instance, military courts may bring proceedings against civilians 
for any offence that is included in the military criminal code. Military courts also have 
jurisdiction over civilians in the event of the criminal participation of members of the 
armed forces and civilians in committing military offences if it is an armed offence, 
and also where they have committed a continuous offence extending from a time 
when the person had military status to a time when they no longer had such status.158  
Although a lack of independence is an issue in both civil and military jurisdictions, 
the fact that military judges are subject to the military hierarchy presents special 
problems. For instance, no military judge can hear a case in which a superior in rank 
is an accused. This can cause obvious difficulties, particularly given the small number 
of military judges above the rank of major, almost all of whom are concentrated in the 
largest cities. Moreover, the fact that a military judge can only hear an accused of 
lower or equal rank is a problem in itself .159 The military judiciary also experiences 
pressures from the military command. Acting either out of ignorance or with the 
deliberate intent of undermining the independence of military justice, certain officers 
take it upon themselves to forbid proceedings against any accused placed under their 
authority, or make such proceedings subject to their own prior authorisation. Such 
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interference may take the form of open written messages, such as the letter dated 24 
July 2006 in which General Mbuyamba Nsona, commander of operations in Ituri, 
instructed the military prosecutor of the Bunia garrison that all summonses or 
warrants to appear in court issued by the latter must henceforth ‘be imperatively 
approved by the Commander of Operations’.160  
There are also clearly problems with corruption and potentially criminal behaviour 
at the heart of power. In 2005, the government struck a deal with rebel leaders in the 
Ituri district, in which six were promoted to the rank of general in the newly 
integrated Congolese army and thirty-two others were installed as colonels.161 Among 
these were some of the ‘most notorious human rights offenders in the country.’162 
They included Jérôme Kakwavu, Floribert Kisembo, Bosco Taganda and Germain 
Katanga, all infamous military leaders who had allegedly personally ordered, tolerated 
or participated in the killing of civilians.163 The most important ministries - interior, 
defense, foreign affairs, reconstruction, finance, and planning - are all occupied by 
former belligerents. More importantly, the President and his powerful followers have 
remained the same since they came to power. This raises doubts about the extent to 
which the government will be willing or able to crack down on the corruption.164  
The key to successful national prosecutions seems to be judicial capacity and 
political will.165 As regards the political will of the DRC to prosecute, one major 
concern lies in the findings of a UN investigation that points fingers at the Movement 
for the Liberation of Congo (MLC). The MLC's leader is now in the government as 
part of a peace deal, making it politically difficult for the DRC government to bring 
the cases involving MLC members to trial.166 In addition, the judiciary is still not 
independent, as evidenced by President Kabila’s dismissal of 89 magistrates and the 
appointment of 28 others, including a new Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and 
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Prosecutor General, by Presidential Ordinances in February 2008.167 Political 
interference, or interference by the military command, which may already be present 
by the time a prosecution begins, continues during the investigation and becomes 
even stronger when judicial decisions are about to be taken.168 Due to the absence of a 
clear government policy on crimes committed in Ituri, the prosecutors have not been 
prepared to investigate the serious crimes that have cast a shadow over Ituri since the 
conflict in this region began in 1998, during the years of judicial collapse in Bunia.169 
Until the beginning of May 2004, 300 cases were under investigation at the 
prosecutor’s office, 45 had been referred for trial, and only 30 judgments had been 
handed down. There are insufficient personnel in the judicial police and the 
prosecutor's office to handle the high level of crime in Ituri, including for more minor 
crimes. The government, which is responsible for this, has not provided Bunia with 
any police force.170 
There has been a lack of a consistent prosecution strategy that has been 
compounded by the political pressure exercised on prosecutors to urge them to 
abandon proceedings that have already begun against former allies amongst the 
leaders of rebel or resistance movements. Among numerous examples, such pressures 
were exerted during the proceedings against the former Mayi-Mayi chief of North 
Katanga, Gédéon Kyungu Mutanga, which began on 12 May 2006 when he 
surrendered to MONUC and was handed over by the UN mission to the Congolese 
authorities. The protection he received from his former allies in the government in 
Kinshasa took the form of pressure to influence the investigation and the fact that he 
was held in pre-trial detention at the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (FARDC) officers’ mess, rather than in a holding cell. Successive 
governments have made abandoning legal proceedings against the leaders of armed 
factions a cornerstone of their peace policy. Accordingly, in certain cases, they have 
exerted pressure to stop proceedings that have already begun. In one of the most 
recent examples of political pressure on independent justice, the government forbade 
military prosecutors from taking action against chiefs and combatants of armed 
factions based in North Kivu and South Kivu, particularly those belonging to the rebel 
                                                 
167
 Davis, Op, cit., 
168
 OSI report, Op, cit., 
169
 HRW report, "Making Justice Work: Restoration of the Legal System in Ituri, DRC  A Human 
Rights Watch Briefing Paper ", Op, cit.,  
170
 Ibid., 
 196 
movement Conrgès National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP). A letter from the 
Minister of Justice dated 9 February 2009 instructed the State Attorney General and 
the Judge Advocate General of the FARDC ‘not to engage in proceedings against the 
members of the aforementioned armed factions and to stop all proceedings that have 
already been initiated’.171  
Although Article 151 of the 2006 constitution provides for an independent judiciary, 
in reality the executive branch continues to issue instructions to judges and sometimes 
refuses the enforcement of court decisions.172 There are also reports of police and 
military commanders refusing to hand over police officers and soldiers for 
questioning or detention, even in cases of serious offences such as rape.173 According 
to the UN Special Rapporteur, it is common for judges to give in to corruption or ask 
for money from the parties; for example, to be able to provide medical treatment to 
family members, meaning that ‘[j]ustice is thus for sale to those who can afford it’.174 
While the situation in the capital is better than in the rest of the country, only one 
serious prosecution for international crimes or human rights abuses has been 
undertaken since the transitional government came to power.175 The first prosecutions 
for international crimes were undertaken in the DRC in 2004, in relation to two cases, 
the Ankoro case in Katanga and the Songo Mboyo case in the province of Équateur. 
While still in its early stages, recent military court case law has revealed that the Code 
Penal Militaire (Military Penal Code) is at odds with international law regarding the 
definition of serious crimes. The fact that such crimes are established solely under the 
Code Pénal Militaire, to the exclusion of the ordinary criminal code, also poses a 
fundamental problem.176 In the Songo Mboyo case, the tribunal used the definition of 
rape as a crime against humanity as outlined in the Rome Statute, which is wider than 
the one found in the Military Penal Code.177  
Providing the military courts with jurisdiction over international crimes violates the 
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa, 
by virtue of which ‘[t]he only purpose of Military Courts shall be to determine 
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offences of a purely military nature committed by military personnel’.178 However, 
there have been some very successful trials in Bunia, especially during the first phase 
of reforms;179 for instance, the case of Chief Mandro Panga Kahwa, a former member 
of the militia of Thomas Lubanga. Kawa split off from Lubanga to form his own 
group and was charged with crimes against humanity, including the murder of 14 
people in the 2002 Zumbe village massacre. He was sentenced in 2006 to 20 years in 
prison.180 But the Kawa case also illustrates the difficulties of trying to reform one 
region when ‘the national judicial system is flawed.’181 The prosecution of Kahwa 
resulted in a decision of acquittal on appeal, pronounced in July 2007 by the military 
court of Kisangani. The judges of this court considered that the crimes of 
‘participation in a rebel movement’ and ‘holding weapons and munitions of war 
without title or right’, for which Kawa had been sentenced in the first instance, were 
covered by the amnesty decreed by the laws of 2003 and 2005. This decision opened a 
debate on the principle and scope of the successive amnesty laws enacted as part of 
efforts to end the activities of armed groups in the east of the country.182 While Kawa 
was found guilty in Bunia, the verdict was then overturned at the military court in 
Kisangani in February 2008. The appeal judges claimed his crimes were covered by a 
2005 amnesty law, even though that law specifically excludes crimes against 
humanity and war crimes.183  
The situation of vulnerable groups, particularly victims of sexual violence, remains 
very precarious. There are major obstacles preventing them from having access to 
justice, including geographic remoteness, poverty, ignorance of their rights, 
insecurity, fear of retaliation, customs, and the feeling of guilt that often haunts 
victims of sexual abuse; all of which encourage them to keep quiet, sometimes even 
preferring out-of-court settlements which are not in their favour. Only a small number 
of victims file complaints and, therefore, few cases are heard.184 The absence of an 
effective criminal justice delivery system has led to an increase in the number of out-
of-court settlements based on traditional justice and often leading to forced marriages, 
to the detriment of the victim’s rights and in violation of the various laws on sexual 
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violence. The major difficulty encountered by the victims, and often leading to the 
perpetrators’ impunity, is the difficulty to prove the crime in court, or even bring the 
matter to court – all the more difficult in the absence of any witness protection 
programme. But even if the victim can bring the matter to court and have the 
perpetrators arrested and convicted, there is no certainty that reparations will be 
paid.185 This may be because victims are unable to afford to pay the legal fees 
required for judgment enforcement or because the perpetrator does not have sufficient 
resources to pay the reparation. Also, due to deficient security in most of the prisons, 
it is not uncommon that the perpetrators are able to escape and become a threat to 
victims and witnesses.186 The inability of the justice system to handle such crimes has 
had the effect of creating a culture of impunity. Unfortunately, and as a direct result of 
the many crimes remaining unpunished and the general sense of impunity, rape and 
sexual violence in the DRC is increasing at an alarming rate and is now being 
committed by ordinary citizens, in addition to the armed and military groups.187  
The reformation of the Congolese judicial system has been assessed by the 
International Legal Assistance Consortium (ILAC) and the International Bar 
Association Human Rights Institute (IBAHRI), who conducted a joint mission in 
2009. The mission focused on specific aspects of the justice system, including the 
independence and needs of the judiciary, legal issues related to crimes targeting 
women, the needs of lawyers and bar associations, access to legal aid, traditional 
justice and military justice. The delegation also looked at ongoing justice reform 
programs in the country.188 They observed that the government and military should 
combat the functional immunity granted to lieutenant-generals and major-generals in 
the military justice system by abolishing the rule that prevents military judges 
handling cases where the accused has a higher rank than the judge, or alternatively by 
promoting the highest military judge to the rank of lieutenant-general.189 The IBA 
noted that FARDC, the militarily ineffective national army, has repeatedly 
demonstrated its inability to suppress armed groups. In addition, much of the violence 
and sexual crime against the civilian population in the eastern DRC is carried out by 
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FARDC forces and members of the Police Nationale Congolaise (PNC).190 An 
amnesty law, which went into effect on 7 May 2009, is a cause of concern in this 
context. The law provides amnesty for acts of war and insurrection committed 
between June 2003 and May 2009. Although the amnesty is not applicable for 
genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, the law will reinforce the 
impression of a culture of impunity for members of the police (PNC), the armed 
forces (FARDC), and the rebel groups with regard to the countless serious crimes to 
which the civilian population has been subjected.191  
International efforts to reform the judiciary in the Ituri province of the north-eastern 
DRC have produced mixed results, according to local NGOs. Despite some initial 
improvements in infrastructure and training, extensive corruption and the lack of 
effective protection for witnesses mean that a fully functioning judicial system 
remains a distant hope.192 Van Woudenberg has pointed to a growing willingness 
among Congolese authorities to prosecute cases of serious crimes. Many of the 
improvements in the Congolese judiciary have occurred in the military courts, which 
have begun employing parts of the Rome Statute in their cases, even though the 
government hasn’t yet passed legislation enacting the Rome Statute nationally. 
However, Van Woudenberg has argued that the military courts are also the most open 
to political interference and have often been used by the government to crack down on 
political opponents. Furthermore, the military courts have the capacity to impose the 
death penalty.193 Although officials in the eastern provinces at all levels of 
government have expressed strong desires to enhance the capacity and effectiveness 
of the domestic judiciary, the Prosecutor General of Kisangani has reiterated the 
current weakness of the domestic judiciary.194 The lack of investigative capacity 
remains another obstacle to a functioning criminal justice system. There is a serious 
lack of cooperation between the police, handling the technical aspects of a criminal 
investigation, and the prosecutor and the investigative judge. There is also a lack of 
knowledge among the judicial police of how to conduct a criminal investigation.195 In 
addition, according to information released by the Ministry of Justice, there are 
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currently 2,150 magistrates in total (both civil and military) which suggests a ratio of 
approximately one magistrate per 25,000 individuals. In order to put this in 
perspective, the minimum recommended ratio by the International Association of 
Judges is one magistrate per 3,000 to 5,000 individuals, which in the case of the DRC 
would mean a total of approximately 12,000 judges.196  
However, Clark has argued that senior judicial officials in Ituri – who are nominated 
by the President and elected by the Ministry of Justice – do not share the Kinshasa 
authorities’ view regarding their unwillingness and inability to investigate and 
prosecute serious cases such as those of the Ituri suspects currently on trial in The 
Hague. In contrast to President Kabila and other Kinshasa-based officials, Chris 
Aberi, the State Prosecutor in Bunia, and John Penza, the Military Prosecutor, have 
claimed that the Bunia courts are capable of investigating and prosecuting serious 
cases, including those of Lubanga, Katanga and Ngudjolo.197 Aberi, in interview with 
Clark, has stated that ‘when the ICC first came here … we showed them the dossiers 
we had already assembled on Lubanga and others. We were ready to try those cases 
here. We had the capacity to do this and it would have had a major impact for the 
people here, to see these [rebel] leaders standing trial in the local courthouse.’ Penza 
has added, ‘you only have to look at our record here to know what we are capable of. 
With MONUC’s help, we prosecuted Kawa here – MONUC detained him and we 
prosecuted him...We found the mass grave at Bavi and we prosecuted [Congolese 
army Captain François Mulesa] Molobo and his men in connection with that...The 
ICC is certainly a necessary thing but it should be handling bigger cases than those [it 
is currently prosecuting].’198 Clark has suggested that a state’s claim that it is 
unwilling or unable to address serious crimes is insufficient, and further analysis of 
these statements must be undertaken. According to Clark, in the Ituri cases, the ICC’s 
decisions on the basis of complementarity have been overly determined by President 
Kabila and the Congolese executive. The impact of these decisions domestically has 
been widespread disappointment among judicial actors in Ituri that, despite the major 
legal reforms of the last seven years, they have been barred from prosecuting major 
atrocity suspects in local courtrooms. Overall, in the DRC situation, the ICC’s active 
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pursuit of a referral by the Congolese state has afforded domestic political authorities 
considerable influence over the nature and scope of the Court’s operations, to the 
detriment of complementarity and the long-term cause of justice in the DRC.199  
In September 2003, Joseph Kabila, asked the UN to establish a special criminal 
tribunal for the DRC. In his speech before the General Assembly, he stated: 
‘[I]n the peace process now underway, an area which is of critical 
importance and imperative is that of independent justice, whose 
equitable administration would mark the end of impunity. On the 
domestic level, the Transition Government is working to conclude 
successfully the reform advocated here… On the international level we 
believe that the major objective is the establishment, with the assistance 
of the United Nations, of an international criminal tribunal for the DRC, 
to deal with crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, including rape 
as a weapon of war, and mass violations of human rights…’. 200  
 
 The ICC accepted the argument of the Congolese state that it was unwilling or 
unable to prosecute the cases of Lubanga, Katanga and Ngudjolo.201 In June 2004, the 
Prosecutor opened the Court’s first ever investigation in the DRC, initially focusing 
on the district of Ituri where some of the worst atrocities have taken place. The 
investigations to date have led to the arrest and transfer to The Hague of three senior 
Iturian militia leaders: Thomas Lubanga Dyilo on 17 March 2006; Germain Katanga 
on 17 October 2007; and Mathieu Ngudjolo on 6 February 2008.202 Theses cases will 
be analyzed further in the next chapter.  
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Conclusion: 
Since 1996, the DRC has experienced a horrific armed conflict in which impunity 
for war crimes and crimes against humanity have been, and continue to be, the 
norm.203 There has been widespread violence between ethnic groups over the last few 
years, often triggered by disputes over land.204 The absence of the rule of law, the 
extended period of dictatorship, massive human rights violations and impunity have 
negatively affected the human rights situation in the country.205 Therefore, justice is 
an essential element in the long-term work to rebuild the DRC.206 Impunity in the Ituri 
region of the DRC has boosted the cycles of violence and serious crimes there since 
1998.207 This situation is another example where the Court needs to recognize the 
importance of cultural differences for the purpose of effective investigations and the 
prosecution of international crimes as the legitimacy of the Court depends on its 
acceptance by both the local communities - in which they seek to bring to justice 
those responsible- as well as the international community. In the Ituri region of the 
DRC, for instance, rape has been used ‘as a weapon of war, as a tactic by armed 
forces to punish communities for supposed support to their enemies, to demonstrate 
control or to instill fear.’208 However, crimes of sexual violence are extremely 
difficult to prove because rape victims are stigmatised by their communities following 
an attack and are often reluctant to testify or unable to disclose details of the sexual 
violence they suffered. They could also be at risk of retributive violence from the 
militias or government troops against which they give evidence.209 Furthermore, the 
ICC has not fully worked out the relationship between national and international 
justice. An example of this problem might be the Lubanga case where the defendant 
was awaiting trial in the DRC for genocide and crimes against humanity. However, 
the case was admissible before the Court, as the national authorities were not trying 
him for recruitment of child soldiers.  
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The Secretary-General of the United Nations, in his report to the UNSC on the 
protection of civilians in armed conflict,210 noted that justice is a fundamental 
requirement in this part of the country, both to assist the reconstruction of society and 
to ensure that those who have committed and continue to commit human rights abuses 
are no longer at liberty to do so.211 Impunity in the Congo continues to prevail both 
within government and in rebel areas. Human rights abusers have been included in the 
government such as the RCD and MLC, and in the case of the army, criminal 
behaviour has been rewarded with warlords being presented with promotions to 
general or colonel.212 The legal system and the fight against impunity do not currently 
seem to be a priority. Generally, the legal system is characterized by numerous 
shortcomings, including: the almost total lack of judicial independence; political 
interference and the non-existent spirit of independence among judges; the lack of 
transparency in recruiting and appointing judges at various levels; and corruption 
related to the poor treatment of judges.213 Significant effort still needs to be made with 
regards to fighting impunity. Military courts have shown very limited effectiveness in 
the fight against impunity for serious crimes, committed for the most part by members 
of the armed forces and police or members of armed factions. Systematic violations of 
the rights of the defence and the right to a fair trial do not warrant the confidence that 
the public places in military justice.214 While the new structure is designed ultimately 
to bring justice closer to the population and provide better access to legal institutions, 
the country is still struggling to implement structures that were introduced decades 
ago.215  
The most serious obstacle to ensuring effective prosecutions for serious human 
rights violations may be the lack of political will to make this happen. Although the 
President has referred the situation of the DRC to the Prosecutor, no serious debate on 
domestic prosecutions has been initiated.216 As Galant, director of a Belgian NGO, 
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puts it, ‘the corruption is still there, it's just more expensive to bribe a judge’.217 In 
truth, delivering justice for the many violations of international law committed on the 
territory of the DRC is an immense task. The complexities of the various interwoven 
conflicts, the international aspects to these conflicts, as well as the lack of any clear 
demarcation between the ‘good guys’ and ‘bad guys’, means that seeking justice for 
the millions of victims in the DRC presents a daunting, seemingly impossible 
challenge. Nevertheless, alongside domestic proceedings including military tribunals, 
international justice has slowly begun to take up the challenge.218 Furthermore, the 
cooperation of the Congolese authorities with the Prosecutor is as important as the 
willingness of the government’s crack down on corruption in national legal system 
and both require careful consideration. The complex web of local, national, and 
regional conflicts in the Ituri region of the DRC makes it a highly fraught and volatile 
situation for the Prosecutor to execute the legal and moral duties which will be 
examined in the next chapter.  
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Chapter Seven: The Decision-Making Process in  
the DRC Situation 
 
 
 
Introduction: 
 
In 2003, the Prosecutor declared that complementarity as a managerial principle may 
serve to promote effective investigation and prosecution of crimes in order to ensure a 
division of labour between the ICC and domestic jurisdictions. The aim was to enable 
states to carry out proceedings and overcome dilemmas of inability or unwillingness.1 
This approach has made its entry into prosecutorial strategy under the label of ‘positive 
complementarity’.2 However, issues may arise from this policy which may cause an 
impunity gap to develop ‘horizontally between situations that are investigated by the 
Court and situations that for legal and jurisdictional reasons are not, or vertically 
between those most responsible brought before the Court and other perpetrators who are 
not.’3 The General Assembly of States Parties (ASP), in its report to the first review 
conference of the ICC in May 2010, noted that ‘actions under positive complementarity 
must not be misused to avoid justice.’4  
A state referral is one of the three trigger mechanisms which can be a precondition for 
the exercise of jurisdiction.5 However, the submission of a situation by a state party to 
the Prosecutor6 has ‘the potential of altering the adversarial relationship between the 
Prosecutor and the state concerned’.7 The purpose of this chapter is to discuss how 
issues concerning admissibility under the Rome Statute present themselves when a case 
relates to a situation that has been the object of a self-referral. State referrals can raise 
complex issues relating to the application of Article 17. Kleffner has claimed that at the 
stage of deciding whether or not to initiate an investigation in accordance with Article 
53 (1), a self-referral has to be treated no differently than other state referrals. In other 
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words, the Prosecutor’s role in considering whether ‘the case is or would be admissible 
is mandatory rather than discretionary.’8 The Prosecutor must determine whether the 
self-referring state is proceeding or has been proceeding genuinely with a given case 
before he or she decides to go ahead.9 Moreover, the Court may raise a question of 
admissibility on its own motion, as was done with regard to the arrest warrant for 
Lubanga.10 However, it is ambiguous whether the admissibility of the referral will be 
considered an indication of ‘inaction’ by the state or an indication of ‘unwillingness’ or 
‘inability’ of the national system.11  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, in the course of different attacks in Ituri region 
of the DRC, almost all of the armed groups – governmental and rebel, national and 
foreign – have committed serious crimes. However, the perpetrators of these crimes are 
rarely punished.12 The other important point that may arise here is that the striking 
feature in all the self-referrals is that in each case the referring state asked the 
Prosecutor to investigate crimes allegedly committed by rebels fighting against the 
central authorities.13 This raises the possibility that the practice of self-referral by states 
could result in states using the ICC for internal political reasons.14 It is unlikely that 
they will be fully cooperative in the investigation of crimes perpetrated by state agents. 
The Prosecutor ‘should be keenly aware of these possible pitfalls; despite initial 
appearances, self-referral is not necessarily the most straightforward option.’15  
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The atrocities that have taken place in the DRC are at the heart of the controversy over 
the effectiveness of international courts.16 Within the DRC situation, both Germain 
Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui have been indicted for crimes against humanity 
and war crimes for the commission of sexual slavery, rape, and outrages upon personal 
dignity.17 Seeking justice for war crimes and crimes against humanity drew attention to 
the lack of a functioning legal system in the DRC at the time of its referral to the 
Prosecutor.18 However, it should be highlighted here that the work of the Prosecutor 
depends on close collaboration with the domestic justice system for the sake of those 
most affected by conflict in the region, and this requires a better understanding of 
cultural awareness to engage in complex criminal proceedings. For instance, the ICC 
investigators and prosecutors must be trained to approach a witness of sexual violence 
crime with cultural and gender awareness to avoid additional suffering and to accurately 
assess his or her credibility given the sensitive nature of the crime. The first section of 
this chapter will analyse the decision-making process in the DRC situation in terms of 
Prosecutorial policy, in order to explore how the decision regarding the admissibility of 
the situation and cases was made by the Prosecutor. Emphasis will be placed on the 
question of the legitimacy of self-referral, as well as an examination of the decisions 
which were made by the Pre-Trial Chamber. The second part of this chapter will 
evaluate the exercise of the discretionary power of the Prosecutor, focussing particularly 
on the preliminary examination and the practice of self-referral in the Congo.   
 
1. Analysis of the decision-making process: 
 
Under article 13 (1) and 14 of the Rome Statute, a state party may refer to the 
Prosecutor a ‘situation in which one or more crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court 
appear to have been committed’.19 However, Article 17 does not distinguish between 
various forms of referrals. Paragraph 1 simply provides that ‘the Court shall determine 
that a case is inadmissible’ in the described situations. Neither does article 53 indicate 
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that the admissibility criteria should not apply when there is a self-referral.20 In short, 
the right of states to make self-referrals has been the subject of considerable debate 
among jurists,21 particularly since the Prosecutor takes the view that a state party can 
voluntarily relinquish its domestic jurisdiction over a situation.22 Furthermore, the 
criticism of self-referrals arises in large measure from ‘the suspicion that states are 
invariably pursuing narrow interests that are inconsistent with the common interest in 
the suppression of international crimes’.23  
 
1.1 Legitimacy of self-referral: 
 
As stated, the legitimacy of self-referrals and the satisfaction of the Court’s 
complementarity regime has been the subject of debate. Arsanjani and Reisman have 
observed that ‘no one – neither states that were initially sceptical about the viability of 
an ICC nor states that supported it – assumed that government would want to invite the 
future court to investigate and prosecute crimes that had occurred on their territory.’24 In 
other words, there is no indication that the drafters ever contemplated that the Statute 
would include voluntary state referrals to the Court of difficult cases arising in their 
own territory,25 and Article 14 was envisaged solely as an inter-state complaint 
mechanism and not a basis for voluntary relinquishment of national jurisdiction.26 It is 
worth mentioning that self-referral was discussed during the negotiating process of the 
establishment of the ICC, but NGOs claimed that states would be reluctant to make 
referrals of situations to the Court and that the prosecutor should therefore be granted 
proprio motu powers to initiate investigations. It was also mooted that states might 
abuse such an option by trying to send politically motivated referrals with regard to 
situations in the territory of a political adversary.27 Schabas believes that a state-referral 
‘flows from a creative interpretation of Article 14 of the Rome Statute that was not 
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seriously contemplated by the 1998 Diplomatic Conference’28, and that ‘there is not a 
trace in the travaux préparatoires’.29 In fact, he claims that self-referrals are an 
‘interpretative deviation’ and an ‘opportunistic construction’30 of the Rome Statute 
driven by the desire to generate activity.31 He maintains that where national courts are 
able and willing to prosecute within the meaning of Article 17 of the Statute, 
‘relinquishment of jurisdiction is impermissible and inconsistent with the independence 
of the Court.’32 
Other commentators, however, have suggested that nothing in the admissibility 
requirements of Article 17 prohibits self-referrals where states parties have not initiated 
investigations or prosecutions, and that there may be compelling reasons why they may 
want to relinquish their jurisdiction in favour of international trials, even if they are able 
and willing to prosecute.33 In particular, in relation to the purpose of the Rome Statute 
to end impunity, ‘the territorial state should not be prevented from choosing a second 
option against impunity, namely to refer a situation to the ICC with a view to 
international investigation.’34 Kress has stated that Article 14 of the Rome Statute 
appears to authorize states parties to refer situations to the Court without any restriction. 
Accordingly, the fact that a state holds a direct interest in the investigation of the crimes 
alleged to have been committed in a given situation does not seem to pose a procedural 
obstacle to a referral pursuant to Article 14.35 However, a question might be raised 
about this interpretation because paragraph six of the Rome Statute speaks of ‘the duty 
of every state to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for 
international crimes.’36 Kress has suggested that the territorial state’s duty to exercise 
criminal jurisdiction should be broadly understood as the obligation to ensure that a 
genuine investigation be undertaken.37 He also believes that the emerging practice of 
self-referral constitutes ‘necessary refinements of the complementarity scheme’ under 
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the Rome Statute.38 In addition, Stigen has noted that letting the admissibility criteria 
apply would be fully consistent with the Statute’s purpose, which is to ensure that the 
perpetrators are brought to justice.39 Akhavan has argued that an important aspect of 
‘self-referrals relates to the mutuality of interest between the Court and states parties’.40  
From the other side, however, Arsanjani and Reisman have claimed that the practice 
of such referrals has to be scrutinized to avoid a costly abuse of the Court, on the 
grounds that self-referrals allow states to shift the burden of prosecutions they are 
unwilling to carry out for financial or other reasons to the international community.41 
Cassese has also suggested that the practice of self-referral by states involved in civil 
wars, who tend to accuse their rebel enemies, may cause misgivings.42 Three 
‘situations’ have been referred so far by the state concerned to the Prosecutor. Stigen 
has claimed that referrals were made after what can best be described as ‘mild pressure 
from the Prosecutor.’43  
In September 2003, the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP), announced in its policy paper 
that it will follow the positive approach to complementarity.44 This encourages genuine 
national proceedings where possible, relies on national and international networks, and 
participates in a system of international cooperation.45 An informal expert paper of the 
Prosecution declared, ‘[t]here may also be situations where OTP and the state concerned 
agree that a consensual division of labour is in the best interests of justice; for example, 
where a conflict-torn state is unable to carry out effective proceedings against persons 
most responsible’.46 In other words, ‘there may be cases where inaction by states is the 
appropriate course of action. For example, the Court and a territorial state incapacitated 
by mass crimes may agree that a consensual division of labour is the most logical and 
effective approach. In such cases there will be no question of unwillingness or inability 
under article 17.’47 It also mentions that where the Prosecutor receives a referral from 
the state in which a crime has been committed, the Prosecutor can be confident that the 
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national authorities will assist the investigation.48 This may, however, be somewhat 
over-optimistic;49 Gaeta has claimed that the government authorities may be prepared to 
cooperate where the crimes investigated have been allegedly committed by the opposing 
side but it is unlikely that they will be fully cooperative in the investigation of crimes 
perpetrated by state agents.50 As mentioned in Chapter three, in the case of a state-
referral no authorisation for an investigation is needed;51 therefore, the Prosecutor will 
be rather more willing to follow up state- referrals from the countries that wish to hand 
over their own situations than to start proceedings proprio motu.52  
El Zeidy has claimed that nothing in the Statute or in the Rules explicitly spells out the 
power of the Prosecutor either to invite states to refer situations or even to encourage 
them to do so. Article 3 (a), in conjunction with Article 14 (1) and Rule 45 governing 
referrals, speak of a situation to be referred to the Prosecutor by a state party ‘requesting 
the Prosecutor to investigate’. Similarly, Articles 15 (1) and (2), together with Rule 46, 
trigger the proprio motu powers of the Prosecutor subject to his receipt of ‘information 
on crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court’.53 The Prosecution, in its report on the 
activities of the Office during its first three years, pointed out that while proprio motu 
power is a critical aspect of the Office’s independence, the Prosecutor adopted the 
policy of inviting and welcoming voluntary referrals by territorial states as a first step in 
triggering the jurisdiction of the Court.54 Robinson has argued that ‘the way to 
encourage state action is not through the admissibility test at all, but rather through a 
prosecutorial policy of trying to encourage states to carry out effective proceedings 
themselves’.55 However, he admits that when the OTP finds itself dealing with state 
inaction, the Statute does not stipulate under what circumstances the Prosecutor should 
press for national action and under what circumstances a burden-sharing arrangement 
might be reached to ensure effective investigation and prosecution.56  
                                                 
48
 Takemura, Op, cit., p. 15. See also, Annex to the “Paper on some policy issues before the Office of the 
Prosecutor”: Referrals and Communications’ (September 2003). www.icc-
cpi.int/library/organs/otp/policy_annex_final_210404.pdf     
49
 Kleffner, Op, cit., p. 44  
50
 Gaeta, Op, cit., p. 952  
51
 Razesberger, F. (2006). The International Criminal Court: The Principle of Complementarity Frankfurt, 
Peterlang, p. 59.   
52
 Ibid., p. 60.  
53
 Zeidy, Op, cit., p. 216. 
54
 Report on the Activities performed during the first three years (June 2003- June 2006), p. 7 from 
www.icc-cpi.int   
55
 Robinson, responding Schabas criticism, Op, cit., p. 28.  
56
 Ibid., p. 29.  
 212 
But this cooperative achievement may have a political dark side, and may ‘[amount] 
to something of a hybrid between the power of self-referral and the prosecutor’s proprio 
motu powers under Article 15 of the Rome Statute.’57 Scharf has argued that the policy 
could be seen as an unwarranted circumvention by the Prosecutor of the authorization 
he is required to obtain from the Pre-Trial Chamber to start an investigation proprio 
motu under Article 15,58 and an abuse of the automatic investigation mandated by a 
state party referral under Article 53.59 He has claimed that the Prosecutor must take 
transparent action in order to encourage states to refer the situation to the Court.60  
 
1.2 Referral of the DRC situation to the Prosecutor: 
 
In September 2003, the Prosecutor informed the Assembly of States Parties (ASP) 
that he was ready to request authorization from the Pre-Trial Chamber to use his own 
proprio motu powers to investigate large-scale atrocities in the DRC, but that a 
referral and active support from the DRC would assist his work.61 Following the 
initiative of the Prosecutor, Joseph Kabila, the President of the DRC, in a letter in 
March 2004, referred the entire territory of the DRC to the Court as regards events 
occurring after July 1, 2002.62  
Some scholars have criticized the DRC referral and the selectivity of prosecution in 
this situation. Gaeta, among others, has noted that the DRC referral was not voluntary 
and it appears that the Prosecutor himself requested it, even though he had declared that 
he was ready to use his proprio motu powers and start an investigation after being duly 
authorized by the Pre-Trial Chamber.63 He suggested that the Prosecutor had a political 
motive, on the grounds that he ‘could have started the investigation in the DRC on his 
own initiative, but he pushed for a self-referral.’64 Thus, according to Gaeta, the Court 
has made its first steps ‘in the guise of an institution that can assist states to obtain 
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justice in the face of mass atrocities committed within their boundaries, rather than as an 
interfering international watchdog against which states have to defend themselves’.65  
On 6 October 2004, the ICC and the DRC signed an agreement regarding the protection 
of investigators and their access to the governmental archives.66 In addition, the 
Prosecutor entered into a dialogue on a ‘consensual division of labour’ with the DRC, 
whereby the he would target leaders who bore the greatest responsibility for crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the Court and national authorities would deal with ‘others in 
appropriate ways’.67 Accordingly, the Prosecutor announced that the situation in Ituri be 
selected as the most urgent for investigation,68 and a formal investigation in the Ituri 
region was subsequently initiated following a preliminary examination of the crimes 
committed in the country since July 2002.69 However, adopting a strict Kantian 
approach, the Prosecutor in the Congo situation erred on the side of universalism by 
ignoring the legitimate needs of the local people.  
In June 2004, the Prosecutor opened the first two ICC cases concerning the situation 
in Ituri. The first investigation of the crimes committed by the UPC led to the arrest of 
Thomas Lubanga, who was charged with enlisting and using child soldiers. The 
Lubanga trial, the first case before the ICC, opened on 29 January 2009. The ICC issued 
a second arrest warrant, relating to the same incidents, against Bosco Ntaganda on 22 
August 2006. It is worth mentioning that Ntaganda, appointed general in December 
2004 as part of the peace negotiations held in Ituri, remains at large and plays an 
important role in the Forces Armees de la Republique Democratique du Congo 
(FARDC) operations against the Forces Decmocratiques de Liberation du Rwanda 
(FDLR) in the Kivus. The DRC government has publicly stated on several occasions 
that it has no intention of arresting Bosco Ntaganda, at least for the moment, despite 
many objections.70  
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In the second investigation into the situation in Ituri, against the Fron des Nationalists 
et Integrationnistes – Front de Resistance Patriotique d’Ituri (FNI/FRPI), Germain 
Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo were transferred to the ICC on 17 October 2007 and 6 
February 2008 respectively, and charged in September 2008 with war crimes and crimes 
against humanity, committed principally during the Bogoro massacre in February 
2003.71 The third investigation opened in the Kivus, announced by the Prosecutor in 
2008.72 On 11 October 2010, Callixte Mbarushimana, a leader of the FDLR was 
arrested in Paris by the French authorities following a sealed arrest warrant issued by 
the ICC. He was charged with 11 counts of crimes against humanity and war crimes, 
including killings, rape, persecution based on gender and extensive destruction of 
property committed by the FDLR during most of 2009.73   
 
1.3 Pre-Trial Chamber decision on the DRC cases: 
 
Case of the Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo 
 
In February 2005, ‘nine Bangladeshi UN peacekeepers were killed, causing the DRC 
government to increase its efforts to arrest militia leaders. In March 2005, Floribert 
Ndjabu, of the Lendu Nationalist and Integrationist Front, and Lubanga of the UPC 
were arrested’ on domestic charges of murder.74 On 13 January 2006, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber granted the Prosecutor’s application for an arrest warrant directed at Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo, who had been in custody in the DRC since March 2005.75 However, the 
Lubanga arrest warrant remained under seal while the Prosecutor worked with the 
authorities of the DRC in order to ensure the accused person’s transfer to The Hague.76 
His detention was well-known to international NGOs so it seems reasonable to assume 
that the Prosecutor was also aware of the situation. The Prosecutor only proceeded to 
seek an arrest warrant when it appeared that the detention was coming to an end, and 
that there was the possibility that Lubanga would be released. This was specifically 
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invoked in the application for the arrest warrant, and helped to persuade the Pre-Trial 
Chamber.77 He was charged with three counts of war crimes, including ‘enlisting and 
conscripting children under the age of 15 and using them to participate actively in 
hostilities’.78  
Pre-Trial Chamber I noted that in deciding whether to issue the arrest warrant, it 
would assess both the jurisdiction and the admissibility of the case ex officio and ex 
parte. For the Pre-Trial Chamber, the ‘Congo situation’ was in the course of being 
transformed into the Lubanga case, and this required a separate and distinct assessment 
of issues of jurisdiction and admissibility.79 Because Lubanga was charged by the DRC 
with crimes other than war crimes relating to the recruitment and use of child soldiers, 
the Chamber reasoned, the DRC was not in fact conducting any proceedings relating to 
the case presented by the Prosecution; Article 17 was, therefore, not a bar to 
admissibility.80 With respect to the admissibility of the case against Lubanga, the Pre-
Trial Chamber noted that ‘it appears that the DRC is indeed unable to undertake the 
investigation and prosecution … In the Chamber’s view, this is why the self-referral of 
the DRC appears consistent with the ultimate purpose of the complementarity regime, 
according to which the Court by no means replaces national criminal jurisdictions, but it 
is complementary to them.’81 Furthermore, Pre-Trial Chamber I, in the Lubanga arrest 
warrant decision, noted that the case at the time of the self-referral was a result of 
inability, not unwillingness. However, the situation in the national justice system had 
evolved in the nearly 2 years since the self-referral, and the Congolese courts might well 
now be in a position to undertake prosecution.82 In this context, Schabas has suggested 
that a state that refers a case to the ICC is indirectly answering one of the prongs of the 
complementarity text; namely, that it is willing to prosecute, at least in the sense that it 
is willing to see the alleged perpetrators brought to justice. It may, however, find itself 
unable to proceed because of a breakdown in its own justice system or because of a 
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serious legal impediment, such as an amnesty.83 Therefore, he has claimed that in the 
DRC situation there is unwillingness not inability.84  
It is also worth mentioning that Pre-Trial Chamber I considered that the Congolese 
justice system was not suffering from ‘a total or substantial collapse or unavailability of 
its national judicial system’, to borrow the words of article 17.85 With regard to the 
admissibility analysis of the Lubanga case, the Chamber observed that ‘since March 
2004 the DRC national judicial system has undergone certain changes, particularly in 
the region of Ituri where a Tribunal de Grande Instance has been re-opened in Bunia.’86 
This resulted in the issuance of two warrants of arrest by the competent DRC authorities 
for Lubanga in March 2005, for several crimes committed in connection with military 
attacks from May 2003 onwards.87 The DRC authorities issued an arrest warrant on 19 
March 2005 against Lubanga charging him with the crime of genocide (art 164 of the 
DRC Military Criminal Code) and crimes against humanity (arts 166-169 of the DRC 
Military Criminal Code), in addition to the ordinary crimes of murder and illegal 
detention.88 Examining these, the PTC found that the DRC arrest warrants contained no 
reference to Lubanga’s alleged criminal responsibility for the Union des Patriotes – the 
Forces Patriotiques pour la Liberation du Congo (UPC/FPLC)’s policy and practice of 
enlisting and using children under fifteen years of age to participate actively in 
hostilities.89  
The fact that Lubanga was in custody in the Congo at the time the Prosecutor took an 
interest in him might suggest that the national justice system was actually working, and 
that the state was meeting its international obligations in terms of addressing impunity.90 
The PTC found the case against Lubanga admissible because he was being charged by 
the ICC based on separate facts, with crimes distinct from those alleged in the domestic 
Congolese warrant against him. Specifically, the Congolese warrant addressed 
Lubanga’s role in the MONUC killings, whereas the ICC warrant focused on his 
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conscription of children into his militia group.91 The Pre-Trial Chamber noted that in 
order for a case to be inadmissible, ‘national proceedings must encompass both the 
person and the conduct which is the subject of the case before the Court.’ Having 
confirmed that no domestic case against Lubanga for the same charges had been 
initiated, the Chamber declined to make a formal analysis of ‘unwillingness or inability’ 
beyond its earlier reference.92 The Pre-Trial Chamber wrote, ‘the DRC cannot be 
considered to be acting in relation to the specific case before the Court…’93 and 
therefore it held that the complementarity test was satisfied.94 
On 29 January 2007, Pre-Trial Chamber I issued the decision on the confirmation of 
charges in the Lubanga case,95 committing the suspect for trial for the war crime of 
conscripting and enlisting children under the age of 15 years.96 The trial of Lubanga, 
which opened in 2009 after a seven-month delay over disputed confidential evidence, 
has been plagued by legal challenges. The OTP was found to have not identified a key 
witness. The first witness at the trial retracted his testimony after first saying he had 
been recruited by Lubanga's fighters on his way home from school. Judge Adrian 
Fulford has stated that Lubanga should be ‘freed without condition’, since his detention 
was ‘no longer fair’ after the trial was suspended.97 On 8 July 2010, Trial Chamber I 
ordered the release of the accused, as the Chamber found that it would be impossible to 
secure a fair trial for him due to non-implementation of the Chamber’s orders by the 
prosecution and non-disclosure of exculpatory materials covered by Article 54 (3) (e) of 
the Statute.98 According to the judges, an accused cannot be held in preventative 
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custody on a speculative basis, in this case the speculation that at some stage in the 
future the proceedings might be resurrected.99 
The Appeal Chamber, with its decision on 8 October 2010, reversed the decision of 
the Trial Chamber to stay the proceedings for abuse of process by the Prosecutor.100 
However, it stated that the Prosecutor is obliged to comply with the orders of the 
Chamber even if there is a conflict between the orders of a Chamber and the 
Prosecutor’s perception of his duties.101 The Appeal Chamber added that a Trial 
Chamber should impose sanctions under Article 71 before ordering a stay of 
proceedings because of a party’s refusal to comply with its orders.102 The Appeal 
Chamber determined that the Prosecutor’s refusal to comply with the orders of the Trial 
Chamber ‘extended to a significant part of the trial and concerned issues of the trial’s 
fundamental fairness.’103 Furthermore, the abuse of process in the Prosecutor’s evinced 
intention not to implement the Chamber’s orders104 threatened not only Lubanga’s right 
to be tried without undue delay but also the fairness of the proceedings as a whole.105 If 
a Trial Chamber loses control of such a fundamental part of proceedings because of the 
Prosecutor’s refusal to comply with its orders, it would indeed be impossible to ensure a 
fair trial, and a stay of proceedings would then be justified.106 However, the Appeal 
Chamber found that the Trial Chamber had not yet lost control of the proceedings in this 
case and noted that Article 71 of the Statute provides Trial Chambers with a specific 
tool to maintain control of proceedings and to ensure a fair trial when faced with the 
deliberate refusal of a party to comply with its directions. The purpose of such sanctions 
is not merely to punish the offending party, but also to bring about compliance.107 Using 
these tools thereby allows the trial to proceed speedily to a conclusion on its merit, 
which is in the interests of not only victims and the international community as a whole 
who wish to see justice done, but also of the accused who is awaiting a decision on the 
merits of the case against him by the ICC.108  
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Case of the Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui 
 
Germain Katanga is alleged to have been the commander of the FRPI. He is accused 
of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity under Articles 7 and 8 of the 
Rome Statute, in relation to an attack conducted against the village of Bogoro on or 
about 24 February 2003.109 In particular, it is alleged that Katanga, acting jointly with 
Ngudjolo Chui, committed the offences of murder, rape, sexual slavery, using children 
under 15 years to take an active part in hostilities, targeting the civilian population, 
pillage and targeting civilian property.110 In early 2004, the President of the DRC, 
Joseph Kabila, appointed Germain Katanga Brigadier-General of the FARDC, a post 
which he held at the time of his arrest by the DRC authorities, on or about 10 March 
2005.111 Katanga was in custody in the DRC from 19 March 2005 pursuant to a 
domestic warrant ‘which include[d] charges of crimes against humanity’.112 The 
proceedings against Katanga in the DRC were terminated on 17 October 2007113 so as 
to facilitate proceedings before the ICC. Pre-Trial Chamber I had conducted a 
preliminary investigation of admissibility, but concluded that the charges in the DRC 
warrant did not ‘encompass the same conduct’ for which he was sought by the ICC.114 
On 2 July 2007, Pre-Trial Chamber I issued an arrest warrant for Germain Katanga; on 
6 July 2007, the Chamber issued an arrest warrant for Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui. On 17 
October 2007, Germain Katanga was surrendered by the Congolese authorities and 
transferred to the seat of the Court in The Hague, making his first appearance before the 
Chamber on 22 October 2007. On 6 February 2008, Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui was 
arrested, surrendered by the Congolese authorities and transferred to the seat of the 
Court in The Hague the following day; he made his first appearance before the Chamber 
                                                 
109
 Morgan, A. (2009). "ICC upholds charges against accused DRC rebel leader." from 
jurist.org/paperchase/2009/09/icc-upholds-charges-against-accused-drc.php [accessed on 10th September 
2011].  
110
 Cross, M. and S. Williams (2010). "Recent Developments at the ICC: Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga 
and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui- A Boost for 'Co-operative Complementarity'?" Human Rights Law Review 
10(2): p. 337. 
111
 DRC Situation, case information sheet, from www.icc-cpi.int  
112
 Prosecutor v Germain Katanga, Decision on the Evidence and Information provided by the 
Prosecution for the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest for Germain Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07 (2007) at 
para.18  
113
 Prosecutor v Mr Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Judgment on the Appeal of Germain 
Katanga against the Oral Decision of Trial Chamber II of 12 June 2009 on the Admissibility of the Case, 
ICC-01/04-01/07 OA 8 (2009). Para 80  
114
 Prosecutor v Germain Katanga, Decision on the Evidence and Information provided by the 
Prosecution for the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest for Germain Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07 (2007) at para 
18 and 20.  
 220 
on 11 February 2008. On 26 September 2008, the judges of Pre-Trial Chamber I 
confirmed charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity against Germain Katanga 
and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui.115 
On 10 February 2009, Katanga filed a challenge to the admissibility of his case,116 
articulating two main challenges.117 First, he criticised the ‘same conduct’ test used by 
Pre-Trial Chamber I in making its preliminary assessment, arguing that its approach 
lacked legal foundation and that an alternative standard should be applied. Second, he 
challenged the interpretation of the terms ‘unwilling’ and ‘unable’ found in Article 
17(1) (a) of the Rome Statute.118 The defence criticized the ICC’s treatment of 
complementarity in the case, arguing that even under the ‘same-conduct test’ Katanga’s 
case is inadmissible given that he was charged with crimes against humanity arising out 
of the attack on Bogoro, and there is no evidence that the DRC is unwilling or unable to 
pursue a corresponding investigation and possible prosecution.119 The DRC 
government, in response to a question as to whether the DRC genuinely carried out 
investigations directed against Germain Katanga, asserted that a file was opened against 
Germain Katanga and seven other persons following the murder of nine Bangladeshi 
MONUC peacekeepers. The investigations into these crimes are proceeding with 
difficulty: more than a year after the arrest of the above individuals, the file is still not 
ready to be forwarded to the trial court.120 
The DRC noted that there is no record of any investigations or any significant 
procedural act by the judicial authorities relating to the events at Bogoro.121 Moreover, 
regarding the ability of the DRC to carry out investigation into these allegations, the 
DRC admitted that at the time of the crimes in February 2003, the ‘country [was] 
ravaged by rebel groups and armed gangs; [there was] generalised insecurity in Ituri, 
making victims and witnesses inaccessible; [in addition] the unavailability of judicial 
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structures, aggravated by the inadequacy of operational capacities; the uncertainties of 
the peace process, with a variety of politico-military agreements between ex-
belligerents; the lack of expertise in dealing with mass crimes and in the collection and 
preservation of evidence of such crimes’ taken together show that the DRC was unable 
genuinely to investigate the crimes at Bogoro.122  
The Trial Chamber held that it need not look at whether or not the test was valid or 
even at whether it had been satisfied in the case of Katanga. Regardless of whether 
Katanga was being tried for the same or different conduct by the DRC, the Congolese 
authorities had willingly surrendered him to the ICC and therefore the national system 
must be deemed ‘unwilling’ to try the case within the meaning of Article 17.123 In 
rejecting Katanga’s challenge, the Trial Chamber emphasised the ‘clear and explicit 
expression of unwillingness of the DRC to prosecute this case’ and the DRC’s manifest 
desire to see the prosecution proceed before the Court.124 Notwithstanding the definition 
in Article 17(2), the Trial Chamber determined a ‘second form of unwillingness’, not 
expressly provided in the Statute, which ‘aims to see . . . person[s] brought to justice, 
but not before national courts’.125 It considered this interpretation ‘designed to protect 
the sovereign right of States to exercise their jurisdiction in good faith when they wish 
to do so.’126 On this analysis, the decision to waive jurisdiction in favour of the ICC 
thus lies within the State’s sovereign discretion, foreclosing the accused’s ability to 
bring challenges under Article 17(1)(a) and (b).127 In other words, the Chamber 
considers that a state which chooses not to investigate or prosecute a person before its 
own courts, but has nevertheless every intention of seeing that justice is done, must be 
considered as lacking the will referred to in Article 17.128 In making its decision, the 
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Trial Chamber noted the extent of the DRC’s co-operation and statements made by 
DRC representatives.129  
Katanga filed his appeal on 22 June 2009,130 challenging the Trial Chamber’s 
construction of Article 17(1) (a) and (b) of the Rome Statute (complementarity test),131 
alleging that it had ‘erroneously enlarged the definition of unwillingness in a manner (1) 
not intended by the drafters of  the Statute and not in compliance with its objective and 
purpose; and (2) contrary to the fundamental values underlying the complementarity 
principle.’132 On 25 September 2009, the Appeals Chamber133 rejected Katanga’s appeal 
against the Chambers’ decision,134 confirming the admissibility of the case The 
Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui.135 The Appeals Chamber 
set forth the following test for admissibility under Article 17(1)(a) and (b): ‘[T]he initial 
questions to ask are (1) whether there are ongoing investigations or prosecutions, or (2) 
whether there have been investigations in the past, and the State having jurisdiction has 
decided not to prosecute the person concerned.136 Only when these questions are 
answered in the affirmative is it necessary to look to the second halves of sub-
paragraphs (a) and (b) and move to the question of unwillingness and inability. It 
follows that, ‘in case of inaction, the question of unwillingness or inability does not 
arise; inaction on the part of a state having jurisdiction . . . renders a case admissible 
before the Court, subject to Article 17(1)(d) of the Statute.’137  
Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber considered that national decisions to halt 
investigations or to decline to proceed with prosecutions in the interests of facilitating 
prosecutions before the ICC do not amount to a decision ‘not to prosecute’ for the 
purposes of Article 17(1)(b).138 It held that the decision of the DRC authorities to close 
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domestic proceedings against the accused was not a decision not to prosecute, but rather 
a decision to surrender the accused to the ICC, and thus necessarily to terminate 
domestic proceedings. This reflected the conviction of the DRC that the accused should 
be tried, but that the trial should take place before the ICC and not national authorities. 
As such, Katanga’s appeal could be disposed of on the basis of the DRC’s legal 
inactivity.139 The Appeals Chamber considered that Article 17(1)(a) provides no basis to 
examine the reasons why the state was not investigating or prosecuting the case.140 This 
means that the motives for the state to decline to exercise its power or duty to provide 
accountability at the national level are not relevant to the admissibility of a case which 
has been initiated before the ICC.141 The DRC had closed its investigation on the 
transfer of Katanga to the ICC. There were thus no domestic proceedings taking place at 
the time of the challenge. The question whether the DRC was willing or unwilling to 
prosecute him, whether it was able or unable to prosecute him, therefore simply did not 
arise.142 
Therefore, the Appeals Chamber reached the same result as the Trial Chamber and 
noted that as long as a state is willing to surrender a suspect to the ICC, it is irrelevant 
whether that person was being genuinely prosecuted in a domestic jurisdiction prior to 
the Court’s intervention.143 However, the Appeal Chamber did not affirm the 
admissibility of the case on the same basis as the Trial Chamber (that the DRC was 
unwilling); rather, it looked at the plain language of Article 17, and found that at the 
time of the challenge the DRC was not investigating or prosecuting Katanga and thus it 
rejected Katanga’s appeal.144 Susana has argued that the Appeals Chamber’s decision on 
complementarity in the Katanga case means that any time a state chooses to co-operate 
with a request from the ICC to surrender an individual sought by the Court’s Prosecutor, 
the Court will be able to try a person who was, prior to the ICC’s intervention, being 
prosecuted in a domestic system. Importantly, this will be the case even if the domestic 
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system was trying the person for the same crimes as the ICC, and even where the 
domestic case involved a broader range of serious crimes.145  
 
2. Evaluation of the exercise of discretionary power by the 
Prosecutor:  
 
In addition to the fact that the Court cannot force a state to investigate or prosecute a 
case, the Court is also faced with the reality that in most situations of mass atrocity it 
will be unable to investigate and prosecute all the alleged perpetrators itself. This has 
led to discussion of the concept of ‘positive complementarity’.146 The complementarity 
principle was introduced in the Rome Statute to preserve the rights of the states to 
prosecute core crime147 but the positive approach to this principle takes a more 
interactive view of the Court and the state, seeing them not in a competitive relationship 
but jointly pursuing shared objectives.148 It envisages the Court encouraging and 
facilitating domestic investigations and prosecutions where possible, in addition to 
conducting international proceedings where necessary.149 Furthermore, by being always 
alive to cultural differences, the operation of the Court should be more meaningful to 
victims populations, and more effective at rebuilding local justice systems.  
 
2.1 Assessment of the preliminary examination: 
 
Some scholars have criticized the validity of the ICC’s strategy in the Ituri region on 
the grounds that Ituri is the most isolated from the political arena in Kinshasa. Clark has 
argued that there is less clear evidence to connect President Kabila to atrocities 
committed in Ituri, although it is suspected that he has previously supported various 
rebel groups in the province, including Germain Katanga’s FRPI. This differs from 
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violence in other provinces, particularly North and South Kivu and Katanga province, 
where government forces and Mai Mai militias backed by Kabila are directly implicated 
in serious crimes. Therefore, investigations and prosecutions in Ituri are those with the 
least capacity to destabilise the current government.150 In addition, Pascal and Rotman 
have claimed that the ICC is addressing a part of the DRC's war that is still very much 
alive and in which at least two of the transitional government's vice-presidents have 
probably been involved in some capacity.151 According to Burke-White, self-referral 
was somewhat surprising considering that Kabila himself may have been responsible for 
some of these crimes and could be subject to investigation. Kabila's decision, while 
signalling the government's willingness to work with international authorities to end the 
violence, was intended to summon the ICC's assistance and have the ICC pay the 
political and economic costs of trying the perpetrators.152 Roach and Leonard have 
suggested that Kabila probably has less to worry about in terms of being investigated 
and prosecuted since ‘any crimes against humanity committed by Kabila likely occurred 
before July 1, 2002, and as yet, there is little evidence that he has been directly involved 
in any of the major issues in the Congo within the Court's temporal jurisdiction.’153  
Clark has suggested that the ICC considered its relations with Kinshasa to ensure the 
security of ICC investigators and MONUC’s major peacekeeping mission, which were 
working in the unstable eastern provinces. The ICC also wanted to avoid implicating 
government officials in the lead-up to Congo’s first post-independence elections, held in 
July 2006. However, this sends a message to major perpetrators that their senior 
political or military status will insulate them from prosecution. For the Congolese 
population, this implies continued impunity for the leaders most responsible for the 
immense harm they have suffered.154 As discussed in Chapter six, since July 2003 the 
EU and the UN have invested more than US$40m in order to reform the Congolese 
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judiciary, and considerable progress has been made in local capacity.155 Ituri provided 
the ICC with a simpler legal task than other provinces; of the conflict-affected provinces 
of the DRC, Ituri has the best-functioning local judiciary, which has already shown 
adeptness at investigating serious crimes, including those committed by Lubanga, 
Katanga and Ngudjolo. It is therefore unclear whether the ICC can adequately justify its 
involvement in Ituri, given the capacity of domestic institutions to investigate and 
prosecute major crimes. The OTP benefited from the fact that when its investigations 
were opened into the Lubanga and Katanga cases, the major militia leaders were 
already in custody and important evidence had been collected by the local civilian and 
military courts, in conjunction with MONUC.156 Therefore, Clark has claimed that ‘Ituri 
is easy for the ICC’ since ‘MONUC have all the information on cases there’. The 
dossiers are ready to go but the question may be raised as to why the ICC wanted to try 
the easiest cases.157 The Prosecutor, for his part, has announced that Ituri represents 
only ‘the beginning not the end’ of the ICC’s work in the DRC and the third 
investigation was opened in the Kivus during 2008.158 
 
2.2 Critiques of the practice of self-referral: 
 
Burke-White has conceded that a ‘division of labour’ approach ‘can be an efficient 
and effective way to end impunity.’ However, positive complementarity does not 
amount to a ‘uniform strategy’ likely to be effective in all circumstances.159 Other 
commentators have reframed160 positive complementarity - a new form of 
complementarity - as ‘a forum for managerial interaction between the Court and States’, 
which permits ‘flexibility’ in the nature of the response.161 This approach has some 
merit, yet the underlying conclusion that sometimes the ICC should do one thing, 
sometimes another, underlines the importance of pragmatism rather than the slavish 
application of principle. In its cautious elucidation of a test permitting ‘co-operative 
complementarity’, this is a lesson that the Katanga Appeals Chamber has clearly learned 
well.162   
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Susana Sacouto has argued that there are potential concerns about the approach of the 
Prosecution towards complementarity.163 According to a policy paper of the OTP, the 
ICC may step in where ‘[g]roups [that are] bitterly divided by conflict’ agree that a 
prosecution by the ICC would be ‘neutral and impartial’, or where ‘a third State has 
extra-territorial jurisdiction, but all interested parties agree that the Court has developed 
superior evidence and expertise relating to that situation, making the Court the more 
effective forum’.164 According to Sacouto, the Prosecutor may find it necessary to take 
over cases from national judicial systems, due to issues such as the national system’s 
inability to protect witnesses or judges effectively, where a state is not genuinely 
pursuing a supposedly ongoing investigation.165 However, in practice, two of the five 
individuals for whom the prosecution has sought arrest warrants in the situation in the 
DRC to date – Thomas Lubanga Dyilo and Germain Katanga – were the subjects of 
domestic proceedings at the time that the ICC issued the arrest warrant, and there is no 
evidence that the Court took over these cases due to the types of scenario described in 
the prosecution’s policy paper.166 Moreover, the Congolese judicial system, at least in 
certain areas of the DRC (including Kinshasa) was ‘able and willing.’ Only Mathieu 
Ngudjolo Chui was not in custody when the ICC issued his arrest warrant,167 but he was 
arrested and surrendered to the ICC by ‘the (willing and relatively able) Congolese 
judicial system.’168   
Susana Sacouto claims that the practice of pursuing individuals who could have been 
prosecuted domestically not only seems to run contrary to the principles underlying the 
Rome Statute’s drafters’ desire for the ICC to act as a court of last resort, but may carry 
additional unintended negative consequences. For example, the Prosecutor’s decision to 
take the cases against Lubanga and Katanga out of the DRC ‘undermines the confidence 
of domestic judiciaries; it sends a message that they might be trying to reform 
themselves and might be trying to deal with very complicated justice questions, but 
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that’s not necessarily going to stop an international body from intervening’.169 Susana 
Sacouto has suggested that, in such cases, the Prosecutor should clearly communicate 
the reasons behind its decision to take over the cases that were being prosecuted 
domestically.170 Jurdi has claimed that current prosecutorial policy, rather than 
encouraging national systems to prosecute, has in a number of cases encouraged states 
to defer the cases to the ICC for reasons other than unwillingness or inability as defined  
by article 17. For instance, lessons from cases in the DRC show that states have used 
the ICC forum for political and other reasons that are only tangentially related to legal 
and judicial incapacity, or for shielding possible perpetrators.171 Jurdi claims that under 
such a policy states may refrain from meeting their primary duty to prosecute, and then 
render their own referrals admissible by taking no action even though they are willing 
and able to do so. This has been noted in the Katanga case where, when the 
admissibility of the case was challenged, the DRC hastened to inform the court that it 
did not intend investigating the conduct that formed the basis for Katanga’s 
prosecution.172 It seems that prosecutions of only one side in the conflict may be the 
price of the self-referral strategy of the Prosecutor.173 It is also claimed that state referral 
appears to be the favoured option amongst states, as it shifts the burden without 
incurring criticism for not fighting impunity.174 A state referral to the ICC has 
considerable financial and logistical advantages for the referring state and can develop 
their international image as a state that believes in the rule of law and international 
justice, while in reality it is doing nothing to fulfil its duty to combat impunity.175  
Jurdi believes that for a court promoting positive complementarity it would have been 
understandable if the ICC had become involved in bilateral discussions with the 
Congolese judicial system, which was already willing (and at least able regarding 
Lubanga and Katanga – they were captured and detained in Kinshasa) to amend the 
national indictments to cover the conducts that were under investigation by the ICC.176 
In his view, the ICC could have made a more effective contribution to the Congolese 
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judicial system if it encouraged the judiciary to take primary responsibility, with the 
ICC functioning to monitor the trial for the degree of conformity with human rights 
standards.177   
 
2.3 Legitimacy of the Prosecutorial policy in the DRC cases: 
It has been argued here that the Prosecutor should always take into account local 
cultural norms before taking action and exercising his or her power within the 
complementarity regime. The trial of Lubanga has taken nearly three years and has 
suffered many setbacks and delays. Although Lubanga was arrested in March 2006, it 
was not until late January 2007 that the ICC confirmed the charges against him and 
ordered a trial. However, ICC judges were unable to set a trial date in 2007 because of 
unresolved issues over procedures, the roles and rights of victims in the trial, and how 
evidence should be handled. The issue of evidence was a severe challenge to the 
credibility of the ICC. The case was initially due to begin on March 31 2008, but was 
delayed until late June in a dispute over how the evidence was gathered and 
subsequently handled by the Prosecutor. In this regard, the trial Judge Adrian Fulford 
has revealed, ‘I will make no secret of the fact of my real frustration, already expressed 
in no uncertain terms in open court, about delays in getting our first trial up and 
running’.178  
The conflict arose over the failure by the Prosecutor to disclose to the defence all of its 
evidence and the identities of witnesses testifying against Lubanga. The evidence was 
supposed to be provided to the defence by mid-December 2007, but by mid-February it 
had received the identities of less than half the witnesses.179 Other crucial evidence had 
been provided only in redacted or summary form. Although the trial was due to begin 
on June 23 2008, on June 13 judges called for an indefinite halt to the case and 
discussed releasing Lubanga after more than two years in custody. The judges accused 
the Prosecutor of abusing his power and noted that the Lubanga trial ‘has been ruptured 
to such a degree that it is now impossible to piece together the constituent elements of a 
fair trial’. The judges' decision in the case was appealed, which also delayed the release 
of Lubanga, and allowed the evidence problems to be resolved. Finally, on November 
18 2008, ICC judges lifted the formal ‘stay of proceedings’ and set the Lubanga trial for 
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January 26 2009.180 The Prosecutor faces a two-fold obligation related to the disclosure 
of evidence: on the one hand disclosing the evidence in the Prosecution’s possession, 
but also communicating every piece of exculpatory material of which he is aware to the 
Defence. Given this understanding of disclosure, the obligation to disclose information 
in the case is clearly an ‘obligation of result’: the accused must receive the 
information.181 In this case, the Prosecutor’s refusal to disclose evidence was 
characterised by two errors. Firstly, the Prosecutor seems to have used Article 54(3) 
indiscriminately in his investigations, without bothering to use subsequent confidential 
evidence to collect other evidence that could have been disclosed. The Statute was never 
intended to be used to allow a trial where the accused would not have access to 
evidence. If Article 54(3) is employed in a rational manner, the new evidence 
discovered using the agreements would be sufficient for the accused to understand the 
charges against him and adequately defend himself. The confidential character of the 
information provided under Article 54(3) is not intended to disadvantage the accused. 
The accused does not need to know how the Prosecutor obtained the evidence; so long 
as the accused receives the information his rights are not undermined, in particular the 
right to understand the case against him and the evidence that has been used to support 
the allegations.182  
Therefore, on 13 June 2008, the Trial Chamber judges established that the Prosecutor 
had abused Article 54(3) of the Statute and acknowledged that they were now in a 
situation where it would be difficult to guarantee a fair trial.183 This has also been 
admitted by the Deputy-Prosecutor, who declared at a status conference hearing, ‘[o]f 
course, there was never any intention on the side of the Prosecutor, and it was also 
understood as such by the United Nations, that these materials were received only for 
lead purposes. The point was to obtain these materials as quickly as possible for the 
sake of the ongoing investigation and then to allow the Office of the Prosecutor to 
identify the materials it wishes to use as evidence and then seek permission.’184 In this 
regard, Stuart has argued that the decision of the Trial Chamber to order the stay of the 
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proceedings and the release of the defendant constitute a reaction to the Prosecutor’s 
investigative methods.185 
In fact, the Prosecutor had been unable to carry out independent investigation and had 
relied on documents provided by the UN, NGOs or other agencies.186 As mentioned 
earlier in Chapter six, the UN peacekeeping mission and the European Union began 
work to stabilize the Ituri region in 2003.187 MONUC’s Human Rights Division has 
been a central player at both international and domestic levels, governmental and 
nongovernmental, influencing the DRC legal process, and has been involved in the 
investigation and prosecution of international crimes in the DRC.188 The European 
Union paid for a prosecutor to come to Ituri from Kinshasa, financing his salary and 
bringing him in from outside the region in an effort to ensure his impartiality and 
honesty. MONUC investigators facilitated the work of prosecutors by sharing factual 
information, meeting jointly with witnesses whom they had already interviewed in their 
investigation, and providing security for victims and witnesses. For a long while, they 
worked with the prosecutors on a daily basis.189  
The defendants and the victims needed lawyers, and so the NGO Advocats sans 
Frontieres found, coordinated, and paid local attorneys to represent both sides. Another 
UN agency began providing witness protection. As the cases moved toward trial, 
everything had to be rebuilt from the ground up; the EU repaired the courtroom, while 
an NGO repaired the prisons. The judges were paid by the EU but lived inside the 
MONUC military camp for their protection. All this time, MONUC and others were 
pressing for arrests and then for prosecutions.190 Notably absent in all of this was any 
participation by the ICC. Indeed, while MONUC investigators made a point of getting 
victims’ and witnesses’ permission to share their statements with the ICC, and while 
they did eventually share some of this information pursuant to a Memorandum of 
Understanding between MONUC and the ICC, this was a one way street. The ICC did 
not provide any resources for the investigations or prosecutions, nor did it play any 
other role in the process whatsoever.191 
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In terms of prosecutorial discretion in filing charges, it should be noted here that the 
Prosecutor brought only minimal charges against Lubanga, although he has been more 
expansive in charging Katanga and Ngudjolo. Lubanga was accused of three counts of 
war crimes involving children, leaving out other serious crimes in which he has been 
implicated.192 Phil Clark has written that the focus of the charges against Lubanga on 
child soldiers, while ‘highlight[ing] the plight of the thousands of child soldiers in 
Congo,’ has led ‘many Congolese [to be] angry that the ICC has not charged Lubanga 
with more serious crimes, including the mass murder, rape, mutilation, and torture for 
which the UPC is notorious.’193 This has also been criticized by Kleffer, who has argued 
that the ICC charges against Lubanga Dyilo could be amended to include conduct in 
relation to which the DRC had initiated criminal proceedings in their domestic courts, 
most notably the killing of UN peacekeepers on 25 February 2005.194 Schabas has 
pointed out that ‘the justice system of the Democratic Republic of Congo was doing a 
better job than the Court itself’, since Lubanga was being prosecuted in Congo for 
genocide and crimes against humanity that are more serious than those for which he is 
being prosecuted in The Hague.195 In fact, the Prosecutor could bridge the gap between 
universalism and cultural sensitivity concerns by ‘working with local government to get 
their system in shape rather than merely fighting off their efforts to resist ICC 
jurisdiction.’196 A group of international organizations has also observed that although 
conscripting and using children as soldiers in armed conflict are serious crimes, the 
failure to include additional charges in the case against Lubanga could undercut the 
credibility of the ICC in the DRC, both for the victims of these crimes and in terms of 
ending the culture of impunity.197 For an example of Lubanga’s potentially more serious 
crimes, in February-March 2003 UPC militias carried out a large-scale military 
operation called Chikana Namukono against the villages located between Lipri and 
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Nyangaraye. The operation, a veritable manhunt, resulted in the killing of at least 350 
persons and the complete destruction of 26 localities.198  
In addition, the Prosecutor has resisted investigating the wider dimensions of 
Lubanga’s crimes, notably the alleged training and financing of Lubanga’s UPC by the 
Ugandan and Rwandan governments, which could implicate key figures in these 
countries.199 It is important to mention here that although the Prosecution argued that its 
decision was dictated by the evidence, charging Lubanga on the basis that the conflict in 
Ituri was internal in character also had political benefits. The uncharitable might 
conclude that the Prosecutor’s decision was influenced by a desire to maintain good 
relations with the Ugandan Government, given the ongoing investigation into the 
situation in northern Uganda, which has resulted in the issuing of arrest warrants for 
five leaders of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), all as yet unapprehended.200 Having 
examined the evidence, the Chamber concluded that between July 2002 and June 2003 
an international armed conflict had existed in Ituri owing to the direct involvement of 
the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF). Relying heavily on the findings of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its judgment in the Armed Activities on the 
Territory of the Congo case,201 the Chamber concluded that until the withdrawal of its 
forces on 2 June 2003, Uganda had been in occupation of Ituri.202 In confirming charges 
under two separate provisions of the Rome Statute, Pre-trial Chamber I departed from 
the Prosecutor's assessment that the Ituri conflict was, at all relevant times, a conflict 
not of an international character.203 The Prosecutor had charged Lubanga as a co-
perpetrator under Article 8(2) (e) (vii) alone. The Pre- Trial chamber ruled, however, 
that from July 2002 to June 2 2003 the conflict could be seen as an international armed 
conflict involving Uganda and that from then until late December 2003, the conflict in 
Ituri was not of an international character.204  
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Conclusion:  
The essence of the Rome Statute and the aims of the complementarity mechanism are 
‘to encourage and facilitate the compliance of states with their primary responsibility to 
investigate and prosecute core crimes’.205 However, the practice of Prosecutorial policy 
in self-referral situations has led to a number of negative repercussions.206 Although the 
OTP highlighted positive complementarity in its policy paper and on many other 
occasions, the current prosecutorial policy in the DRC207 seems to be at variance with 
the positive complementarity approach.208 As Jurdi has suggested, the Prosecutor’s 
policy on the admissibility of inactions could in theory encourage national systems to 
prosecute core crimes; however, in reality it could lead to the opposite. The 
admissibility of all inaction scenarios regardless of inability or unwillingness could 
encourage states to be lazy in prosecuting core international crimes. A state that is 
willing and able can still relieve itself of the burden of prosecuting international crimes 
under the Rome Statute by refraining from taking any action. In such a situation, states 
will pass off the financial burden and the political difficulties inherent to trials of those 
most responsible for international crimes.209  
Baylis has claimed that the ICC has not involved itself in the promotion or support of 
domestic cases in the DRC. Instead, the ICC has been involved in its own 
investigations. In addition, the ICC outreach activities intend to publicize its work, but 
not by supporting or participating in domestic efforts at achieving justice.210 A reference 
to the ICC may in various cases be favoured for political motives since states may 
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prefer to ease certain pressures by passing on the burden of international justice.211 
Therefore, the prosecutorial policy of the ICC should prevent the ICC from becoming a 
‘judicial shopping forum for states able and willing to prosecute, but reluctant to 
exercise their duties under the Rome Statute.’212  
In the DRC, the Court focused on easier targets in the form of Lubanga, Germain 
Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo.213 In the Lubanga, Katanga and Ngudjolo cases, 
domestic authorities and MONUC had done most of the hard work of capturing the 
suspects and investigating their crimes. The Lubanga case, while addressing grave 
crimes, does not relate to the gravest of Lubanga’s crimes for fear these would greatly 
complicate the judicial process. The Lubanga, Katanga and Ngudjolo cases also 
represent the ICC’s attempts to maintain good working relations with the Congolese 
government in order to facilitate ICC investigations during ongoing conflict and to 
maintain the support of the Court’s principal donors in the context of the Congolese 
elections. This highlights a fundamental dilemma for the ICC, which often operates in 
fraught political and military environments. However, the ICC’s responses to this 
dilemma so far in the DRC have significantly undermined the Court’s legitimacy among 
affected populations, who had hoped it would finally hold accountable those most 
responsible for mass atrocities.214 
Schabas has claimed that that ICC investigations have focused unduly on non-state 
actors rather than agents of referring states, and asserts that this is because self-referrals 
entail an ‘implied compact with governments’215 and hence ‘prosecutions of only one 
side in the conflict seem to be the price of the self-referral strategy’ of the Prosecutor.216 
In addition, he has argued that both the Prosecutor and the Pre-Trial Chamber ‘seem to 
have been a bit impetuous in [the Lubanga] case, perhaps anxious to have a real 
defendant before the Court.’217 He adds that the offered interpretation of the Rome 
Statute is ‘more intrusive with respect to the criminal justice system of states than was 
ever intended.’218 This may also have an impact on many other states, encouraging them 
to ratify the Rome Statute in such a way that the Court will respect its promise to defer 
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to national proceedings.219 In the Lubanga case, the Pre-Trial Chamber did not discuss 
the crimes for which the accused had been charged in the DRC, despite the fact that he 
was awaiting trial on charges of genocide and crimes against humanity.220 Schabas has 
asserted that in such a context, where an accused person is also being prosecuted by 
national authorities for serious crimes, the determination of admissibility ‘should not be 
reduced to a mechanistic comparison of charges in the national and the international 
jurisdiction, in order to see whether a specific crime contemplated by the Rome Statute 
is being prosecuted directly or even indirectly.’221  
The performance of the Prosecutor has been explored in terms of the practical 
application of the complementarity regime through a set of linked case studies, the 
Darfur region of Sudan and the DRC. These two contrasting situations have produced 
different procedural mechanisms in order to satisfy the requirements of Article 17 of the 
Rome Statute. However, the way in which the Prosecutor executed his international 
legal and moral obligations has been criticised in both of these situations, although in 
different ways. Taking into account the necessity of cultural sensitivity in achieving 
justice, the Prosecutor must be able to reconcile the contradictions between the legal 
traditions that underpin the world’s major cultures and societies.  
Since independence, the Sudanese government has continually fluctuated between 
military and civilian rule. As a result of the government’s Islamization programme, 
Sudan represents an extreme example of an Islamic state under Shari’a. The current 
military government has control over the judiciary and has imposed Islamic law on the 
criminal justice system and the conduct of the courts. In addition, the government 
strongly supports Shari’a as an important part of its agenda to gain ideological influence 
in other African states with substantial Muslim populations.  
As noted in Chapter Four, since the UNSC referral of the Darfur situation to the 
Prosecutor, the Sudanese government has taken some action in response to violations of 
human rights in Darfur in order to demonstrate its ability to handle proceedings 
domestically. However, the observations of the UNCOI and other international 
organizations suggested that most cases before the special courts concern ordinary 
crimes and that the Sudanese authorities failed to process international crimes 
committed in Darfur. Moreover, concerns over the compatibility of Shari’a with 
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international human rights treaties binding on Sudan, and the lack of a formal definition 
of international crimes within the Sudanese legal system, seem to indicate a degree of 
uncertainty about genuine criminal proceedings. In other words, these criminal courts 
were designed to shield the accused from the ICC. For instance, Kushayb appeared to 
be under investigation in respect of a number of allegations, but no charges have yet 
been brought and no trial has been held.  
As far as prosecutor’s actions are concerned, following the receipt of the referral the 
ICC Prosecution initiated its own investigation in Darfur and the Sudanese government 
began to cooperate with the Prosecutor in his investigation of the matter. However, this 
cooperation ended when the Prosecutor requested that a senior government official be 
summoned to appear before the Court and the government refused to comply with the 
arrest warrants. In refusing to cooperate with the Prosecutor, the Sudanese government 
‘painted the ICC investigation as a Western-inspired plot to punish the regime and 
perhaps seek a regime change.’222 In the second case, the Prosecutor requested an arrest 
warrant against Sudanese President Al-Bashir, which has provoked critical reactions 
from African and Middle Eastern governments. The Al-Bashir administration accused 
the Court of ‘being part of a neo-colonialist plot against sovereign African and Muslim 
states.’223 The African Union also reacted negatively towards the ICC warrant against 
Al-Bashir and even African contracting parties to the Rome Statute considered a mass 
withdrawal from the work of the ICC.224 Finally, African Union suggested that a special 
hybrid court consisting of Sudanese and international judges should work alongside 
traditional justice mechanisms and bring to justice the perpetrators of the serious crimes 
committed in Darfur. Therefore, they decided not to enforce the ICC arrest warrant and 
Al-Bashir has since travelled to many countries in the region.  
The situation in the DRC has a completely different background and context, 
illustrating the diversity of prosecutorial strategies and the different ways in which the 
prosecutor’s discretion has been exercised. Given the fact that when the civil war had 
ended in 2003, the DRC government lacked legitimacy, the Prosecutor encouraged the 
government to refer the situation to the Court to investigate and try crimes, particularly 
those committed in the eastern region. As a result of this investigation, in 2006 the 
Prosecutor charged Thomas Lubanga with conscripting and using child soldiers, despite 
                                                 
222
 Nick Grono, Future of the World Court in Balance, YaleGlobal March 7, 2007    
223
 International Criminal Court Cases in Africa: Status and Policy Issues from 
fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/158489.pdf [accessed on 10th September 2011]  
224
 www.asil.org/rio/africanunion_sum09.html [accessed on 10th September 2011]  
 238 
the fact that people in Ituri expected the ICC to bring charges for his widespread killing 
of civilians, torture, rape and forced displacements.  
As in the Darfur situation, in the brutal conflicts in the DRC both rebel groups and 
armed forces under the control of the government carried out serious crimes. During the 
wars, there were serious problems in the Congolese criminal justice system, such as a 
lack of independence, a lack of personnel, corruption, etc. However, in contrast to the 
Darfur situation, the Prosecutor has ignored the Congolese government’s involvement 
in the country’s worst human rights abuses, including arbitrary executions and raping, 
robbing or extorting civilians. The Prosecutor has shown little interest in investigating 
or prosecuting any government officials in the DRC. This demonstrates the absence of 
an effective code of ethics, although the Prosecutor has claimed that his investigative 
decisions are based on four principles: independence, impartiality, objectivity, and non-
discrimination. In practice, however, the Prosecutor has focused on rebel groups in the 
DRC, something which has also been seen in other self-referral situations, leading to 
skepticism toward self-referrals. On the other hand, the Prosecutor has been accused of 
pursuing regime change in Sudan when seeking arrest warrants for Sudanese 
government officials. The Prosecutor’s functions have been seen as a neocolonial, anti-
Muslim assault on Muslim and African sovereignty. The AU Commission Chairperson 
also ‘reiterated assertions that the Hague tribunal is bullying Africa.’225 Moreover, 
Islamic states have made it clear in their response to the recent attempt by the ICC 
officials, late May 2011 in Doha, that many Islamic leaders ‘are deeply suspicious of 
the court's impartiality’.226   
The Prosecutor started criminal proceedings in the DRC with the Lubanga case, 
which saw both achievements and near-disasters for international justice and, after six 
years of proceedings, is entering its final phase. What is more, the Prosecutor ignored 
the tension between Western and traditional African ideas of justice, which give 
importance to social harmony.227 In fact, the Prosecutor has been overly focused on his 
own cases instead of aiding domestic efforts based on positive complementarity to 
achieve justice. In the two case studies, the Prosecutor has not carefully enough 
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considered the principle of equality and the presumption of innocence, and has not 
investigated incriminating and exonerating circumstances sufficiently.  
Therefore, it is suggested that the Prosecutor’s strategies in the selection of cases has 
had a negative impact on the legitimacy and impartiality of the ICC. This is due to the 
fact that ICC Prosecution has not been clear on what basis some ‘individuals have been 
the subject of warrants and of particular charges, while those of apparently equal 
culpability have not.’228 In addition, it could be suggested that the Prosecutor’s actions 
in opening cases against 26 individuals (13 of these are from the Darfur and DRC 
situations) in connection with five African countries has painted the ICC as a form of 
imperialism, prioritizing Africa over other regions. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
‘The greatest problem for the human species, the solution of which 
nature compels him to seek, is that of attaining a civil society which 
can administer justice universally.’ 
 Immanuel Kant 
 
Prior to the establishment of the International Criminal Court, the international 
community could act through the UN Security Council to create ad hoc international 
tribunals when states failed to fulfil their duties to either extradite or prosecute those 
responsible for international crimes. However, the problem of selectivity and the 
delivery of justice dependent on the will of the Security Council1 paved the way for a 
permanent international criminal court, focused on the rights and obligations of 
individuals2 and with an independent Prosecutor to investigate and prosecute alleged 
perpetrators of serious international crimes based on the complementarity regime. The 
uniqueness of the ICC, as Brown has noted, arises because it is an independent Court 
with global jurisdiction over crimes of concern to the entire international community, 
and has the power to prosecute those accused of violating fundamental international 
crimes regardless of their nationality.3 As Maget has suggested, the Rome Statute 
‘might well one day precipitate a revolution of Westphalian proportions which, 
although it may not do away with the state system, would certainly rest its legitimacy on 
an entirely different footing’.4  
My research set out to explore the moral and legal legitimacy of the prosecutorial 
decision-making process over whether to intervene when national jurisdictions are 
unwilling or unable to investigate and prosecute international crimes. Based upon a 
Kantian interpretation of the Rome Statute, setting up a judicial system that is 
complementary to the national jurisdictions and giving the power to the Prosecutor to 
intervene when desired, this process ‘promises to encourage evolutionary change as 
much as it threatens to transcend [the society of states]’.5 The ICC as a judicial 
institution is given a mandate to intervene in situations where heinous crimes are taking 
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place. The Court discharges its mandate through the Prosecutor via his or her 
preliminary examinations and investigations, which may cover a broad range of 
situations.6 As Olasolo has pointed out, the ICC’s well-timed intervention can play an 
important role in exercising the international community’s responsibility.7 In Chapter 
Two I noted that the ICC is an example of a global institution that is designed to 
prosecute and punish violations of cosmopolitan morality.8 The Court aims to secure 
justice for individuals9 and the intent of the drafters was to create a court that is 
acceptable to the nations of the world, since every country has a different policy and 
ideology to govern its criminal justice system.10 These issues are explored in Chapter 
Two from two possible ethical perspectives: that of Kant’s moral philosophy and that of 
Islamic law. I argued in Chapters Two and Three that moral obligations and political 
responsibilities do not end at national borders11 and that the Prosecutor’s moral duty to 
intervene in national jurisdictions pursuant to the complementarity regime is a crucial 
issue. In addition, as Roach has asserted, the cosmopolitan intent of the Court needs to 
be considered as key to its moral progress and such progress requires consistency in the 
use of Prosecutorial discretion.12 As such, one of the most important roles of the 
complementarity regime of the Rome Statute is to regulate the relationship between the 
Court and national jurisdictions in order to reduce the tension between the demands of 
states and those of world society.13 The ICC must therefore always give priority to the 
exercise of national jurisdiction. However, as Ross Cranston has observed, ‘states with 
well-developed criminal justice systems that have the ability and the capacity to 
investigate and prosecute international crimes would benefit more from this.’14 That is 
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to say, as Michael Akehurst has also noted, that ‘third World states often feel that 
international law sacrifices their interests to the interests of Western states.’15  
I applied Kantian moral philosophy as a mode of thinking in order to explore a 
potentially legitimate authority for the complementarity principle of the Court. The 
Court should focus on individual responsibility16 and deliver justice impartially, on 
behalf of the international community, for serious crimes committed against humanity.17 
As has been noted in Chapter Two, from a Kantian point of view, ‘a violation of rights 
in one place on earth is felt in all,’18 with the result that universal law (moral 
cosmopolitanism) ‘must form a supplement to the unwritten code of both state law and 
international law if the public rights of human beings are to be secured.’19 In this sense, 
states are no longer the privileged agent, but rather individuals are privileged ‘through 
the inception of complementary sovereignty in the emerging global society.’20 
Therefore, the principles of international justice should be compatible with the 
principles of internal justice based upon the Kantian categorical imperative,21 moral 
principles that need to be recognized universally. Kantian cosmopolitan law provides an 
appropriate setting within which to regulate global interactions, doing so in line with 
reason and the requirement of a civil condition of global public right.22 As such, I 
argued that a new form of sovereignty has emerged and the ICC is an example of the 
changing nature of sovereignty from one agent to another based upon the principle of 
complementarity.23 Furthermore, the chapter noted that this would be the result of ‘a 
slow-going evolutionary process’ for the purpose of the transformation of all kinds of 
power into one generally accepted or at least acceptable legal order.24 Thus, for Kant, 
there should be a cosmopolitan legal system in order to focus on the rightful condition 
of human beings regardless of their national origin or state citizenship.25 This leads, in a 
Kantian analysis, to perpetual peace which can be secured through a consistent 
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commitment to universal law26 and through a republican form of world government. For 
Kant, a democratic world government should be dedicated to ‘peace, justice, and well-
being for all people everywhere.’27  
In addition to the Kantian approach, I also take an Islamic law perspective in my 
research in order to explore the universal morality asserted by the ICC. As I wrote in 
Chapter Two, during the twentieth century a greater sense of a morality shared by the 
entire international community was observable both in the Islamic world, based upon 
classical Islamic knowledge, and in non-Muslim countries in attitudes towards cruel and 
inhumane treatments. Justice is a core value of Islamic law and an aspiration of all 
Muslims, having its roots in the principles and dictates of the primary sources of Shari’a 
(Qur’an and Sunnah).28 In general, the primacy of ethics over metaphysics is shared by 
both the Islamic and Western Kantian moral approaches; although in Islamic philosophy 
ethics are religious, whereas with Kant they are based on rationality.29 Highlighting this 
focal point, Islamic perspectives are explored in Chapter Two to analyse the 
compatibility of the values and principles of Shari’a with the existing norms of 
international criminal law. According to the Islamic philosophy of law, all human 
beings are subjects of divine law30 and the individual is considered as a member of a 
community of believers (ummah) regardless of the territory they reside in.31 Defenders 
of Islamic law have claimed that the world wide application of the Shari’a would result 
in universal freedom and justice,32 based on the will of God rather than the will of the 
moral majority or the will of a human lawmaker.33 
 I concluded that although there is a similarity in substance with Western human rights 
norms which are aimed at the establishment of universal justice, there are some 
difficulties that make the Islamic approach unlikely to provide justice to victims (on the 
Western idea of justice) unless global legal norms are interpreted with a liberal 
understanding of the non-Western norms of Islam. As I argued in Chapter Two, there 
are different categories of crimes in classic Shari’a criminal law and the range of 
punishments set out in the Islamic penal code differ from those under Western criminal 
law. In addition, different forms of discrimination can be found in the penal code of 
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Islamic countries, with men and women treated differently with regard to evidence and 
blood money. These rules are now included in most recent Islamic penal codes. For 
instance, one situation which puts women in an inferior legal position is that the 
pregnancy of an unmarried woman is regarded as conclusive proof of unlawful sexual 
intercourse. This approach has been adopted in Sudan, and if women want to report the 
incident to authorities, such a report constitutes a confession and they will face strict 
Islamic punishment.34 Furthermore, under classic Islamic criminal law, Muslims and 
non-Muslims do not always have the same rights. Here, different treatment exists in the 
fields of evidence, the law of retaliation and blood money, and with regard to the 
application of certain fixed penalties. As an example, under classical Islamic law the 
testimonies of non-Muslim witnesses are not admissible in Shari’a courts.35  
Most Islamic countries contributed to the negotiation process of the Rome Statute and 
demonstrated their interest in the creation of an international criminal court.36 However, 
the low level of ratification of the Rome Statute by Islamic countries shows that the 
practice of the Court has enjoyed little support from Islamic states, particularly in Africa 
and the Middle East. By taking an Islamic approach in analysing the moral legitimacy 
of the ICC intervention in national jurisdictions, I attempted to evaluate Islamic states’ 
concerns with respect to the global system of justice. Some Islamic states have 
complained that their sovereignty has not been protected by the ICC, and that Western 
states have used the principle of complementarity to preserve their own exercise of 
jurisdiction.37  
 Above all, the main concern of Islamic states is that the ICC focuses only on them 
(Islamic states), or on less developed countries. In fact, as Maget has noted, Islamic 
states believe that Western countries apply double standards and that decisions to resort 
to international criminal justice are only made against weak and developing countries,38 
while they ‘[turn] a blind eye to the violations of human rights norms committed by 
friendly nations.’39 Islamic officials’ fears are mainly based on allegations of selectivity 
of cases and political interference from the Security Council or other major powers, 
leading to mistrust toward the current system of international criminal justice.40  
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The Prosecutor, as a primary guardian of the complementarity regime of the ICC in 
exercising his or her power to initiate investigations and prosecutions, should aim to 
improve trust and encourage states to pursue cases. Complementarity, as Perrin has 
observed, seems ‘intellectually [a] simple concept . . . [however it] masks deep 
philosophical and political difficulties’41 that the Prosecutor must overcome to guide the 
ICC.42 As discussed in Chapters Three and Seven, in 2006 the Prosecutor adopted a 
positive approach to complementarity as one of the essential principles of the 
Prosecutorial strategy,43 seeking to encourage ‘genuine national proceedings where 
possible; [to rely] on national and international networks; and [to participate] in a 
system of international cooperation.’44 This positive approach aimed to promote 
national authorities by encouraging them to comply with their duties to investigate and 
prosecute those crimes which had already occurred.45 However, as Carsten has 
observed, ‘the nuances and limits of a 'positive' reading of complementarity are still 
unclear’46 and it has become ‘a paper exercise’.47 I argued in Chapter Seven that the 
practice of Prosecutorial policy in self-referral situations has led to a number of negative 
effects. In the DRC situation there has been a lack of a strategy for complementarity 
programming which could build domestic capacity, tap into existing rule-of-law 
programming, and deliver justice for atrocities.48 In Chapter Six I examined the fact 
that, in the Ituri cases, the result of the ICC decisions on the basis of complementarity 
has been widespread disappointment among judicial actors in Ituri. Despite the major 
legal reforms of the last seven years, they have been banned from prosecuting major 
atrocity suspects in local courtrooms.49 The Congolese judicial system, at least in 
certain areas of the DRC (including Kinshasa) was ‘able and willing’ to pursue cases;50 
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however, the Prosecutor indicated that the Ituri region of the DRC was his first priority 
to initiate investigation and prosecution.51  
 As Jurdi has asserted, the ICC could have made a more effective contribution to the 
Congolese judicial system if it had encouraged the judiciary to take primary 
responsibility, with the ICC’s function being to monitor the trial for the degree of 
conformity with human rights standards.52 However, the ICC has pursued its own 
investigations instead of promoting or supporting domestic cases in the DRC.53 
Moreover, according to Clark, the Court has focused on easier targets in the form of 
Lubanga, Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo.54 I analyzed these cases in Chapter 
Seven and highlighted the fact that two of the five individuals for whom the prosecution 
has sought arrest warrants in the situation in the DRC to date – Thomas Lubanga Dyilo 
and Germain Katanga – were the subject of domestic proceedings at the time that the 
ICC issued the arrest warrant. There is no evidence that the Court took these cases over 
due to the types of scenario described in the prosecution’s policy paper.55 More 
importantly, the DRC authorities had issued an arrest warrant for Lubanga in 2005 
charging him with the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity and the ordinary 
crimes of murder and illegal detention.56 However, in 2006 the Prosecutor charged him 
with the recruitment and use of child soldiers to participate actively in hostilities,57 
rather than the more serious crimes which were being prosecuted by the Congolese 
justice system. I critically discussed this instance of prosecutorial discretion in Chapter 
Seven, arguing that it has affected the legitimacy and credibility of the ICC in the DRC, 
both for the victims and in terms of ending the culture of impunity in this situation. 
Although positive complementarity was announced as a pragmatic approach to the 
division of labour and burden sharing, the practice of this strategy has carried negative 
effects, especially undermining the confidence of domestic judiciaries.58 In addition, 
Schabas has asserted that ICC investigations have focused unduly on non-state actors 
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rather than agents of referring states,59 and hence ‘prosecutions of only one side in the 
conflict seem to be the price of the self-referral strategy’ of the Prosecutor.60 According 
to Greenwalt, the selection prosecution in the ICC needs focus only on the select group 
of suspects who merit the attention of the ICC.61 As a result, the Prosecutor has been 
seen as biased and politically motivated in his selection of situations and cases.62 This 
conflicts with the principle that there must be an impartial, reliable, and depoliticized 
process for identifying the most important cases of international concern, evaluating the 
action of national justice systems with regard to those cases, and triggering the 
jurisdiction of the ICC when it is truly necessary.63 In this sense, the intervention of the 
Prosecutor in domestic jurisdictions, in accordance with the complementarity regime, 
should be exceptional and should only occur in situations where there is a failure of 
national authorities to conduct investigations and prosecutions, or where they claim to 
do so but in reality are unwilling or unable to genuinely carry out proceedings.64   
The first Review Conference on the Rome Statute, that took place in Kampala, 
Uganda, from 31 May to 11 June 2010, provided an opportunity to reflect on some key 
aspects of the Court’s regimes, such as complementarity. The complementarity regime 
was an important area of discussion because of the uniqueness of the ICC, which places 
a primary obligation on states to investigate and prosecute international crimes.65 The 
Assembly of State Parties (ASP) also noted in its report that focusing on this regime is 
crucial, as ‘it is imperative to further the fight against impunity both at the international 
and at the national level to ensure that any impunity gaps are closed.’66 A significant 
shift in the meaning of the term positive complementarity was proposed at the 
Conference, contrasting with that used by the Prosecutor, to the involvement of the 
Court in national proceedings. Instead, the emphasis was placed on strengthening 
national capacity and the involvement of states, international organizations, and civil 
society in capacity building activities,67 enabling the state to deal with other perpetrators 
and victims while the Court is investigating and prosecuting those bearing the greatest 
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responsibility for the most serious crimes.68 It was emphasized  that ‘the role of the 
Court in positive complementarity should be limited so as to ensure that the 
construction of national capacity would not interfere with the ICC’s judicial function or 
divert funds from investigations and prosecutions being carried out by the Court.’69 
Furthermore, it was stated that the judicial and prosecutorial independence of the Court 
must be taken into consideration in all situations, and actions under positive 
complementarity must not be misused to avoid justice.70 Finally, the application of 
positive complementarity can be useful not only in practice but also through its 
‘catalytic effect’.71  
The Prosecutor, based on his or her discretion, clearly has to make critical decisions 
such as in the selection of situations and cases.72 As Neresko has written, ‘… a wrong 
decision to prosecute, as well as a wrong decision not to prosecute, has the potential to 
undermine public confidence in the criminal process.’73 I detailed criticisms of the 
exercise of Prosecutorial discretion in the main body of my thesis by examining two 
different situations before the Court, the DRC and Darfur. As Stahn has observed, ‘the 
Prosecutor made himself vulnerable to criticism by using quantitative assessments of 
the crime scale or comparisons between groups or individual perpetrators to justify 
choices of selection’.74 Other criticisms include the suggestion that the Prosecutorial 
decision-making process has been subject to political guidance, something not helped 
by the fact that the Prosecutor does not consider for prosecution all admissible situations 
that fall within the jurisdiction of the Court.75 Chapters Five and Seven showed that, in 
the context of a self-referral or Security Council referral, it is crucial ‘to demonstrate 
objectivity in the investigation and selection of cases, in order to avoid the impression 
that ICC prosecutions appear politically motivated.’76  
Like the DRC, the referral of the Darfur situation to the Prosecutor - the first Security 
Council referral - has provided another good example of the ‘shadow side of 
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complementarity’;77 the exercise of Prosecutorial decision in this situation was 
examined in Chapters Four and Five. I analyzed the complexity of the Darfur crisis and 
the impact of the Islamization process in the Sudanese criminal justice system. I 
highlighted the fact that in the Sudanese legal system, political and legal processes are 
woven together in such a way that the courts are influenced by political power. The 
adequacy of the Sudanese criminal justice system in relation to the Darfur situation, and 
in the context of the complementarity regime, was the main theme of this case study. I 
argued that national authorities, in response to grave human rights breaches that have 
occurred in Darfur, took some actions to promote the national proceedings, such as the 
establishment of Sudanese special courts.78 In particular, after the announcement of the 
initiation of the investigation by the Prosecutor, they created the new Special Criminal 
Court on the Event in Darfur (SCCED) to demonstrate the government’s ability to 
pursue cases domestically.79  
Although Sudan is party to some Human Rights treaties such as the ICCPR and the 
Genocide Convention, and has signed the Rome Statute, Sudanese criminal law needs to 
be reformed to ensure human rights protection, particularly for the most vulnerable 
members of society, and in order to bring to justice the alleged perpetrators of the 
atrocities in Darfur.80 Many serious gaps remain between international standards and 
Sudan’s laws governing criminal matters and procedure, and ‘some gaps in due process 
are cited as cause for political grievances.’81 Importantly, Sudan’s legal system and the 
compatibility between Islamic law and human rights law may raise particular 
controversies.82 For instance, the Criminal Act of 1991 lays down many Islamic 
penalties which are inconsistent with the provisions of relevant international human 
rights treaties to which the Sudan is party. Such penalties include limb amputations for 
theft or robbery, public flogging for consumption or possession of alcohol, stoning to 
death for adultery, and the death penalty for apostasy and waging war against the state.83  
The findings of different international and national bodies have demonstrated that the 
Sudanese government continues to exercise its political will over the justice system. The 
local mechanisms in Darfur have failed to produce any transparent findings and charges 
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brought before the special Court did not reflect international crimes.84 For instance, Ali 
Kushyab, who is the subject of an outstanding ICC arrest warrant, has been charged 
with criminal offences but these have not yet come before a court.85 The importance of 
the Darfur situation is that it represents a challenge in the context of the 
complementarity principle to determine whether national proceedings were initiated for 
the ‘purposes of shielding the person from criminal responsibility,’ or were not 
conducted ‘independently or impartially.’86 In the case of the Prosecutor v. Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo, the Court decided that in order for a case to be inadmissible before the 
ICC under the complementarity principle as a result of concurrent national court 
proceedings, these proceedings must ‘encompass both the person and the conduct which 
is the subject of the case before the Court.’87 As I observed in Chapter Four, the SCCED 
completed thirteen cases, all of which were against low-level suspects, none of whom 
were charged with crimes of the same order as those in the Prosecutor’s Application 
against Harun or Kushaby.88  
As I discussed in Chapters Three and Five, bringing criminals to justice before any 
court requires a complex body of procedural law and the Prosecutor must address the 
issue of how to detect national failure in order to proceed, considering at what stage, 
how and by whom, the admissibility and prosecutorial discretion are to be settled.89 In 
the Darfur situation, I explored the Prosecutorial decision-making process on the 
admissibility assessment of the situation and cases. In this situation, although the 
Prosecution highlighted that admissibility assessment is an ongoing process that relates 
to the specific cases to be prosecuted by the Court, it was clear that the continuing 
insecurities in Darfur represented a serious obstacle to the conduct of effective 
investigation into alleged crimes even by national judicial bodies seeking to bring to 
justice those responsible.90 Therefore, investigation activities by the ICC have taken 
place outside Sudan in attempting to identify those individuals with greatest 
responsibility for the most serious crimes in Darfur.91 As the Prosecutor should not 
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make a decision for the purposes of satisfying popular opinion,92 the sensible approach 
is to clarify the criteria on the basis of which inability and unwillingness to prosecute 
should be determined.93 Based on my observations and analysis in the field, it is not 
clear upon what criteria the Prosecutor’s discretion is being based. As Danner has 
suggested, the articulation of public prosecutorial guidelines can assist the Prosecutor in 
establishing the legitimacy and transparency of his or her policies and discretionary 
decision-making.94 However, inconsistency of prosecutorial policy, based only on the 
governing principles of case strategy, challenges the legitimacy of prosecutorial 
discretion and ultimately the work of the ICC.95 The Darfur cases, particularly the Al-
Bashir case, pose challenges for the ICC in relation to the efficacy of the prosecutions 
of international crimes, which could undermine the legitimacy of the ICC.96 The 
Prosecutor was supposed to deal with legal cases, and as Kastner has pointed out, 
although political considerations must not be disregarded, rushing into indictments is 
not advisable. The question of the right timing in order to exercise a genuine threat 
while minimizing potential political risks will always be crucial.97 Otherwise, an arrest 
warrant issued for a sitting head of state (such as Al-Bashir) can be assumed to be ‘a 
demand for regime-change’98 or, as Peskin has asserted, the Prosecutor’s move can be 
seen as a strategic attempt to persuade Al-Bashir to hand over the suspects, something 
that is ‘emblematic of the Prosecutor’s propensity to play the politics of conciliation 
with a defiant state.’99 According to Rozenberg, targeting Al-Bashir was intended to 
demonstrate the ICC’s willingness to tackle difficult cases of high-ranking officials and 
to reestablish some of the legitimacy that the Court lost in Uganda and the DRC.100  
We can see, therefore, that impartial and effective investigation should be guaranteed 
and the judicial system should be independent in its work. The exercise of discretionary 
power by the Prosecutor must be based on a set of criteria such as transparency, 
independence, and freedom from political interference in prosecutorial policy. Ethical 
principles should be used to formulate a comprehensive policy to guide the Prosecutor 
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in determining which situations to investigate and which cases to prosecute. These 
ethical principles are particularly relevant to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion 
‘when the ordinary meaning of statutory provisions pertaining to the Prosecutor's 
functions is indeterminate’.101 Lepard has suggested that fundamental ethical principles 
are logically related to ‘a pre-eminent ethical principle of unity in diversity’. The 
principle of unity in diversity maintains that all human beings should seek to be unified 
as members of one human family while respecting one another's right to diversity of 
language, religion, and culture, and individual freedom of thought, conscience, belief, 
and expression.102   
The ICC as a global Court should also set national standards in order to develop 
appropriate domestic criminal justice for adjudicating crimes against humanity, 
genocide, and war crimes. This is a consequence of the principle of complementarity 
and the fact that it allows the ICC to proceed with a case only when a state is not 
genuinely doing so itself.103 Given that there is considerable diversity among states and 
their conceptions of justice, the ICC as a global institution would be wise to respect 
these differences to the fullest extent compatible with its mission. This respect is what 
underlies the ‘margin of appreciation’ that the European Court of Human Rights 
provides to its constituent states in judging their disparate human rights practices.104 
Blumenson writes, ‘the ICC cannot expect to escape severe constraints and complex 
moral dilemmas, but it can expect to be an integral part of the movement towards 
international justice’.105 In particular, the Prosecutor should endeavour to explain his or 
her decisions by reference to ethics, and not solely on the basis of juridical criteria, 
which, as we have seen, the Rome Statute often leaves vague.106 As Goodale and Clarke 
have stated, simply holding a criminal trial does not guarantee the ‘societal shift of 
perceptions and consciousness that must accompany the building of a culture of 
rights’.107 Moreover, creating a global commitment to combating impunity entails the 
‘construction of a complete worldview’ that includes the evolution of subjective 
meaning.108  
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An understanding of cultural diversity would have a great impact on the efficiency of 
the ICC as an international criminal tribunal and it would also affect those who are 
supposed to benefit from the Court, i.e. actual participants (accused, witnesses and 
victims) and affected populations.109 Thereafter, national courts could offer more 
appropriate sites of adjudication.110 A shared understanding of justice enables the 
national judicial authorities to deliberate and to resolve disputes involving citizens in a 
way that is reasonable in the eyes of all citizens. From this point of view, the 
adjudication of disputes among citizens in the national courts serves to secure 
legitimacy in judgment in the eyes of the disputing parties and others whose rights or 
interests are affected.111  
Given the fact that the ICC will be able to deal with only a few situations at a time - 
and only a few cases within those situations - the Court should consider the 
development and action of effective national justice. The Rome Statute’s 
complementarity provisions are designed to assure a decentralized system responsive to 
municipal norms and interests by limiting ICC jurisdiction to cases where the state has 
failed to prosecute.112 Laplanted has suggested this be implemented in the form of the 
admissibility examination set out in Articles 17-20 of the Rome Statute. However, this 
leads to two notable consequences that could undermine the wider effectiveness of the 
ICC in attaining its broader mission. First, the ICC will remain completely removed 
from many local efforts to harmonize national systems with international norms. At the 
same time, the ICC will be removed from many important domestic criminal 
proceedings despite the fact that these trials involve a significant number of the world's 
worst offenders, whose trials constitute important contributions to international 
jurisprudence and directly impact upon the ICC's own work to assure uniformity in 
prosecutions of international crimes.113 Secondly, this strict interpretation of the ICC's 
mandate also means that it will miss the opportunity to offer the subtler forms of 
international support that can often create a ‘moral suasion’.114  
The power of complementarity should be understood to be much more than a simple 
last-resort court for failed domestic prosecutions.115 The Court can take on a monitoring 
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function, with states parties themselves undertaking criminal investigations, by 
providing outreach, technical assistance, and guidance116 to assure the more effective 
and efficient functioning of national criminal prosecution. Such strategies could help 
‘shift the burden of prosecution back to states,’117 whilst the Prosecutor ‘must give 
significant weight to the ethical principle that crimes morally must be punished in some 
fashion and that violators must be held to account’.118 In fact, ‘a less hierarchical 
international criminal justice system that relies on national governments is likely to be 
better informed by diverse perspectives, more acceptable to local populations, and more 
effective in accomplishing its ultimate goals.’119 This is in line with the horizontal 
power of the ICC and decentralizing its power to make it acceptable and justifiable to 
all nations.  
Akhavan has suggested that the success of the ICC is inherently linked to the exercise 
of national jurisdiction and that positive complementarity is an incentive for domestic 
trials, although it may not be enough.120 As Bassiouni has claimed, ‘the experience of 
the ICC thus far illustrates an international court requires an exorbitant economic and 
administration infrastructure.’121 Therefore, a shift from supranational criminal courts to 
national courts will be more successful in prosecuting the guilty. The transformation of 
international criminal justice will essentially be an incremental evolution of 
complementarity, an evolution that will require national criminal justice to assume the 
roles and functions of that complementarity.122 
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Methodology 
 
Socio-legal approach: 
This doctoral thesis employed socio-legal approach in order to explore the operation 
of the ICC in two different situations, the DRC and the Darfur region of Sudan. By 
using the socio-legal approach, this thesis attempted to examine the actual practice of 
the legal procedures that are used within the Court with regard to the complementarity 
regime. The socio-legal perspective covers the social and political dimensions of human 
activity in different situations and is concerned with the analysis of social phenomena 
with an emphasis on the exercise of power.1 The need to study what is actually taking 
place in practice rather than focus on the law in the books led me to adopt this  approach 
to my research. This type of research investigates law in action and the actions of legal 
officials within different circumstances, which are simply beyond the scope of doctrinal 
analysis.2 In other words, the socio-legal approach examines the social and political 
considerations which influence the operation of procedures. It investigates law in 
society and gathers data wherever it is appropriate to the problem, rather than focusing 
on case laws and statutes.3 In addition, socio-legal research focuses on ‘the various 
cultural, economic and political consequences of the selective enforcement of different 
laws by officials, including the basis on which discretion is being exercised in 
practice.’4 
 
Choice of methods: 
The qualitative method of conducting research is one of the major techniques in the 
socio-legal approach to research. The reason for choosing a qualitative research method 
was to explore and build up an understanding of the complex factors that affect legal 
proceedings. The flexibility of qualitative methods can develop further insights as they 
emerge through work in the field.5 As Creswell has noted, the purpose of qualitative 
                                                 
1
 Jupp, V. and P. Davies (2000). Doing Criminological Research. London, Sage. p. 173.  
2
 Salter, M. and J. Mason (2007). Writing Law Dissertations: An Introduction and Guide to the Conduct 
of Legal Research. Harlow, Pearson Education Limited. p. 126.  
3
 Thomas, P. A., Ed. (1997). Socio-Legal Studies. Socio-Legal Studies. Aldershot, Dartmouth Publishing 
Company. p. 99.  
4
 Salter, Op, cit., p. 152.  
5
 Sieber, J. E., Ed. (1982). The Ethics of Social Research: Surveys and Experiments. New York, Springer-
Verlag. p. 182.  
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research is ‘to understand a particular social situation, event, role, group or intention’.6 
A variety of methods of data collection can be used to conduct this style of research. In-
depth interviews and participant observation are the two most commonly used.7 In this 
thesis, these methods were used in combination with other data gathering strategies, 
such as: analysis of published statements by professionals, the reports of international 
and national organizations, and internal professional conduct regulations. Documents 
and secondary sources provide an initial overview of the issue under examination, 
whilst interviews with key players can produce new data that will advance the research 
process as well as providing a better understanding of the particular issue.8  
 
Participant observation and interview: 
Participant observation, as Burgess has declared, allows the researcher to work with 
individuals in their natural settings.9 By using this strategy, I could join in with 
everyday activities and talk informally with group members, building mutual trust and 
gaining a deeper knowledge and understanding in my research topic than an outsider 
would be able to. Field research is a learning situation and enables the researcher to 
study actions and activities as they occur in real situations.10 Going into the field to 
conduct research and confronting the real world is very different from theoretical 
expectations.11 There are no rules that can be applied to the field setting,12 and as 
Halliday has written, ‘we should not expect the prescriptions of research methods found 
in the text books to be perfectly mirrored in the research process.’13 Conducting 
fieldwork interviews is one of the major techniques in the qualitative research method,14 
which explores specific topics, events or happenings.15 The qualitative interview 
explains the importance of the views and interpretations of certain social actors 
                                                 
6
 Creswell, J. (2003). Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods. London, Sage.  
p. 198.  
7
 Henn, M., M. Weinstein, et al. (2006). A Short Introduction to Social Research London, Sage. p. 160.  
8
  www.lse.ac.uk/collections/EPIC/events/Interviewing.pdf [Accessed on 5th September 2011]  
9
 Burgess, R. G., Ed. (1991). Field Research: A Sourcebook and Field Manual. Cambridge, Routledge.  
p. 2.  
10
 Ibid., p. 1. 
11
 Halliday, S. (2009). Conducting Law and Society Research : Reflections on Methods and Practices. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. p. 4.  
12
 Burgess, Op, cit., p. 16. 
13
 Halliday, Op, cit., p. 2. 
14
 Richards, D. (1996). "Elite Interviewing: Approaches and Pitfalls." Politics 16(3): 199-204. p. 201. 
15
 Rubin, H. and I. Rubin (1995). Qualitative Interviewing: The Art of Hearing Data. London, Sage.  
p. 3.  
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regarding the research questions.16 Through this process, knowledge is constructed 
based on conversation between research interviewer and interviewee,17 in order to 
obtain a realistic description of a situation.18  
 
Field research in The Hague: 
I have always been fascinated by criminal justice and exploring how it operates and 
impacts upon societies. I decided to conduct my doctoral research into criminal justice 
in an international context for practical trial experience. I chose the ICC because it is a 
completely new type of institution, the first permanent international criminal court. I 
decided to focus on ICC prosecution and to conduct my fieldwork in The Hague.   
The main means of undertaking my research was an Internship programme at the ICC. 
This helped me greatly to conduct my research into the prosecutorial decision-making 
process of the complementarity regime. My research was unusual for a PhD in that I 
prepared to go into the field at an early stage of my research project. During the 
preparation for the fieldwork, I spent much time in the library reading as widely as 
possible around my research topic. I also read textbooks about interviewing elites and 
started to identify some potential interviewees. In addition, I prepared the interview 
protocol and informed consent letters for my interviewees.  
There were a few problems at the outset of the field research. In particular, I felt that I 
did not have complete control of my project while I was working as an intern. But 
gradually, working in the Court gave me confidence and I tried to learn as much as I 
could about my research subject. I kept my research journal from the earliest day of my 
research project, particularly when I entered the field. I recorded my experience of 
conducting my research, most importantly, what others and I thought and felt about 
what was happening and key moments where I thought there was a shift in the way 
things were happening. Keeping a log of personal responses towards the research 
process allowed me to become more conscious of how my ideas and feelings about my 
research subject may influence the way I collect and analyse data, and helped me to 
keep an open mind, and challenge my personal assumptions and beliefs. It was often 
useful for me to go over the notes at later points to add further insights and think about 
                                                 
16
 Dunne, M. and P. Yates (2005). Becoming a researcher: A Research Companion for the Social 
Sciences. Berkshire, Open University Press.  p. 27.  
17
 Kvale, S. (1996). InterView: An Introduction to Qualitative Research Interviewing London, Sage.  
p. 14.  
18
 Rubin, Op, cit., p. 81.  
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the kinds of support and the actions I needed to take in order for the research to 
progress. Therefore, although I did not refer to my research journal specifically in the 
thesis, my field notes initially informed my understanding of two case studies, the 
Darfur and Ituri situations. In fact, it was the basis of my understanding of the 
importance of cultural sensitivity in relation to the operation of the complementarity 
regime of the Court, in a manner which would be legitimate and relevant to local 
culture. Also my field notes often led to informal, conversational interviews about a 
code of prosecutorial ethics and guidelines.   
 
Semi-structured and in-depth interviews: 
Semi-structured interviews are a way of capturing the point of view of a person and 
getting inside information. Using this technique, the researcher may ask some questions 
which are structured and some that are open-ended.19 Unstructured questions allow the 
researcher to collect a lot of information from a few people about the different 
dimensions of a concept,20 and encourage interviewees to respond in their own terms. 
As Burgess has pointed out, the researcher can obtain a lot of rich materials and become 
aware of new dimensions to a problem through a natural conversation, allowing people 
to speak freely in relation to the research problem.21 This flexible method is a 
particularly good choice in situations where there is only one chance to interview 
someone - for instance, when the researcher is dealing with elite members of a 
community, institution, etc.22 As elites have an important role in the structure and 
context of judicial institutions, data collection techniques for interviewing elites about 
the ‘politics of law and order’ are key to understanding the political-social context of the 
policy-making process.23 Another major advantage of conducting semi-structured 
interviews is that they can enable the researcher to move beyond written accounts and 
collect first hand information about the underlying context.  
In-depth interviews are much less formal than the semi-structured interview and the 
researcher may ask only a few thoughtful questions to collect complex information and 
personal experiences. In other words, in-depth interviews allow ‘interviewees to talk 
                                                 
19
 May, T. (2001). Social Research: Issues, Method and Process. Buckingham, Open University Press. p. 
123.  
20
 Bernard, H. R. (2000). Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches. London, 
Sage. p. 191.  
21
 Burgess, Op, cit., p. 108.  
22
 Bernard, Op, cit.,  
23
 Jupp, Op, cit., p. 176.  
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about the subject in terms of their own frames of reference and enable [the] interviewer 
to maximize her or his understanding of the respondent’s point of view.’24 In-depth 
interviews may provide a more relaxed atmosphere and may offer a more complete 
picture of what happened and why. However, the researcher should always come back 
to the point and keep the discussion moving in a direction relevant to the research 
problem.25  
Conducting interviews in the early stages of the data collection phase, I tried to be 
open and sensitive to new ideas and new suggestions in what respondents were saying. I 
developed several strategies to choose my interviewees. I knew that I needed people 
who were familiar with the Court proceedings and those who were dealing with cases 
before the ICC. Prior to the interview, I emailed people who were willing to be 
interviewed and explained about my research, giving them a general idea about our 
discussion in advance. I began my interviews with open-ended questions. Most of the 
time, when I started to talk about my research project they would become interested in 
the project, which was a great help. The legal officers and trial lawyers I interviewed 
were particularly informative. Their insights gave me further questions to pose to people 
who played different roles in different divisions of the Court. At the end of every 
interview, I asked who had experience and knowledge relevant to my research subject. 
In this way, one contact led to another as they introduced me to other legal officers. 
Furthermore, I could develop a research network and conducted interviews with people 
outside the ICC, who have specialised competence in the relevant field. It should be 
reiterated here that confidential information from anonymous sources with third parties 
helped me in some stages of the research process. However, as ethical considerations 
were of importance in the collection and use of data, before using their materials, I gave 
promises to the participants that their identity and details of their information would not 
be disclosed in the thesis and would be completely protected. On a couple of occasions, 
I sent them my ideas and they gave me very helpful feedback about the points that I had 
made.  
The recording of data is an important issue during interview research, particularly in 
unstructured or semi-structured interviews.26 I found that my interviewees did not agree 
to being recorded as we were discussing Court practices. Therefore, in order to manage 
                                                 
24
 Henn, Op, cit., p. 161.  
25
 Burgess, Op, cit., p. 107. 
26
 Ibid., p. 45.  
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and organize my data, I decided to rely on my notes. As Henn has pointed out, the 
purpose of note taking is to make sense of what is observed and discussed for future 
reference.27 I recorded my interview data by writing down brief notes, a few key phrases 
or sentences so that I could rework and reconstruct my notes later in the same day and 
come very close to what people had said. On a few occasions I had the chance to 
conduct a second interview and could thus double-check my understanding and my 
notes.  
After I left the field, I had clear ideas about the significant issues that had emerged in 
the fieldwork and about the way in which I needed to present and analyze them. I 
started by reviewing the literature and organizing my field notes. In this, both of my 
doctoral supervisors were extremely supportive, especially Dr. Vogler who was very 
helpful to me in devising the structure of my argument based on my fieldwork findings.  
 
Ethical issues in qualitative research: 
Empirical socio-legal research may have a range of possible ethical issues. By caring 
about ethics and by acting on that concern the researcher can promote the integrity of 
their research.28 As Salter has pointed out, potential ethical conflicts exist with regard to 
‘protecting confidentiality with respect to how data is both used and published, 
obtaining fully informed consent from research participants, and avoiding interventions 
that damage the welfare of such participants.’29 I explained the purpose of the interview 
and I was truthful and straightforward about the study objectives in order to earn their 
trust for addressing sensitive issues in relation to my research topic. I committed myself 
to guarantee promises of confidentiality made to my research participants. I attempted 
to enhance the protection of confidentiality for participants who had contributed 
personal information by the anonymisation of data which would have identified real 
names, and personal information. My data was coded.  
To a large extent, discussion about ethics in social research tends to focus on these 
issues of consent, privacy, harm, confidentiality, and anonymity.30 Informed consent is 
central to ethical discussions. Participants should have given their informed consent to 
                                                 
27
 Henn, Op, cit., p. 194. 
28
 Israel, M. and I. Hay (2006). Research Ethics for Social Scientists: Between Ethical Conduct and 
Regulatory Compliance. London, Sage. p. 5. 
29
 Salter, Op, cit., p. 164. 
30
 Henn, Op, cit., p. 69. 
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take part in a research study before being involved in any research activities.31 
Discussion of confidentiality is also part of the informed consent process.32 However, 
there may be difficulties with informed consent in situations where participants are part 
of a hierarchical work structure. In these situations, the anonymity of participants can 
encourage them to take part and ensures that data cannot be identified with even a 
specific department.33 As Henn has noted, having granted anonymity to the research 
participants, the researcher must protect their identity and ensure that they can not be 
identified on publication of the research.34 One of the advantages of anonymity is that it 
allows participants to feel free and confident to express their true feelings in an 
objective manner.35 Anonymity is also a key method that the researcher may use as the 
starting point for a discussion of confidentiality and as a way to explore sensitive 
issues.36 It is important to note that as part of the informed consent process, participants 
should be told that participation is voluntary and they have the right to refuse or 
withdraw from the interview at any time without giving any notice or any explanation.37   
 
Limitations: 
Despite the aforementioned advantages of qualitative data collection techniques, there 
were also some disadvantages or limitations. The main disadvantage of participant 
observation was that it was time-consuming and circumstances could be difficult for my 
research. It was also hard to decide which observations were significant and who to 
observe at various stages of my research. With regard to interviews, it was difficult to 
strike a balance between having control of the interview and leaving space for the 
participant to take control. It was also difficult to compare answers and identify 
unnecessary information in addition to transcribing and analyzing the data. 
Confidentiality issues were another limiting factor during the field research. In fact, it 
was sometimes difficult to have productive conversations due to the confidential nature 
of the procedures regarding the application of the complementarity regime in different 
situations. It was also difficult to discuss ongoing proceedings before the ICC.  
                                                 
31
 Oliver, P. (2003). The Student's Guide to Research Ethics. Maidenhead, Open University Press.  
p. 28.  
32
 Ibid., p. 82. 
33
 Ibid, p. 29. 
34
 Henn, Op, cit., p. 85. 
35
 Oliver, Op, cit., p. 78. 
36
 Ibid., p. 81. 
37
 Ibid., p. 47. 
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